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ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces two essays with the focus on alternative approaches to em-
pirical research in economics. The first essay uses a reduced-form approach to address a
“macro-phenomenon:” the long-standing puzzle of China’s high household saving rate. The
second essay employs a structural model to evaluate the social welfare of a procurement
mechanism: the A+B auction.
In the first essay, we study the role of income inequality interacting with liquidity con-
straints in explaining the high household saving rate in China. The predictions implied by a
simple lifecycle heterogeneous agent model are consistent with data facts. Using three large
nationally representative data sets, China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS), and Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), we find robust evi-
dence that (1) the rich save more; (2) the poor are more likely to face liquidity constraints,
and the effect of liquidity constraints on household saving rate is significantly positive; (3)
income inequality has a significant positive effect on aggregate household saving rate; and
(4) the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income for poor households is
significantly higher than for rich households. Our study provides a policy implication that
economic policy of reducing income inequality would lower the aggregate saving rate and
thus become a policy of economic transition and growth.
In the second essay, we investigate an innovative and widely used contracting mecha-
nism, the A+B auction, in highway procurement projects. We introduce a structural model
with time incentives/disincentives and construction uncertainties under which contractors’
actual working days may deviate from the bidding days in the construction phase. This
may make the A+B mechanism neither ex-ante nor ex-post efficient. We demonstrate that
the model primitives including the contractor’s cost function, distribution of private types,
and incentive/disincentive parameters are all nonparametrically identified. Using the data
from highway procurement auctions in California, we provide strong empirical evidence that
ii
considering the existence of uncertainty in the structural analysis would lead to a significant
efficiency loss. On average, the ex-ante (ex-post) welfare loss is 38% (37%) of the contract
value. Counterfactual time incentive contracts under A design would decrease the ex-ante
(ex-post) total costs by 26% (36%) of the contract value, with an average reduction of $2.6
million ($3.7 million).
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The primary focus of the dissertation is to apply alternative empirical methods to address
critical economic questions.
In the first paper, we investigate the role of income inequality interacting with liquidity
constraints in explaining the high household saving rate in China. In a simple two-period
model, households are heterogeneous in income and subjective discount factor, and whether
the liquidity constraint is binding, consumption and saving rate are endogenously deter-
mined. The model generates several predictions consistent data facts: (1) the rich save
more; (2) the proportion of constrained households for the poor is higher than that for the
rich; (3) liquidity constraints would increase household saving rate. (4) when income in-
equality increases, the rich save even more, in the meanwhile, the poor would also save more
due to the binding liquidity constraints, and thus the aggregate household saving rate would
rise.
Using three sources of large, nationally representative household survey data, the China
Household Finance Survey (CHFS), the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and the Chi-
nese Household Income Project (CHIP), we provide direct empirical evidence implied by
the theoretical model. We find that in China, (1) the top 20 percent permanent income
households’ saving rate is 19–23 percent significantly higher than the bottom 20 percent
households’. (2) the bottom 20 percent permanent income households are more likely to
face a borrowing constraint, with a 12–20 percent significantly higher probability; (3) the
existence of liquidity constraints would lead to a significant increase of more than 20 percent
in the household saving rate; (4) income inequality would have a significant positive impact
on the household saving rate at the county level, with a 1 point on a scale of 100 measure
increase in the Gini coefficient leading to an increase of 0.2 percent in the aggregate saving
rate; (5) the estimated MPC for the top 20 percent households range from 200 to 400 RMB
per 1000 RMB, while for the bottom 20 percent households, the range from 600 to 900 RMB
1
per 1000 RMB.
These findings would have significant policy implications. The Chinese government’s
policies on reducing the saving rate have not yet produced substantial results. If income
inequality and liquidity constraints were the key reasons for the high aggregate household
saving rate, the resulting policy would be drastically different. For example, it is appropriate
for the Chinese government to design some income redistribution programs (such as EITC) to
reduce income inequality or devote more resources to support the credit market development.
An economic policy of tackling income inequality would lower the aggregate saving rate, thus
becoming a policy of economic transition and growth.
In the second essay, we study the A+B procurement contracts in the context of high-
way projects construction. We set up a structural model that features by time incen-
tives/disincentives, externalities, and construction risks. We explain why contractors often
do not complete the projects on time. This discrepancy may make the A+B mechanism
neither ex-ante efficient nor ex-post efficient. We show that the model components (the
marginal expediting cost function, the distribution of private type for contractors, and the
incentive/disincentive daily rate) are all identified from the contract level and bid level data.
We apply the model to analyze the data on the Caltrans auctions of highway procurement
contracts. Our estimates provide substantial evidence that considering the existence of im-
plement uncertainty in the structural analysis of bidding data leads to significant inefficiency.
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2. INCOME INEQUALITY, LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS, AND CHINA’S
HOUSEHOLD SAVING RATE
2.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been growing at an average annual
rate of nearly 10 percent, and now it becomes the second largest economy in the world.
One of the unique features of Chinese economy is the high and rising household saving rates:
China’s aggregate household saving rate has exceeded 35 percent in the recent decade, which
is one of the highest in the world.1 China’s high household saving rate may already have
real implications for the world economy. In 2005, Ben Bernanke, then a governor of the
Federal Reserve Board, argued that China’s large surpluses have adverse effects on richer
countries’ current accounts and financial markets. In fact, another unique feature of the
Chinese economy over the same period should not be ignored: China’s household income
inequality has been among the world’s worst.2 Put them together, between 1992 and 2015,
China’s household saving rate has been increasing steadily from 33.98 to 37.07 percent, in the
meanwhile, Chinese households income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient has also
risen from 0.390 to 0.462.3 Are the two simultaneously existing unique features of Chinese
economy correlated? In this paper, we examine the role of income inequality interacting
with liquidity constraints in explaining the high household saving rate in China.
To date, there are some compelling explanations on the “Chinese Saving Puzzle” (first
refered by Modigliani and Cao, 2004) in the literature, including (1) demographic changes
(Modigliani and Cao, 2004; Horioka and Wan, 2007; Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark, 2015; İmro-
horoğlu, Zhao, et al., 2017; Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2013; Ge, Yang, and Zhang,
2012); (2) precautionary saving motives (Meng, 2003; He, Huang, Liu, and Zhu, 2017; Cha-
mon and Prasad, 2010; Wang and Wen, 2012); (3) gender imbalance and competitive mo-
1See panel (1) of Figure A.1 in Appendix.
2See panel (2) of Figure A.1 in Appendix.
3See Figure A.3 in Appendix.
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tives (Wei and Zhang, 2011); (4) high income growth and habit formation (Horioka and
Wan, 2007), co-residence effects (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2014), financial choices (Cooper
and Zhu, 2017).4 No consensus has emerged, and the puzzle remains.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature on China’s household saving rate is
that we make the first endeavor to bridge income distribution with China’s household saving
rate and provide consistent and comforting micro-level evidence. Inspired by the literature
on heterogeneous agent model in macroeconomics (Aiyagari, 1994; Achdou, Han, Lasry,
Lions, and Moll, 2017), we build up a simple two-period model which links household saving
rates to income inequality and liquidity constraints. Specifically, in this model, households
are assumed to be different in two dimensions: (i) heterogeneity in initial wealth and flow
income, with a particular case of two types, the rich and the poor; (ii) heterogeneity in
time preference thereby in subjective discount factor, with a particular case of three types,
the impatient, the less patient, and the patient. Also, we assume that households may face
liquidity constraints.5 Given a household’s type of income and discount factor, whether the
liquidity constraint is binding, consumption and saving rate are endogenously determined
in the model. With this simple model, we provide several implications consistent with data
facts: (1) the rich save more; (2) the proportion of constrained households for the poor
is higher than that for the rich; (3) Liquidity constraints would increase household saving
rate. (4) when income inequality increases, the rich save even more, in the meanwhile, the
poor would also save more due to the binding liquidity constraints, and thus the aggregate
household saving rate would rise.
Using three sources of large, nationally representative household survey data, the China
Household Finance Survey (CHFS), the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and the Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP), we provide direct empirical evidence implied by the
4For a a comprehensive review of the facts and explanations pertaining to China’s saving, see Yang,
Zhang, and Zhou (2012).
5Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) indicate that as long as the institutional barriers (such as a lack of consumer
credit, or capital market imperfections leading to credit rationing) are present, there will be liquidity con-
straints in the economy. Financial development in China, although has been improving over the past decades,
is still underdevelopment. Thus, assuming liquidity constraints exist is reasonable.
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theoretical model. First, we regress the household saving rate on current income quintile
dummies to estimate the differences in the saving rate between higher income quintile and
the lowest. We find a robust positive relationship between the saving rate and current income
across all income classes in all three data sets. For example, for the CHFS, the estimated
increments in the median household saving rate range from 30 percent in the second lowest
income quintile to above 70 percent in the highest, and they are strictly increasing from
the lowest income quintile to the highest. We continue to find a highly significant positive
association when using subsample regressions and three years average income to correct the
endogeneity problem for the current income. Estimated saving rate differences range from
35 percent to 82 percent in the CHFS for the subsample regressions, and from 5 percent
to 19 percent for the average income approach. The positive relationship is even more
pronounced when we exclude high-income entrepreneurs, drop younger households (below
age 60), use an alternative definition of saving rate as a dependent variable, and apply per
capita income to redefine income quintiles. Overall, in China, the top 20 percent permanent
income households’ saving rate is 19–23 percent significantly higher than the bottom 20
percent households’.
We then exploit the probit regression to examine if poor households are more likely
to face liquidity constraints. We use two ways to measure whether or not household i is
facing a liquidity constraint, that is, the variable LCi = 1. One is the definition in Zeldes
(1989a), which states that a household is liquidity constrained if the total value of financial
assets is less than two months permanent income. Another is directly from our CHFS
questionnaire, which asks respondent “Does your family have any credit cards, excluding
inactivated cards?” Our estimates indicate that estimated marginal effects of the income
quintiles on the probability of facing liquidity constraints range from 2 percent for the quintile
4 to 10 percent for the quintile one using measure the first definition in the CHFS. The effects
are even more significant when using the second measure. In sum, the bottom 20 percent
permanent income households are more likely to face a liquidity constraint, with a 12–20
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percent significantly higher probability.
To evaluate the effect of liquidity constraints on the saving rate, we design a difference-
in-difference approach (DID) applying to the CHFS and the CFPS. Only the households
that are credit constrained in 2013 (2012) from CHFS (CFPS) data are used as the whole
sample. We separate them into two groups: treatment group, defined as the unconstrained
households in the year 2015 (2014), and the comparison group, defined as the constrained
group in the year 2015 (2014). We show that the existence of liquidity constraints would
lead to a significant increase of more than 20 percent in the household saving rate.
Next, we address the research question what the general equilibrium effect of the ag-
gregate household saving rate from a rise in the income inequality. We perform the cross-
sectional regression that links the calculated county-level aggregate saving rate to the mea-
sure of income inequality for all three data sets, controlling for location fixed effects and
other factors. We find, in the CHFS, that income inequality would have a significant posi-
tive impact on the aggregate household saving rate at the county level, with a 1 point on a
scale of 100 measure increase in the Gini coefficient leading to an increase of 0.2 percent in
the aggregate saving rate.
Finally, we provide empirical evidence that the marginal propensity to consume out of
both the permanent income and transitory income would be significantly different across
income classes for all three data sets. Although we do not see a diminishing MPC with
income classes, there is still an essential pattern that the MPC out of both types of income
for the bottom 20 percent households are much higher than that for the top 20 percent
households. The estimated MPC for the top 20 percent households ranges from 200 to 400
RMB per 1000 RMB, while for the bottom 20 percent households, the range from 600 to 900
RMB per 1000 RMB.
These empirical pieces of evidence would have significant policy implications. The Chi-
nese government’s policies on reducing the saving rate have not yet produced substantial
results. If income inequality and liquidity constraints were the key reasons for the high
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aggregate household saving rate, the resulting policy would be drastically different. For ex-
ample, it is appropriate for the Chinese government to design some income redistribution
programs (such as EITC) to reduce income inequality or devote more resources to support
the credit market development. An economic policy of tackling income inequality would
lower the aggregate saving rate, thus becoming a policy of economic transition and growth.
Related literature
According to the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH), the basic idea about demographic expla-
nation is that a decrease in the non-working population, which consists of the young and
the old, would increase household savings due to the “less mouths to feed”. Besides, China
has a long historical tradition of children taking care of their elder parents. As a result,
since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979, increased savings were not only due to
the reduction in young population but also viewed as an effective substitute for children
(“old-age security”). Using a ratio of working population to the number of nonworking (“mi-
nors”) as a proxy to the demographic change, Modigliani and Cao (2004) find that increased
China’s household saving rate over the period from 1953 to 2000 can be well explained by
the increased ratio of employed population to nonworking population, mainly driven by the
decrease in the young dependent population. Besides, Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015)
conduct a quantitative overlapping generations model and also provide some evidence sup-
porting the link between demographics and the saving rate at the aggregate level. However,
applying panel data analysis and separately considering the young dependent ratio and the
old dependent ratio, Horioka and Wan (2007) finds that the changes in those ratios do not
go very far in explaining China’s provincial household saving rate for the period 1995–2004.
Using the data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS), Chamon and Prasad (2010) reach
a similar conclusion: there is no significant effect of the demographic shifts in China’s house-
hold saving rate. Recent work about the demographic explanations focus on bridging the
micro-level mechanism with the macro-level framework and provide some micro-evidence
(see, e.g., İmrohoroğlu, Zhao, et al., 2017 and Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin, 2013).
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One concern about the demographic explanations lies in that demographic shift is not static
but dynamic. As the age population move over time, we would not see a consistently high
and even rising household saving rate. In fact, since 2000, Chinese household saving rate
has been rising rapidly and hit the highest point in the history.
The precautionary saving motives argue that people who are not covered by a social safety
network tend to have precautionary saving motives and thus save more for unexpected events
(Giles and Yoo, 2007). Although the Chinese economy has experienced rapid growth since
the reform and opening up, due to lack of a safe social security and insurance network and
increasing costs on education, housing, and healthcare, etc., make Chinese household tend
to save more to respond the income and expenditures uncertainties in future. On the income
uncertainties side, Meng (2003) examine the role of precautionary saving in Chinese urban
households during the period from 1995 to 1999. She finds that not only the Chinese urban
households ever experienced past income uncertainties tend to have increased propensity
to consume, but for households without unemployed members, the income uncertainty has
an even stronger effect on saving. Using China’s reform of the state-owned enterprises
(SOE) in the late 1990s as a natural experiment, He, Huang, Liu, and Zhu (2017) also
show that the precautionary saving motive does exist in Chinese households. Using the
CHFS, however, our preliminary results show that the saving rate of households whose
heads work in government entities, public-sector organizations and state-owned enterprises
are slightly and insignificantly higher (0.04 percent higher) than that of households whose
heads work in privately-owned enterprises, collectively-owned enterprises, and foreign-funded
enterprises. This result shows that China’s gradually well-established labor law and law of
employment contracts makes income uncertainty a less influential factor for the increasing
household saving rate. On the expenditure uncertainties side, Chamon and Prasad (2010)
argue that uncertainty in expenditures, particularly on education, housing, and healthcare,
may generate high aggregate savings for the young and the elderly. Over the last decade
or so, however, the social insurance system has been firmly established. There is almost
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universal health insurance coverage, and rapid retirement insurance coverage has not lowered
the saving rate. Also, there is no consensus as to whether the high housing prices can explain
the high household saving rate (Wang and Wen, 2012).
Another compelling explanation is the imbalanced sex ratio and competitive motive.
The idea is built on the traditional culture of son preferences in Chinese households: as sex
ratio increase, Chinese households tend to save more to improve son’s competitiveness in
the marriage market. Using household-level data, Wei and Zhang (2011) find that saving
rates for the households with sons in the high sex ratio county is significantly higher than
for the households with sons in the low sex ratio county in both rural and urban sample.
At the provincial level, they find evidence that the sex ratio has a significant positive effect
on the provincial aggregate household saving rate. They argue that during 1990–2007, the
factor can account for at least 60 percent actual increase in China’s household saving rate.
However, we reexamine the competitive saving motives using the same data sources as they
did and find the evidence may be not robust. First, although we find the similar effects of
the sex ratio on household saving rates using the sex ratio from the 1990 census when using
the sex ratio from 2000 census, the effects vanish. Second, even using the ratio from 1990
census, the effects exist only in the rich households sample and rich counties sample. For the
poor households and poor counties, the estimates are significantly negative and statistically
insignificant, respectively.
There are other explanations for Chinese household saving rate. According to Carroll
and Weil (1994), the rising household savings may be due to a consequence of high-income
growth and habit formation. Horioka and Wan (2007) find that the lagged saving rate has a
significant positive effect on the provincial-level household saving, which is consistent with
the existence of inertia or persistence. However, as argued in Modigliani and Cao (2004),
during the 1950s to the mid-1970s, average Chinese household saving rate was lower than
5 percent, which implies that the Chinese cultural, ethical values of “thrifty” counts little
if any. Cooper and Zhu (2017) estimate a structural life-cycle model to study household
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finance in China. They find that the high Chinese household raving rate is mainly driven
by the labor market risk and the patient Chinese households. Other studies, such as Ge,
Yang, and Zhang (2012), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2014), and Song and Yang (2012), focus
on explaining another feature of Chinese household saving rate, the “U–shaped” age-saving
profile started with Chamon and Prasad (2010).
Roadmap
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the data and styl-
ized facts of Chinese household saving rates. In Section 2.3, we introduce our theoretical
model that links income inequality, liquidity constraints and saving decisions in a two-period
lifecycle model. Section 2.4 describes the empirical methodology. The results and analysis
are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs, figures,
tables, and other details.
2.2 Data
In this section, we provide data pieces of evidence that motivate the idea that income
inequality interacting with liquidity constraints matter in the explanation about China’s high
household saving rate, based on various household survey data sources from China. First, we
plot the household saving rates by income class. The data pattern is consistent with various
data sources. Second, we take a look at the household saving rate by income group and
note, within each income group, the importance of facing a liquidity constraint on household
saving rates. Finally, we show the relationship between the county-level aggregate household
saving rate and the county Gini coefficient. These data facts motivate the theoretical model
in the next section and the reduced form analysis in the following section.
2.2.1 Data sources
We use three data sets from China in the analysis. The data are drawn from the China
Household Finance Survey (CHFS), the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and the Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP).
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The CHFS is our primary source of data used in the analysis. It is a large, nationally
representative and longitudinal data set, conducted by the Survey and Research Center for
China Household Finance at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu,
China. The survey was first launched in 2011, and another three waves were conducted in
2013, 2015, and 2017, respectively. The CHFS uses a three-stage stratified sampling method
and covers 29 provinces and autonomous regions (except Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan). It also has a low non-response rate compared to other survey data. The overall
representativeness of the CHFS is excellent, and it fits our research purpose well. Besides,
the survey contains detailed information about a large sample of individuals and households’
demographic characteristics, assets and liabilities, insurance and social welfare, and income
and expenditures. So thus the CHFS is particularly suited to our purposes. We primarily
use the 2013 and 2015 waves in this study.
The CFPS, conducted by the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University,
China, is also a nationally and representative longitudinal data set. The survey started in
2010, and the following three waves were in 2012, 2014, and 2016. The primary purpose of the
survey is to track individuals, families, and communities in contemporary China. Although
the CFPS focuses on various aspects of social life, it also collects wealth information about
incomes and expenditures. It fits our research purpose well. Among the current four waves,
the 2012 and 2014 waves are used in the analysis.
The CHIP is nationally representative data set conducted in 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and
2013. The five waves of the survey are designed to track the dynamics of income distribution
of Chinese individuals and households in both urban and rural area, and thus it also contains
sufficient information about incomes and expenditures. The 2013 wave is used in the study.
We apply the same criteria in all three data sets to construct our estimation sample.
First, we remove outliers and households with missing data, the 2015 CHFS survey provides
a sample of 21,861 urban households from 1,048 different communities in 262 counties; the
2014 CFPS survey has a total 6,603 urban sample from 1,413 distinctive communities in 358
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counties; the 2013 CHIP survey data include a total 6,674 urban sample from 212 counties.
Survey participation was randomized; so, again, the data are highly representative regarding
the geographic location and economic development. For panel exercise in our paper, we use
both three-years panel and two-years panel, and the matching households from 2013 and
2015 of CHFS data reduces the sample size to 13,120; the matching sample size is 10,677 for
the 2012 and 2014 CFPS survey. We use the 2013 CHIP survey data only to perform the
cross-section analysis because of the long time span for the recent CHIP survey.
2.2.2 Data evidence
Income-saving rate profile
We first summarize China’s uneven distribution of household saving rates across income
level. Additionally, we plot Chinese households by income classes. These pieces of evidence
together show the first of total four facts: not every Chinese household saves; the high-
income households’ savings account for a much larger fraction of total savings, with very
high household saving rates.
Table A.1 shows household saving rates by income classes and shares of savings for each
income class, calculated from our three data sets CHFS 2015, CFPS 2014, CHIP 2013, and
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). According to the CHFS 2015 data, Chinese
households have an aggregate saving rate of 29.1 percent, which is slightly higher than the
level of 28.5 percent from the NBS of China. It is also consistent with both the available
macro data and microdata used in other studies (see Zhou, 2014 and Banerjee, Meng, Porzio,
and Qian, 2014, for example). The aggregate saving rate for urban households and rural
households are 37.3 percent and 11.6 percent, respectively. Also, not every household saves
in the CHFS 2015 sample, however, as about 44.1 percent of households did not save. More
important, the distribution of saving rates is extremely uneven across income classes. The top
1 percent of income households’ total savings account for nearly 70 percent of total household
savings, with an extraordinary high saving rate of 86.6 percent. The top 5 percent of income
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households have an average saving rate of 74.1 percent, with the share of the total savings
for these households are over 99 percent of total savings. The saving rate for the top 10
percent and top 25 percent of income group households are 67.2 percent and 56.9 percent,
respectively. As an opposite, for the bottom 50 percent of income households, their saving
rates and the shares of savings are even negative, with –132.7 percent and –45.8 percent,
respectively.
The fact that household saving rate is greater for the higher income class than that for the
lower income is robust in the CPFS 2014 and CHIP 2013. In the CFPS 2014, the aggregate
rate goes down from 58.1 percent for the top 1 percent of income class to –45.8 percent for
the bottom 50 percent income class. Moreover, the saving rate decrease to 1.7 percent for
the bottom 50 percent of income class from 53.6 percent for the top 1 percent of income
in the CHIP 2013. Additionally, the savings shares for the top 1 percent of income class
own 44 percent of total savings in the CFPS 2014 and 12.2 percent of total savings in the
CHIP 2013. Figure A.2 displays that Chinese households saving rate by income percentile
increases as income level rises for CHFS 2015 (panel 1), CFPS 2014 (panel 2), and CHIP
2013 (panel 3).
Saving rate and liquidity constraints
Next, we show evidence about the role of liquidity constraints on households saving rates,
by comparing households saving rates for those who may be constrained with those who may
be not across different income classes. In particular, we exam households whose income are
above top 20 percent, below bottom 20 percent, and in the middle. For the measures of
constrained household, we use the one in (Zeldes, 1989a) and the credit card usage to define
whether or not a household is facing liquidity constraint. Table A.2 shows a summary for
CHFS 2015, CFPS 2014, and CHIP 2013.
Among 5179 urban households in CHFS 2015, there are 4330 (83.61 percent) households
in the top 20 percent, 501 (9.67 percent) households in the bottom 20 percent, and 293 (5.66
percent) households in the middle. The first three columns in the panel (a) of Table A.2 uses
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the definition in the literature (Zeldes, 1989a) and the last three uses the credit card usage
measure. We find that in the top 20 percent of income group, about 17 percent households
are facing a liquidity constraint, and the corresponding saving rate is about 78 percent, which
is about 40 percent higher than those who are not facing a liquidity constraint in the same
income group. For the middle-income group, the percentage of constrained households goes
up to near 32 percent, with the saving rate for constrained households is 13 percent, which
is also higher than that for those unconstrained households in the group. The proportion of
constrained households in the bottom 20 percent is even higher to 38 percent. The saving
rate for the constrained households is still higher than that for unconstrained households,
even though it is a negative number. Similarly patterns can be found in the panel (b)
and (c) for CFPS 2014 and for CHIP 2014, respectively. There are more households may
face a liquidity constraint for the bottom 20 percent of income group than that for the top
20 percent of income group. Moreover, within each income group, the saving rate for the
constrained households tend to be higher than that for the unconstrained counterpart in
each income bracket.
Aggregate household saving rate and the Gini coefficient
Finally, we look at data regarding the relationship between aggregate saving rate (both
the country-level and the county-level) and the Gini coefficient. Figure A.3 displays the
simple time-series trend for the aggregate household saving rate and the Gini coefficient
from 1994 to 2015. The household aggregate saving rate increased steadily from 34 percent
in 1992 to 37 percent in 2015, in the meanwhile, the Gini coefficient rose dramatically from
0.39 in 1992 to 0.46 in 2015. Except for some periods, the Gini coefficient exhibits a similar
trend to that of the household aggregate saving rate.
In addition, Figure A.4 shows the simple cross-sectional patterns between the county-level
aggregate household saving rate and the county-leve Gini coefficient. Panel (1) of Figure A.4
simply suggests that a county with a higher Gini coefficient may have a higher aggregate
saving rate for CHFS 2015, even though the pattern seems to be not clear in the panel (2)
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for CFPS 2014 and (3) for CHIP 2013.
To summarize, in this section, as expected, we show that (1) the aggregate household sav-
ing rate is high in China; however, not all households saved, with 44 percent of households
not saving (CHFS 2015). The distribution of household saving rate is extremely uneven.
The rich tend to save more. The saving rate of the top 1 percent of income households is
much higher than that for the bottom 50 percent of income group households; (2) Chinese
households may face a liquidity constraint. Comparing to the top 20 percent of income
households and the middle-income group households, there is a larger proportion of house-
holds in the bottom 20 percent of income group facing a liquidity constraint. Moreover, the
constrained households’ saving rate is higher than the unconstrained’s across income classes;
(3) at county-level, the aggregate saving rate may be higher for the county with higher Gini
coefficient. These pieces of data patterns are robust to various sources of data sets.
2.3 A Simple Heterogeneous Agent Model of Saving
In this section, we formulate a simple two-period endowment economy with heterogeneous
households in time preference, wealth and income. The parsimonious model leads to several
analytic results of household saving behavior that are consistent with data evidence presented
in the previous section. That is, the rich tend to save more; the poor are more likely to face
a liquidity constraint; the existence of liquidity constraints leads to a higher saving rate; a
higher level of income inequality may lead to a higher level of aggregate household saving
rate.
2.3.1 Preference and the constraints
An individual maximizes life-time utility drawn from the consumption ct at each period
t, t = 1, 2
u = log(c1) + β · log(c2) (2.1)
where log(ct) is the per-period utility function, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount
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factor. The budget constraints for the household obeys
c1 + w1 = w0 + y1 (2.2)
c2 = (1 +R) · w1 + y2 (2.3)
where w0 denotes the initial level of wealth, w1 represents the level of wealth to carry between
“now” and “the future”, y1 and y2 are the income received today and tomorrow, respectively,
and r is the net real interest rate. We assume that there is no income growth, that is,
y1 = y2 = y.
In addition to the budget constraints 2.2 and 2.3, households may also face a liquidity
constraint
s1 ≥ − τ · y2
1 +R
(2.4)
where s1 denotes the saving plan and τ ∈ [0,m] measures the degree of constrained.6
Notice that this is a two-period model in which individuals will die at the end of the
second period. We do not consider the bequest saving motive in the last period (even
though it could be more realistic in real life and also be important in theory). Since caring
about nothing afterward, individuals will consume all the available resources in hands, and
there is no savings or wealth left.
2.3.2 Heterogeneity
We assume that individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: (i) their initial wealth
w0 and income yt and (ii) their subjective rate of discount factor β. First, we consider two
wealth and income types, the rich (denoted by r) and the poor (denoted by p). Let wk0 and
ykt denote the initial wealth and income for the k class, where k ∈ {r, p}. And the wealth
6This condition ensures non-negative consumption in the second period. When τ = 1, it is actually
so-called “natural borrowing limit” as discussed in Aiyagari (1994).
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and the income for the rich and the poor satisfy
wr0 = θw · wp0
yrt = θy · ypt
where θw and θy are the ratio of wealth to income for the rich and the poor, respectively.
Second, we assume that there are three types of household in terms of the subjective
discount factor: impatient household with 0 < βL ≤ βr; less patient household with βr ≤
βM ≤ βp; and patient household with βp ≤ βM < 1.
2.3.3 Household decisions and the model predictions
The individual household’s optimal consumption can be solved by maximizing the lifetime
utility function 2.1, subject to budget constraints 2.2 and 2.3, and the borrowing constraint
2.4, given the exogenous wealth and income, the discount factor, and the interest rate. Since
there are three levels of subjective discount factor and two levels of initial wealth and income,
there are total six types household in this model economy: (1) rich–impatient household, (2)
rich–less patient household, (3) rich–patient household, (4) poor–impatient household, (5)
poor–less patient household, and (6) poor–patient household.
For each type of household, the interior solution (that is, the borrowing constraint is
not binding) for optimal consumption satisfies the intertemporal Euler equation, and the
assumption of log utility function implies that the current optimal consumption is a linear
function of the present value of lifetime resources, with a fixed proportion
ck1 =
1
1 + βj
(wk0 + y
k + τ · R˜ · yk). (2.5)
It follows from Equation (2.5) that household’s current optimal saving is
sk =
(
1− 1 + τ · R˜
1 + βj
)
yk − 1
1 + βj
wk0 . (2.6)
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If the borrowing constraint is binding, then the kinky solution for the current optimal con-
sumption is
ck1 = (1 + τ · R˜) · yk. (2.7)
Whether the household is facing the borrowing constraint depends on wealth/income group
and patient degree. To characterize the equilibrium, we introduce the following assumption
Assumption 1. (a) Assume that the initial wealth gap between the rich and the poor is
smaller than the permanent income gap between them, that is, θw/θy < 1. (b) The cutoff
values of β are given by following equations
βr =
ρr + 1− τ · R˜
1 + τ · R˜
βp =
ρp + 1− τ · R˜
1 + τ · R˜
where ρk =
wk0
yk1
, k ∈ {r, p} and R˜ = 1
1+R
.
This assumption implies that the initial wealth-permanent income ratio for the rich is
smaller than that for the poor, that is, ρr < ρp. Figure A.5 displays the data evidence that
motivates us. Optimal consumptions and savings for different types of household can be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, (1) for the rich-impatient, the poor-impatient, and the
poor-less patient household, the borrowing constraint is binding and thus the current optimal
consumption
cr,Lt = (1 + τ · R˜) · yr, for the rich-impatient household,
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and
cp,jt = (1 + τ · R˜) · yr, for the poor-j household, j ∈ {L,M};
(2) for the rich-less patient, the rich-patient, and the poor-patient household, the borrowing
constraint is not binding and thus the current optimal consumption
cr,jt =
1
1 + βj
(wr0 + y
r + τ · R˜ · yr), for the rich-j household, j ∈ {M,H},
and
cp,Ht =
1
1 + βH
(wp0 + y
p + τ · R˜ · yP ), for the poor-patient household.
These analytic solutions are useful to convey simple predictions that are consistent data
evidence presented in Section 2.2. Those model predictions are summarized as follows:
(1) The rich tends to save more.
(2) Among the poor household, there is a larger fraction of households facing the borrowing
constraint than that among the rich households.
(3) The existence of liquidity constraints lead to a higher aggregate household saving rate.
(4) Increasing the current income inequality would make the aggregate household saving
rate even higher.
2.4 Empirical Strategies
In light of the theoretical model in Section 2.3, we construct and estimate several empirical
models to study: (i) do the rich save more? (ii) are the poor more likely to face the liquidity
constraints, and do the liquidity constraint leads to a higher saving rate? (iii) whether or
not, at the aggregate level, income inequality will have a positive effect on the household
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saving rate? (iv) does the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) decreases with income
level?
2.4.1 Income and saving rate
Econometric specification
Following Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004), we consider the following empirical speci-
fication
saving ratei = α + β ·DincGi + γ ·X i + i. (2.8)
In this model, the dependent variable is the household saving rate, which is defined as the
ratio of household disposable income minus household consumption to household disposable
income.
The explanatory variable of interest DincGi is a vector of dummy variables for income
quintile that take a value of one if the household’s income belongs to specific income quintile
and zero if the ith household’s income is not in this quintile. These dummy variables capture
the different types of income class as discussed in the simple theoretical model in Section
2.3. The regression model in Equation (2.8) also includes some control variables that capture
household characteristics and household head’s characteristics. These independent variables
are used to control for other saving motives in the existing literature. The regression errors
are denoted by .
The regression model (2.8) is estimated by running the mean and the median cross-
sectional regression. In each case, we include dummies for all income quintiles except for the
first one. The critical parameters of interest are the coefficients of the income quintiles. Each
estimated β for a given income quintile captures, all else equal, the average excess saving
rate for households in that quintile relative to households in the last income quintile.
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The measurement
The variables used in our analysis include household consumption, household income,
household demographic variables (household size, young dependent ratio, old dependent
ratio), precautionary-type variables (employed status, employed type, hukou, health status,
health insurance, pension, housing), competitive-type variables (number of boys and girls,
age of children), and a set of household head characteristics (age, gender, married status,
ccp member, years of schooling). The detailed definition of each variable is shown in panel
(a) of Table A.3. Panel (b) - (d) of Table A.3 shows the summary statistics of these variables
in the full sample.
Endogeneity
One problem in the regression (2.8) is the correlation between current income and the
error term. According to Friedman (1957), one’s consumption at a point in time does not only
depend on the current income, but also on the permanent income, the expected long-term
average income. To solve the endogeneity issue of current income, we adopt two approaches.
First, since the previous related literature has typically found that the association between
current income and permanent income will become close to one between one’s mid-thirties
and forties (see Haider and Solon, 2006, Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006, and Grawe, 2006), we
do the regression on a subsample which is restricted to include those households whose head’s
age is between 30 and 45. Obviously, this approach will suffer a dramatic decrease in sample
size. Second, we deal with the endogeneity issue by constructing the measure of permanent
income following the most applicable approach in Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005)
and Bhalla (1980). Specifically, we use an average of the current income and the recent past
incomes as a proxy for the measure of permanent income, and then re-group households by
using quintile based on the measure of permanent income.
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Robustness check
To examine to what extent the analysis results are robust, we conduct several robustness
checks. First, using the definition of non-entrepreneurs in Gentry and Hubbard (2000) (the
value of business income for a household is less than $5,000), we restrict our samples to non-
entrepreneurs so that we can test if the saving behavior of entrepreneurs drives the main
results.7 Second, we consider if the relationship between income and saving rate is consistent
for the older ages population, by restricting our sample to households with household head’s
age above sixty. Third, rather than define income quintile by household income, we use
per capita household income to regroup households as income quintile dummies to check
the robustness of the estimates. Finally, we investigate whether or not the main results are
robust by using an alternative definition of household saving rate introduced in Chamon and
Prasad (2010) and Wei and Zhang (2011).
2.4.2 Liquidity constraints and saving rate
In Section 2.2, we present data evidence that across three sources data sets, there are more
households may face a liquidity constraint for the bottom 20 percent of income group than
that for the top 20 percent of income group, and within each income group, the saving rate
for the constrained households tend to be higher than that for the unconstrained counterpart
in each income bracket. In this subsection, we formally estimate the probability gap of facing
liquidity constraints between income quintiles and the effect of the liquidity constraints on
the household saving rates.
First, we run a probit regression to estimate the difference in probability of facing liquidity
constraints between income quintiles
Pr(LCi = 1) = Φ(α + β ·DincGi + γ ·X i), (2.9)
7In the literature, Quadrini (1999, 2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), and Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
have emphasized that the high-income entrepreneurs plays an important role in wealth accumulation and
thus in savings.
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where LCi is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if household i face a liquidity
constraint and zero if the household does not face a liquidity constraint. We use two ways
to measure whether or not household i is facing a liquidity constraint, that is, the variable
LCi = 1. One is the definition in Zeldes (1989a), which states that a household is liquidity
constrained if the total value of financial assets is less than two months permanent income.
Another is directly from our CHFS questionnaire, which asks respondent “Does your family
have any credit cards, excluding inactivated cards?” Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution. The explanatory variable DincGi and control
variables Xi are the same as Equation (2.8). When do the regression, the last income
quintile is omitted so that the coefficients of interest β are used to measure the difference
in probability of facing a liquidity constraint relative to the last income quintile. We also
use three-year moving average income as a proxy to permanent income to solve for the
endogeneity problem in the probit regression.
Next, we use a Difference-in-Difference (DID) method to estimate the effect of the liq-
uidity constraints on the household saving rates. Specifically, we estimate the following
model
saving rateit = α + β · creditit ·Dit + γ ·Dit + ρ · creditit (2.10)
+ δ · household incomeit + µ ·X it + it, t = 1, 2,
where creditit is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if household i is credit con-
strained in the first period but unconstrained in the second period and zero otherwise. Dit is
a time dummy variable that takes a value of one if t = 2 and zero if t = 1. household income
is household’s total disposal income, and X includes other household and household head’s
characteristics that are the same as previous regression equations.  refers to regression er-
rors. The key coefficient of interest is β, which measures the average “treatment” effect of
credit unconstrained on the household saving rate.
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The “common trend” assumption is required to be held for identifying β in DID approach.
That is, in the presence of financial constrained, households without financial constrained
would have experienced changes in saving rate similar to those with financial constrained. We
address the validity of this assumption by using the t-test of all the controlled characteristics
of the treatment and comparison group since we only have one-year panel sample before the
treated year. After the control variables t-test for these two groups, all the indicators on the
leading year are not statistically different between treated and comparison group; therefore,
it provides support for the validity of the identifying assumption.
2.4.3 Income inequality and saving rate
In order to identify the effects of income inequality on household saving rate at aggregate
level, we estimate the following regression model
county saving ratei = α + β · Ginii + γ ·X i + i, (2.11)
where the dependent variable is county saving rate, which is defined as the ratio of the
sum of total household savings in the same county to the sum of total household disposable
income in the same county. Gini is the Gini coefficient at county-level, and X contains
other county characteristics.  refers to regression errors. The key coefficient of interest is
β, which measures the average effect of income inequality on the aggregate saving rate at
county-level.
We focus on the Gini coefficient as the primary measure for income inequality, and use
other measures, including the income ratio of the top 20 percent of households to the bottom
20 percent of households as a robustness check. Control variables in X include other county
demographics such as log of county per capita income, county level young dependent ratio,
and county level old dependent ratio, and etc.
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2.4.4 Marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
The old idea that the marginal propensity to consume out of current income is dimin-
ishing, that is, consumption function is concave in current income, can be dating back to
the discussion in Keynes (2016), which writes “. . . not only is the marginal propensity to
consume is weaker in a wealthy community, but, . . . ” in part II of Chapter 3, and “But
with the growth of wealth and the diminishing marginal propensity to consume, . . . ” in part
V of Chapter 23. On the theoretical side, a formal analytical explanation for the intuition
does not appear until Carroll and Kimball (1996).8 On the empirical side, there is little
recent literature that provides the micro empirical evidence that the marginal propensity to
consume for the rich is lower than that for the poor. Lusardi (1996) estimates the changes in
household consumption response to the changes in transitory income using two panel data
sets and provides evidence of the concavity of the consumption function, and Souleles (1999)
examines the response of household consumption to income tax funds and finds that the
response is smaller for rich households.9
In this subesection, rather than estimating the changes in consumption response to the
changes in income, we estimate directly the marginal propensity to consume out of current
income following Paxson (1992). Specifically, we estimate the following equation
consumptioni = α + β · transitory incomei + γ · permanent incomei + δ ·X i + i,
(2.12)
where consumption is household total consumption, transitory income is the measure
of household temporary income in current period, which equals to the difference between
current income and permanent income, permanent income refers to the household’s ex-
8Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that a sufficient condition for the concavity of consumption function, in
most of the cases, is that introducing income uncertainty into the utility maximization problem. Before them,
Zeldes (1989b) uses numerical methods to show adding labor income uncertainty can make consumption
function concave, and Kimball (1990) explains the increase in the slope of the consumption function.
9There is an older literature focusing on the test of the hypothesis of permanent income, which also finds
the concavity evidence, e.g.
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pected long-term average income, and X summarizes household characteristics and house-
hold head’s characteristics. The key coefficient of interest is β, which measures, by definition,
the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income.
For the measure permanent income, as in the previous subsection, we use the moving
average of three years income as a proxy for the permanent income. Equation (2.12) is
estimated by running five separate cross-sectional regressions, with each one focusing on an
income quintile sample.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present our main results to answer four empirical questions: (1)
whether rich households tend to save more? (2) whether poor households are more likely
to face liquidity constraints, and the liquidity constraint makes the household saving rate
higher? (3) whether income inequality, at the county-level, has a positive effect on aggregate
household saving rate? (4) whether the marginal propensity to consume for poor households
is higher?
2.5.1 Income and saving rate
The empirical model in Equation (2.8) is estimated using the CHFS 2015, CFPS 2014,
and CHIP 2013 data. The coefficient of interest is the parameter of the income quintiles β,
which measures the additional saving rate for each income quintile relative to the first one
when controlling for the effects of all other factors that may also affect the household saving
rate. The estimates in Table A.4 are estimated by median regression, and the standard errors
for the coefficients are achieved in parentheses by bootstrapping based on 500 replications.
Saving rate and current income
Panel (a) of Table A.4 presents our estimation results with the first two columns showing
the estimated effects for CHFS 2015 Urban, the next two columns for CFPS 2014 Urban, and
the last two columns for CHIP 2013 Urban. Odd columns show estimates without controlling
for the variable employ_typ, while the estimates in even columns controlling for it.
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Column 1 and column 2 of the panel (a) suggest that the household saving rate increases
dramatically with measured current income in the CHFS. The increments in the median
household saving rate range from 30 percent in the second lowest income quintile to above
70 percent in the highest, and they are strictly increasing from the lowest income quintile
to the highest. All the differences in these columns are statistically significant at 1 percent
significant level. We also report the estimates for other factors that may affect the household
saving rate. Among demographic-type factors, one increase in household size (hh_size)
would decrease household saving rate by 2 percent, and a 1 percent increase in the old-
dependent ratio (ODratio) would increase 0.07–0.10 percent saving rate. Both estimates are
significant. These results are consistent with the existing demographic explanations about
Chinese household saving rate. In precautionary-type variables, a household with urban
hukou would decrease saving rate by 2 percent in column 1, although it is not significant
when controlling for employ type employ_typ in column 2. The private burden of possible
expenditures on health and housing would have a positive effect on the household saving
rate in column 1, which is also consistent with the explanation focusing on precautionary
motives.
Column 3 and column 4 shows results from similar regressions using the CFPS data.
The estimates of the coefficient between the household saving rate and current income are
smaller than in the CFPS. Nevertheless, we still see the estimated the differences in median
saving rate rising significantly from 25 percent for households in the bottom quintile to over
50 percent of households in the top quintile. The qualitative effects of other factors such
as household size, hukou, health, and housing on the saving rate are robust, although the
magnitude is different.
The remaining columns of the table show the relationship between the household saving
rate and current income in the CHIP data. As in the CHFS and the CFPS, the change in
the saving rate strictly increases as income quintile moves up. For the second lowest-income
households, the estimated median saving rate is 7–8 percent higher than the lowest-income,
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and for the highest income quintile, it is 25 percent higher than the lowest. Although the
estimates are much lower than the comparable numbers from the CHFS and the CHIP,
the result is not surprising: the variation in household income is much smaller in that the
CHIP covers a more substantial proportion of households working in the state-own enterprise
(SOE).
Endogeneity: saving rate and permanent income
We now adopt two approaches described in Subsection 2.4.1 to investigate the relationship
between the household saving rate and permanent income. We first do the regression on a
subsample which is restricted to include those households whose head’s age is between 30
and 45. Obviously, this approach will suffer a dramatic decrease in sample size. Then, we
use an average of the current income and the recent past incomes as a proxy for the measure
of permanent income and re-group households by using quintile based on the measure of
permanent income. The results are presented in panel (b) of Table A.4, with the first two
columns showing the estimated results for CHFS, the next two columns for CFPS, and the
last two columns for CHIP.
The odd columns of the table show that when subsample regression is used to consider
the endogeneity issue. The estimated change in the saving rate increases consistently with
income level for all three data sets. Indeed, the difference in the saving rate is significantly
positive for every quintile at 1 percent significant level, range from 35 percent to 82 percent
in the CHFS, 26 percent to 62 percent in the CFPS, and 8 percent to 23 percent in the
CHIP. The estimated gradients of the coefficients are similar to (and in some cases slightly
larger than) to those in panel (a), the relationship between the saving rate and the measured
current income.
Our next approach is to use a three-year moving average current income as a measure
of the permanent income. For the CHFS, we do have three years income data surveyed in
2010, 2012, and 2014. For the CFPS, we also have income data surveyed in 2009, 2011, and
2013. Although the CHIP data cannot keep track of households over time because it does
28
not have a panel dimension, it contains information about previous incomes, and thus we
can still calculate a three-year average income. The results are reported in the even columns
of the table. This procedure also yields a strong relationship between the saving rate and the
permanent income. For the CHFS, the estimated differences in the saving rate range from 5
percent for the second lowest-income quintile to 19 percent for the highest-income quintile.
Except for the estimated differences for the second lowest-income quintile, the CFPS also
shows a highly significant correlation, with the range the range from 14 percent for the third
income quintile to 17 percent for the top income quintile. For the CHIP, the estimated
changes in the saving rate are all significant, with the range from 8 percent for the bottom
20 percent of households to 23 percent for the top 20 percent. In all cases, we again see
the saving rate strictly increases with the predicted permanent income. What’s more, the
magnitudes of the saving rate with respect to income are quite close across the three data
sets, but the estimates are much smaller than those in panel (a) and the odd columns. This
result suggests that much of the effects of transitory income is eliminated when simply using
a three-year average as a proxy to permanent income.
Robustness checks
We now turn to show several tests to check the robustness of the main results. We first
extend the analysis to explore the extent to which dropping all entrepreneurs with business
income is greater than $5,000 (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000) affects the results. Next, we
present the results where we restrict the sample to households at older ages (above 60) from
the analysis. Finally, we investigate whether the effects are robust by using an alternative
definition of household saving rate introduced in Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Wei and
Zhang (2011) and by constructing quintile dummies using per capita income, respectively.
In panel (c) of Table A.4, we present the estimates based only on non-entrepreneurs and
older households. Odd columns in the table continue to show a highly significant positive
correlation between the median household saving rate and the income quintile, with the range
of the differences in saving rate from 44 percent for the second lowest-income quintile to 91
29
percent to the highest in the CHFS, from 23 percent to 60 percent in the CFPS, and from 9
percent to 24 percent in the CHIP. When considering only the older households, the estimated
differences in the even columns are still significantly positive and strictly increasing, with
the gradients much higher for the CHFS and the CFPS and similar to the previous results
for the CHIP. The estimated differences rise from above 70 percent for the second income
quintile to above 140 percent for the fifth in both CHFS and CFPS, whereas from 8 percent
to 27 percent in the CHIP. These even higher estimates suggest no evidence that at the older
age, high-income households dissave at a faster rate than low-income households.
Panel (d) of the table shows the results using an alternative definition of saving rate (in
the odd columns) and alternative income quintile (in the even columns). Again, the results
show that there is a strong positive association between the saving rate and income in all
three data sets, and the estimates strictly income with income level. The CHFS has the
largest estimated coefficients in both odd columns and even columns, with the range from
33 percent for the second lowest-income quintile to 121 percent for the highest-income, while
the chip’s estimated coefficients are smallest in both odd columns and even columns, with
the range from 8 percent for the second quintile to 25 percent for the fifth quintile.
The validity of the theoretical model
Finally, we present the empirical counterpart of the assumption in Section 2.3 and exam-
ine the validity of the theoretical model. Since we do have data on previous period wealth,
there are only results for the CHFS and CFPS in panel (e) of Table A.4, with first three
columns are results for the CHFS, and the last three are for the CFPS.
The first column is estimated from the similar regression to Equation (2.8) with restricting
the sample to households having data on previous period wealth in the CHFS. The estimated
differences in the saving rate are all significantly positive and strictly increasing. We report
the estimated differences in the ratio of previous wealth to current income for income quintiles
in column 2. The results show that the changes in the ratio strictly decrease as income
quintile moves up. The estimated ratio is six times lower than the bottom 20 percent for
30
the second lowest-income quintile, ten times lower for the third income quintile, 12 times
lower for the second highest, and 15 times lower for the highest. This suggests that the
assumption is realistic and reasonable. After controlling for the wealth-income ratio, in
column 3 of the table, the effect of the ratio on saving rate is significantly negative. Besides,
we see again highly significant and strictly increasing estimated differences in saving rate
for income quintile. The smaller coefficients for the income quintiles along with a significant
negative coefficient for the ratio implies that the previous wealth-current income ratio may
be a channel in explaining why the rich tend to save more. As in the CHFS, similar patterns
can be found in the CFPS, and they are shown in column 4–6.
We summarize the results presented so far: looking at all three data sets, although
the estimates in magnitude of the increments in median household saving rate for different
income quintiles relative to the bottom 20 percent differ, the pattern is generally the same
—— as income quintile moves up, the difference in the saving rate between the higher income
quintile and the lowest income quintile is strictly increasing, which implies that the rich do
save more.
2.5.2 Liquidity constraints and saving rate
After carefully examining the relationship between the income distribution and household
saving rate, in this subsection, we formally illustrate that the bottom 20 percent households
are significantly more likely to face a liquidity constraint than the richer household and
that liquidity constraint will lead to about 20 percent of household saving rate increases.
We use two ways to measure whether household i is facing a liquidity constraint, that is,
the variable LCi = 1. For one measurement, we can use the financial liquidity constraint
measure of Zeldes (1989a) in our three sources data sets. Zeldes (1989a) is the first paper
using this financial constraint measure, "a household is liquidity constrained if the total
value of financial assets is less than two months permanent income," and applying it into the
PSID data. The paper finds that the consumption growth responds very strongly to lagged
disposable income for the household with low wealth and also find that the similar estimated
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responses were sometimes statistically insignificant and smaller. He interprets this results
as evidence that in favor of liquidity constraints and between 30 to 66 percent of households
in PSID sample are liquidity constrained by this measurement and different definitions of
"low wealth". For another measurement, we use it directly from our CHFS questionnaire,
which asks respondent “E2002: Does your family have any credit cards, excluding inactivated
cards?”. For the households who reply the question "Yes" as the answer will not face the
liquidity liquidity constraint, and the counterpart will face the liquidity liquidity constraint,
that is LCi = 1, due to the household do not own an activated credit card. Since only
the China Household Finance Survey ask the respondent question about the credit card
information, we only use CHFS 2015 data to examine the relationship between the liquidity
constraint and income distribution.
Liquidity constraints and current income
In this subsection, our dependent variable is the probability of LCi = 1, whether household
i is facing a liquidity constraint, and the explanatory variable of interest is also the income
quintile dummy variables vectorDincGi . We omit the highest income quintile for the reference
in each regression and directly report the marginal effects of each explanatory variable in
the results table for the explanation convenience. Both the results from using the household
current and permanent income, we illustrate similar evidence suggest that financial constraint
and borrowing constraints are important for the poor household in China which is consistent
with the evidence of U.S. (Zeldes, 1989a).
First column of panel (a) and the odd columns of panel (b) of Table A.5 present our
estimation results showing the estimated effects of the current income distribution on the
first measurement of financial liquidity constraint. Column 1 of the panel (a) suggest that the
probability of the household facing the binding financial constraint increases dramatically
with measured current income in the CHFS. The increments in the probability of facing
financial liquidity constraint range from 2 percent in the second highest income quintile, 5
percent in the third highest income quintile, 9 percent in the second lowest income quintile
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to 10 percent in the lowest income quintile all compared to the highest quintile of current
income. Except for the coefficient of second highest income quintile, all the difference in this
column is statically significant at 1 percent significant level. The poor are significantly more
likely to face the liquidity constraint, and this relationship pattern is the same for CFPS
and CHIP data. The odd columns of panel (b) of Table A.5 shows that the increments in
probability of facing financial liquidity constraint range from 5 to 6 percent in the second
highest income quintile to 23 to 13 percent in the lowest income quintile all compared to the
highest quintile of current income for the CFPS and CHIP data respectively. Almost all the
difference in this column are statically significant at 1 percent significant level. Therefore,
the estimates pattern in magnitude of the increments in probability of facing the liquidity
constraint using the current income quintile is generally the same: as income quintile moves
down, the difference in the probability of facing the liquidity constraint between the higher
income quintile and lowest income quintile is strictly increasing, which implies that the poor
are more likely to face the financial liquidity constraint.
For the current income distribution on the second measurement of liquidity constraint,
column 3 of the panel (a) present our estimation results showing the estimated effects.
Column 3 of the panel (a) suggest that the probability of the household facing the binding
liquidity constraint increases dramatically with measured current income in the CHFS. The
increments in the probability of facing liquidity liquidity constraint range from 13 percent
in the second highest income quintile, 18 percent in the third highest income quintile, 23
percent in the second lowest income quintile to 27 percent in the lowest income quintile all
compared to the highest quintile of current income. All the difference in this column is also
statically significant at 1 percent significant level. The poor are significantly more likely to
face the binding liquidity constraint. The magnitude of the effects on liquidity constraint
is much larger compared to the first financial measure using the CHFS data. The reason is
that the credit card application in China has multiple criteria such as the stable income with
good credit record or history, enrolled in the social security system and working job type. A
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household with "self-employed", "owning small private business" or "farmers" are all very
difficult to apply for the credit card in China financial institution. So the variance of the
second measurement variable is larger than the first one, the difference of facing the liquidity
constraint from the financial institution is more important and severe for the poor household.
Therefore, the difference in the probability of facing the liquidity constraint, measured as
"without an activated credit card," is strictly increasing as income quintile moves down,
which also implies that the poor are more likely to face the liquidity liquidity constraint.
Liquidity constraints and permanent income
These above estimates may be potentially problematic if there is a third factor that
varies across the population and is driving the difference between the probability of facing
the financial liquidity constraint and current income or if there exists reverse causality.
For example, although the current income level of a household will lead to the liquidity
constraint degree, facing the binding borrowing or financial liquidity constraint will also lead
to the short-term property and total income reduction. Therefore, we also use the household
permanent income to correct this endogeneity, and the permanent income is defined same as
the above in three data sets.
Column 2 in the panel (a) of Table A.5 suggest that the probability of the household
facing the binding financial constraint increases dramatically with permanent income defined
same as the above in the CHFS. The increments of magnitude and significance in probability
of facing financial constraint with the permanent income quintile is similar to the current
income, range from 1 percent in the second highest income quintile, 4 percent in the third
highest income quintile, 7 percent in the second lowest income quintile to 12 percent in
the lowest income quintile all compared to the highest quintile of permanent income. The
magnitude of this pattern is slightly larger for the second measurement of liquidity constraint
column 4 of panel (a): from 7 percent in the second highest income quintile, 12 percent in
the third highest income quintile, 16 percent in the second lowest income quintile to 17
percent in the lowest income quintile all compared to the highest quintile of permanent
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income. The magnitude of the effects on liquidity constraint is smaller compared to the
current income quintile analysis using the CHFS data. All the differences in this column are
statically significant at 1 percent significant level. Similarly, the pattern also holds or CFPS
and CHIP data. The even columns of the panel (b) of Table A.5 also shows the increments
effects range from 5 to 6 percent in the second highest income quintile to 20 to 15 percent in
the lowest income quintile all compared to the highest quintile of permanent income for the
CFPS and CHIP data respectively. Almost all the difference in this column are statically
significant at 1 percent significant level. Therefore, the difference in the probability of facing
the financial or borrowing constraint is strictly increasing as permanent income quintile
moves down. Since the permanent income for the household can be treated as exogenous in
the current financial or borrowing constraint situation, these results confirm our theoretical
implication along with the data facts that the poor household are more likely to face the
financial and borrowing liquidity constraint than the counterpart in China.
We also report the estimates for other factors that may affect the probability to face the
financial or borrowing liquidity constraint both for the current income and permanent income
specification. In demographic-type variables, 1 percent increase of the young-dependent
ratio (YDratio) will decrease the probability of facing the liquidity constraint by 0.22 to
0.24 percent. Among precautionary-type factors, the registered residence status (hukou)
change form the rural hukou to the non-rural hukou will decrease the probability of facing
the liquidity constraint by 7 to 8 percent, which is consistent with the explanation that hukou
restrictions system can depress private consumption demand of the migrant or the non-rural
hukou household in the urban city. In addition, the household which has a poor health person
or not being enrolled in public or private health insurance or pension insurance system will
increase the probability of facing the liquidity constraint by 6 to 7 percent, 3 to 5 percent and
12 to 13 percent, respectively, taken the household social security into consideration. The
estimated age-profile of the probability of facing the liquidity constraint is like hump-shaped,
as the estimated coefficient of age (age) and age square (age2) is significantly positive and
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significantly negative, respectively. A married household will be 4 to 5 percent significantly
less likely to face the liquidity constraint due to the complete family structure and the China
Communist Party membership of the household head will be 1 to 3 percent significantly less
likely to face the liquidity constraint. Moreover, the household head with one more year of
schooling will decrease the probability of facing the liquidity constraint about 2 percent. All
the above-estimated coefficient of these other factors are statistically significant from zero
and consistent with consistent with the explanation of previous literature.
Liquidity constraints and household saving rate
Similar to the Zeldes (1989a) as in the U.S., we next to issue that the liquidity constraint
is important to understand the poor household consumption and saving behavior. Therefore,
in this subsection, we identify the effect of liquidity constraint on the household saving rate
in China. In fact, in the previous specifications on identifying the income distribution and
saving rate, we control our liquidity constraint measure and find the significant negative
effects if the household has the financial credit or an activated credit card; however, these
estimates may be potentially problematic if there exists reverse causality. For example, the
current income and saving level of a household will definitely affect the next period income
and also affect the household financial and credit market behavior. Also, a third unobservable
factor such as the risk and financial attitude that drives the difference between the household
liquidity constraint and consumption behavior. Therefore, we use a Difference-in-Difference
(DID) method to estimate the effect of the liquidity constraints on the household saving
rates.
We only use the household that is credit constrained in 2013 as the whole sample from
CHFS data and separates them into two groups: treatment group is the unconstrained
household in the year 2015 and comparison group is the still constrained group in the year
2015. We use the Difference-in-Difference (DID) specification, and the variable of interest
is the interaction term of treatment dummy and year dummy variable, which measures the
average “treatment” effect of credit unconstrained on the household saving rate.
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We use the t-test of all the controlled characteristics of the treatment and comparison
group in the leading year to address the validity of the “common trend” assumption. AS the
results, we provide support for the validity of this identifying assumption. Thus, according to
the Difference-in-Difference (DID) specification, the key coefficient of interest is that before
the interaction term of treatment dummy and year dummy variable. As the column 1 and
2 of Table A.6 shows, the estimated effects of credit unconstrained on the household saving
rate is significantly negative by using the credit card measure. The difference of odd and
even column is that the income control variable, for the odd ones we simply control for the
household disposable income, and control for the logarithm of household disposable income
for the even ones. Compared to the still credit constrained sample, the credit unconstrained
sample will decrease the household saving rate by 11 to 27 percent, that is to say, the average
“treatment” effect of credit unconstrained on the household saving rate is impressive, and
credit constraint is an anchor to reduce the saving rate especially for poor households.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table A.6 show the estimated effects of credit unconstrained on the
household saving rate is significantly negative by using the financial credit measure (Zeldes,
1989a) by using the CHFS and CFPS data. The most recent CHIP data sample of the year
2013 is in the year 2009, and it should be more problematic due to the longer time span.
The Difference-in-Difference (DID) specification and the t-test for the two sample groups
are also the same The magnitude and significance of the interaction term are similar for
the financial constraint measures. Compared to the still financial credit constrained sample,
the financial credit unconstrained sample will decrease the household saving rate by 21 to
26 percent and 24 to 26 percent for CHFS and CFPS data, respectively. The conspicuous
effect of the borrowing and financially unconstrained on the household saving rate confirm
our data facts and theoretical implication that the existence of the liquidity constraint leads
to a significantly higher household saving rate and also expect the liquidity constraint lead
to higher aggregate saving rate if we measure household sample as more aggregate level.
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2.5.3 Income inequality and saving rate
Evidence across counties: cross-section regressions
We have seen that the household saving rate response to a move up in the current and
permanent income quintile significantly positive. We address the research question what the
general equilibrium effect of the aggregate household saving rate from a rise in the income
inequality. We raised this by examining the calculated county-level data and indicators from
CHFS 2015, CFPS 2014 and CHIP 2013 data sets for any association between local total
saving rate and Gini coefficient. The three data sets cover 353 counties, 334 counties and 212
counties, respectively. The empirical exercise is valid for the causal relationship between the
local total saving rate and inequality measure because the inequality across the county has
no association with the county local saving rate after controlling for the location fixed effects.
The income inequality indicators we use is the Gini coefficient and other measures such as
coefficient of variation, Theil index, Mehran index, Piesch index, Kakwani index and the
income ratio of the top 20 percent of households to the bottom 20 percent of households or
relative mean deviation (Chu and Wen, 2017; De Maio, 2007). We perform the cross-sectional
regression that links a county i’s saving rate in the year 2013-2015 with the inequality index,
controlling for location fixed effects and other factors. The variable we controlled maintain
the previous specification as the (Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 2000) such as the local level
young-dependent ratio (YDratio) and the old-dependent ratio (ODratio). To be precise, we
report the results both controlling the county level young-dependent ratio (YDratio) and the
old-dependent ratio (ODratio) or not to check the robustness of the effect. The location local
saving rate and the inequality indexes, along with the young-dependent ratio (YDratio) and
the old-dependent ratio (ODratio) are computed from CHFS 2015, CFPS 2014 and CHIP
2013 data sets. The saving rate of each county is defined as local total income minus
consumption, divided by income. The inequality measure is defined as (De Maio, 2007) and
local per-capita disposable income is defined as the county local total income divided by the
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local total population. We cluster the standard errors by province.
Income inequality and aggregate household saving rate
The odd column of Table A.7 report the regression results with only county per-capita
income and Gini coefficient as the regressors, using the CHFS, CFPS and CHIP data set,
respectively. The effect of income inequality on local saving rate is significantly positive at
5 percent level: a 1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with higher county
saving rate by 0.18–0.20 percent points. The coefficient on local per-capita income is around
0.33 and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. In other words, CHFS 2015
data reveals that the county level saving rate tends to be higher in the county with more
unbalanced income distribution. In any case, we note that similar household saving rate
age-profile patterns relative to the prediction of the life cycle hypothesis are documented
in Chamon and Prasad (2010) since we note that the share of young-age population and
the old-age population has a positive significant coefficient. A 1 percent increase in the the
old-dependent ratio (ODratio) or young-dependent ratio (YDratio) is associated with 0.35
to 0.6 percent higher county saving rate. These results may imply that that old-age house-
holds or household with children tend to save more than working-age household, however
the significant association appears in the CHFS data set is not consistent for other two data
sets. Columns 3 to 6 of Table A.7 show the estimated effects of Gini coefficient on local
saving rate is not significant: a 1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with
insignificant higher local saving rate by 0.13 and 0.02 percent points for CFPS and CHIP
data, respectively. To save space, we do not report the results using other inequality mea-
sures, and some of the association between the income inequality and local saving rate are
significantly positive at 5 to 10 percent level. To summarize, although the positive relation-
ship between high-income inequality and a high county level saving rate is not robust and
statistically significant, we can conclude that the increase in the current income inequality
would make the local total household saving rate even higher.
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2.5.4 Marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (PIH) states that one’s current consumption
is determined not just only by the current income but also by the expected future income
(permanent income). The hypothesis suggests that the changes in consumption are mainly
driven by the changes in permanent income rather than the changes in current income, which
implies that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of permanent income would be
greater than the MPC out of current income. To know how Chinese household would respond
to the current income, we estimate Equation (2.12) by running five separate cross-sectional
regressions, with each one focusing on one income quintile sample. Table A.8 presents the
estimates of the MPC out of each type of income.
In panel (a) of Table A.8, for both types of income, the estimated MPCs are significantly
positive in the CHFS. The estimated MPCs out of permanent income range from 223 RMB
per 1000 RMB for the highest-income quintile households to 778 RMB per 1000 RMB for
the lowest. We notice that the coefficients are decreasing with income classes except for the
quintile 4. For the quintile 4, the coefficients are 541 RMB per 1000 RMB, which is not only
greater than the quintile 5 but also than the quintile 3. The estimated MPCs out of current
income share the similar pattern to the permanent income. The lowest-income quintile has
the largest coefficient of 788 RMB per 1000 RMB, and the highest-income quintile has the
smallest MPC with 178 RMB per 1000 RMB. Except for the quintile 4, the coefficients
exhibit a decreasing pattern with as income quintiles move up. The estimated MPC out
of current income for the quintile 4 is 507 RMB per 1000 RMB, which is larger than the
quintile 3 and 5. These results indicate that the MPC out of both types of income for the
bottom 20 percent households is much higher than the top 20 percent.
Panel (b) shows the results from similar regression using CFPS. The MPCs for both
types of income are highly significant. The estimates of the MPCs out of current income
range from 336 RMB per 1000 RMB for the quintile 5 to 927 RMB per 1000 RMB for the
quintile 1. They display a decreasing pattern with income levels except for the quintile 2,
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whose estimated MPC is 361 RMB per 1000 RMB, but it is still larger than the quintile
5. For the MPC out of permanent income, excluding the quintile 2, the coefficients are still
exhibiting a decreasing pattern with income classes. A little bit differences from the MPC
out of current income is that the coefficient for the quintile 2 is 347 RMB per 1000 RMB,
which is the smallest among the five quintiles. The MPC out of both types of income for
the lowest-income quintile is again much higher than the highest-income quintile.
The results of estimation from CHIP are shown in panel (c) of the table. The estimated
MPCs out of permanent income is 613 RMB per 1000 RMB for the bottom 20 percent
households. It increases a little bit to 623 RMB per 1000 RMB for the second income
quintile and then decreases steadily from 510 RMB per 1000 RMB for the third income
quintile to 233 RBM per 1000 RMB for the top 20 percent households. All the numbers
are significantly positive. For the estimated MPCs out of current income, the CHIP data
exhibit a diminishing pattern as income quintiles move up, decreasing from 563 RMB per
1000 RMB for the bottom 20 percent households to 167 RMB per 1000 RMB for the top 20
percent households. Except for the coefficient for the top 20 percent households, all others
are statistically significantly positive. Besides, the results in the CHIP exhibit the pattern
implied by the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) that the coefficients for the permanent
income higher than that for the current income.
In sum, although we do not see a diminishing MPC with income classes across three data
sets, there is still a not surprising pattern that the MPC out of both types of income for the
bottom 20 percent households are much higher than that for the top 20 percent households.
The results are consistent with empirical evidence in the literature.
2.6 Conclusion
We show in this paper the role of income inequality interacting with liquidity constraints
in explaining the high household saving rate in China. In a simple two-period model, house-
holds are heterogeneous in income and subjective discount factor, and whether the liquidity
constraint is binding, consumption and saving rate are endogenously determined. The model
41
generates several predictions consistent data facts: (1) the rich save more; (2) the propor-
tion of constrained households for the poor is higher than that for the rich; (3) liquidity
constraints would increase household saving rate. (4) when income inequality increases, the
rich save even more, in the meanwhile, the poor would also save more due to the binding
liquidity constraints, and thus the aggregate household saving rate would rise.
Using three sources of large, nationally representative household survey data sets, the
China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and the
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), we provide direct empirical evidence implied
by the theoretical model. We find that in China, (1) the top 20 percent permanent income
households’ saving rate is 19–23 percent significant higher than the bottom 20 percent house-
holds’. (2) the bottom 20 percent permanent income households are more likely to face a
liquidity constraint, with a 12–20 percent significantly higher probability; (3) the existence
of liquidity constraints would lead to a significant increase of more than 20 percent in the
household saving rate; (4) income inequality would have a significant positive impact on
the aggregate household saving rate ath the county level, with a 1 point on a scale of 100
measure increase in the Gini coefficient leading to an increase of 0.2 percent in the aggregate
saving rate; (5) the estimated MPC for the top 20 percent households range from 200 to 400
RMB per 1000 RMB, while for the bottom 20 percent, the range from 600 to 900 RMB per
1000 RMB.
These findings would have significant policy implications. The Chinese government’s
policies on reducing the saving rate have not yet produced substantial results. If income
inequality and liquidity constraints were the key reasons for the high aggregate household
saving rate, the resulting policy would be drastically different. For example, it is appropriate
for the Chinese government to design some income redistribution programs (such as EITC) to
reduce income inequality or devote more resources to support the credit market development.
An economic policy of tackling income inequality would lower the aggregate saving rate, thus
becoming a policy of economic transition and growth.
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3. INCENTIVES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN A+B PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
3.1 Introduction
Public procurement, which is the purchase by governments and state-owned enterprises
of goods, services, and works, constitutes a substantial proportion of GDP and has a direct
and vital impact on the economy. For example, according to estimations drawing from
National Accounts data, governments in OECD member countries spend on average 12.1
percent of their GDP on public procurement in 2013. In the United States, public-sector
procurement accounts for over 10 percent of GDP (Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011). An
innovative procurement mechanism widely used by state transportation agencies to select
qualified contractors is called A+B procurement contracts.1 The A+B procurement contract
also referred as the Cost-Plus-Time contract, is awarded through a first-price, sealed-bid
scoring auction that scores bidders on the two-dimensional bid of contract items: the quoted
cost (A component) and the quoted completion time (B component). The project will be
awarded to the bidder with the lowest score. Motivated by the practical prevalence of this
procurement mechanism, this paper makes the first effort to identify and estimate a structural
model of A+B procurement contracts with time incentives and construction uncertainty. Our
structural model can be used to conduct social welfare analysis of the A+B mechanism and
will shed some lights on the study of contract design in procurement industry.
Drawing on the score auction model of Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008), we
incorporate time incentives/disincentive scheme and allow for a discrepancy between the bid-
ding time and actual completion time by incorporating construction risks. The contracting
game and the constructing practice proceed as follows. Before the bidding stage, the pro-
curer will announce an estimated bundle of construction costs and working days, a selecting
1In the 1990s, the A+B mechanism was first introduced by the Department of Transportation (DOT) of
California as an experiment for emergency-type projects because of the criticism that highway constructions
took too much time, and has been extended to non-emergency type project since 2000. See the memorandum
issued by the DOT of California (http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/oppd/design/m093002.pdf).
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rule for awarding the contract, and a provision for rewarding early completion and punishing
late completion. These are common knowledge to all players. Next, upon this information
being advertised before bidding, each contractor’s will quote a sealed price-day bid. The
bid depends on contractor’s innate efficiency cost parameter, which is served as a private
information and is drawn independently by nature. The contract will be awarded to the
bidder who has the lowest score, which is calculated by the procurer’s pre-announced rule.
In the construction stage, before the winning contractor’s work, a cost shock is realized
and observed to the contractor. The contractor then rationalizes the actual working days
to maximize the profit. Due to the existence of the construction uncertainties, the actual
working days may deviate from the bidding days. Because of such discrepancy, the A+B
contracting mechanism may be neither ex-ante nor ex-post efficient, meaning that the A+B
mechanism may not select the contractor who will generate the highest social welfare among
all bidders and the winning contractor will not necessarily maximize the social welfare.
We show that the model primitives including the contractor’s cost function, the con-
tractor’s private-type distribution, incentive and disincentive parameters can be nonpara-
metrically identified from the bidding dataset and contracting dataset. The identification
of model primitives can be established through the equilibrium conditions implied by the
model, together with some functional restrictions on the cost function and the variation of
agents’ characteristics. Specifically, our identification argument takes several steps. First,
we use the result in the influential work of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) to identify
the pseudo-type in the theoretical model. Similar to Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000),
who provide a general identification result on the bidders’ private-type, we explore the one-
to-one mapping between the bidding score and the pseudo-type implied by the theory and
the number of bidders to back out each bidder’s private-type. Second, we use the result
in Torgovitsky (2015) to identify the one-to-one structural link between the pseudo-type
and the actual private-type. Some mild restrictions on the contractor’s cost function, the
variation of contractors’ characteristics and bidding days, and the normalization condition
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of unobserved heterogeneity are used to recover the pseudo-type function. Based on these
two identified one-to-one mappings, we can identify the contractor’s private-type distribu-
tion according to the result in Matzkin (2003). Third, we use the observed actual working
days to identify incentive and disincentive parameters. We show that the cutoff values of
uncertainty for deciding whether or not to complete the project on-time or early or delay
are the same across private-types. Having identified all objectives above, the identification
of contractor’s cost function is established accordingly.
We apply our model to evaluate the social efficiency of A+B contracts in California’s
construction projects between 2003 and 2008. The empirical questions we would like to
address are twofold. First, whether the contractors selected by the California Department
of Transportation will generate the highest social welfare among all competitors. That is,
whether it is possible that there would exist another contractor who would produce a higher
level of social welfare if it would be selected. We call this ex-ante efficiency. Second, no matter
which contractor would be selected, whether or not it would always lead to a maximum level
of social welfare. We call this ex-post efficiency.
Specifically, we propose a three-step semiparametric method to estimate the parameters
of the structural model, and then based on the estimates, we simulate the actual working
days for other contractors if they would implement the project under the same exogenous
shocks. We find that 66 percent of A+B contracts are ex-ante inefficient with a welfare loss
of $1.4 million per contract. Besides, we calculate ex-post optimal social welfare for each
contract, and find that 52 percent of the contracts are ex-post inefficient with a welfare loss of
$3.5 million per contract. Second, we perform two alternative mechanisms, and find that the
counterfactual experiments would increase significantly social welfare in both ex-ante and ex-
post. Specifically, we find that the counterfactual A design with time incentive contracting
will decrease the ex-ante inefficiency to 8.7 percent and increasing welfare by 2.558 million
dollars. Regarding ex-post efficiency, although all contracts will be inefficient under A design,
the average welfare loss is much smaller (0.289 million dollars). Furthermore, under the
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alternative lane rental policy, the ex-ante inefficiency will be reduced by 61.4 percent on
average with an average welfare gain of 0.569 million dollars. For ex-post inefficiency, the
lane rental policy performs much better, with 100 percent inefficiency reduction and welfare
gain of 4.135 million dollars.
Related literature
This paper is related to three main bodies of literature. A wide array of theoretical
models of regulation have been used to study procurement problem (see, e.g., Weitzman,
1974; McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Riordan and Sappington, 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1987,
1993; Manelli and Vincent, 1995; Krishna, 2009). In the context of A+B mechanism, Che
(1993) studies a two-dimensional scoring auction when private information is one-dimensional
and analyzes optimal buying mechanism. Branco (1997) explores the impact of correlated
bidder costs on the design of the multidimensional mechanism. Asker and Cantillon (2008)
provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions under bidders’
multidimensional private information and show that scoring auctions dominate several other
commonly used mechanisms. Along the lines of Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008),
we propose a stylized model of A+B bidding in the context of highway procurement in an
environment where construction uncertainty exists, and contractors may have the incentive
to deviate their bidding when time incentive scheme is introduced.
This paper also contributes to broad literature on the identification and estimation of
structural models in auction and contract theory. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) show
that the underlying distribution of bidders’ private values in the first-price sealed-bid auctions
within the independent private values (IPV) framework can be nonparametrically identified
from observed bids and the number of actual bidders. An, Hu, and Shum (2010) develop
a nonparametric procedure to recover the conditional distribution of the bids given the
number of bidders and consider the identification and estimation problem when the number
of actual bidders is unknown to econometrician, exploiting the results from recent literature
on the models with misclassification error (see, e.g., Mahajan, 2006; Hu, 2008). To our
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best knowledge, there are very few studies on the rigorous econometric analysis of models
related to contract theory. Some of the previous studies build their argument upon the
one-to-one mapping between the characteristics of contract in the data and unobserved type
of agents (see, e.g., d’Haultfoeuille, Février, et al., 2007; Aryal, Perrigne, and Quang, 2012;
Perrigne and Vuong, 2011, 2012). Comparing with their work, we consider A+B incentive
contracts which are competed via a first-price sealed-bid scoring auction and develops a
quantitatively different argument of identification. To our best knowledge, our paper makes
the first attempt to formally address the issue of identification in the scoring auction models,
which is innovative and novel in the literature
Besides, our paper contributes to a growing, but still relatively scarce empirical literature
on auctions with multidimensional attributes (see, e.g., Levin and Athey, 2001; Marion, 2007;
Lewis and Bajari, 2011; Krasnokutskaya and Seim, 2011; Krasnokutskaya, 2011; Bajari,
Houghton, and Tadelis, 2014). Lewis and Bajari (2011) use the same sources of data as
ours to estimate the benefits to commuters from the acceleration of completion time and
that the contractual benefit gain from expanding the use of A+B mechanism design to
all highway construction projects. In comparison, our work differs from Lewis and Bajari
(2011) in several fundamental aspects. First, in terms of the theoretical model, we take
into account the cost uncertainties when modeling the bidding environment and characterize
contractors’ behavior. Specifically, we show that discrepancy between the quoted completion
days and intended actual completion days can happen due to the presence of unanticipated
cost shocks during the construction stage. Second, concerning empirical results, we conduct
the empirical analysis of social welfare related to the A+B mechanism and demonstrate that
A+B mechanism can be neither ex-ante nor ex-post efficient, which contradicts the welfare
analysis result in Lewis and Bajari (2011) since they ignore the construction uncertainties.
Roadmap
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents our model of A+B
procurement contracting with time incentives and construction uncertainties. In Section 3.3,
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we establish the main identiïňĄcation results. Section 3.4 introduces the A+B mechanism
background of CalTrans highway procurement contracts, and describes the data. A three-
step semiparametric estimation procedure is discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 reports the
estimation results. In Section 3.7, we conduct counterfactual welfare analysis of the A+B
mechanism. Section 3.8 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs, figures, tables, and other
details.
3.2 Model
In this section we lay out a structural model of A+B contracting along the lines of scor-
ing auction literature (see, e.g., Che, 1993; and Asker and Cantillon, 2008). In addition to
extending the classical scoring auction model to a two-stage model, when agents are making
bidding decisions, the structural model also includes both time incentive/disincentive mech-
anism and construction uncertainties in the execution of the contract. The structural model
allows us to quantify the importance of incentives and uncertainties in bidding decisions and
estimate policy counterfactuals. For a generic function f(·) with more than one argument,
we denote fl(·) its derivative with respect to the l-th argument. A random variable is denoted
by uppercase letter while its realized values are denoted by lower case letters.
3.2.1 Setup
A buyer (or procurer) seeks to procure an indivisible good (e.g., a highway project)
among N ≥ 2 potential risk-neutral bidders (or contractors). Unlike the traditional first-
price auction, the bidder needs to submit a bid combination of total cost pB ∈ P ⊂ R+ and
working days xB ∈ X ⊂ R+ in the procurement auction. The contract then is awarded via
a so-called “first-score” auction in the sense that the lowest scorer wins the contract. The
score is calculated by a rule, s : P ×X 7→ s(P ,X ), which is determined by the procurer and
represents a continuous preference relation of the buyer over the bid combination (pB, xB).
The winning cost-time combination becomes the contractual cost and working days.
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Contractor’s cost function
We assume that contractors have different abilities, which reflect the innate efficiency
cost (“type”, hereafter) to complete the construction project and each contractor knows her
own type. The type is denoted as θ, which reflects contractors-specific private information
of cost, such as their current managerial capacity, their expertise with working on a tight
schedule, and their relationships with input suppliers or with subcontractors. The total cost
function is given by:
TC︸︷︷︸
total cost
= (1 + ε)C(xA, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
construction cost
+ K(xA, xB, i, d),︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive cost
(3.1)
where we assume that the total cost function consists of two parts and is additively separable.
The first part in Equation (3.1) is the bidder’s actual construction cost. We assume that it
has a multiplicative structure. That is, the actual construction cost for the contractor equals
a deterministic cost C(xA, θ) times a percentage deviation from the deterministic part of
construction cost due to the construction uncertainty ε. Similar assumption on the cost
function in the literature includes Krasnokutskaya (2011), Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis
(2014), and etc. The multiplicative structure in cost function is implicit in Krasnokutskaya
(2011), where the bidder’s cost realization is given by an auction common component times
an individual cost component. In Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), the authors assume
the bidder’s actual cost is a variant of the engineer’s cost estimate. The second part in
Equation (3.1) is the incentive cost that captures rewards and punishments scheme in the
contract. The incentive costs depend on the relationship between the actual working days
xA and the bidding days xB, and incentive parameters i and d. The specification of incentive
costs K is as follows:
K(xA, xB, i, d) = 1(xA < xB) · i · (xA − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward early completion
+1(xA > xB) · d · (xA − xB),︸ ︷︷ ︸
punish delay completion
(3.2)
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where I(·) is an indicator function, i ∈ R+ and d ∈ R+ are daily cash bonus and daily cash
punishment, respectively. Equation (3.2) implies that the contractor may face punishment if
the project fails to be completed according to the contractual working days. Alternatively,
the contractor may receive awards due to the early completion relative to the contractual
working days.
Timing and decisions
The construction procurement usually takes place in three stages: First, at the beginning
of the auction, the procurer announces three messages: (i) an engineer’s estimated specifi-
cation of the project, (pE, xE), which is the estimate of the project costs and the project
length in working days respectively; (ii) a scoring rule s : P×X 7→ s(P ,X ) that associates a
score to any potential contract and represents a continuous preference relation over the con-
tractor’s two-dimension bidding (pB, xB); (iii) an incentive/disincentive (I/D) scheme (i, d),
which is the daily cash bonus for the early completion and the daily cash penalty for the
delay completion, respectively.
Second, upon this information being advertised before bidding, each contractor draws
the private-type θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R+ independently from a cumulative distribution function FΘ(·),
with a density fΘ(·) on a support [θ, θ]. The contract then quotes a sealed price-days bid
(pB, xB). The contract is awarded to the bidder that quotes the lowest score (a.k.a. the
“winner”).
Third, according to terms of the contract, the construction stage begins, and then the
contractor receives payment when the project is completed. In the construction stage, the
contractor may encounter various kinds of construction risks or construction uncertainties.
The contractor may adjust implementation plan in response to them. We assume that all
uncertainties are characterized by a percentage deviation from the costs and that they are
realized at the beginning of the project to be carried out.2 Figure B.1 illustrates the timing
2In fact, we assume that ε is a sufficient statistics that reflects all construction uncertainties in the imple-
mentation stage. This is an imperfect approximation, although, in the reality, the realization of construction
uncertainties is a complex dynamic process because different kinds of uncertainties may occur at different
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of events and decisions.
Remark. The engineering’s estimate (pE, xE) serves as a role of “reservation price”in stan-
dard auction models. Unlike the reservation price, however, (pE, xE) is announced by the
procurer at the beginning and this is observed by all bidders. Neither xB > xE nor pB > pE
can be acceptable by the procurer. Therefore, the procurer imposes an upper bound on the
contractor’s bid.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
We now provide the details of contractors’ behavior. We maintain the following restric-
tions on the cost function C and the scoring rule s throughout the paper. Notice that the
engineer’s estimate (pE, xE), the scoring rule s(pB, xB), the incentive scheme (i, d), and type
distribution FΘ(·) are common knowledge. This is an independent private values (IPV)
framework.
Assumption 2. The actual construction costs (1 + ε)C(xA, θ) for the private-type θ to
complete the project in xA days satisfy:
(a) the uncertainty ε is independent and identically distributed according to a known
distribution function Fε(·) with a density fε(·) on its support [−1,∞) with the mean E(ε) = 0.
(b) the deterministic cost function C(·, θ) is strictly decreasing convex for every θ;
(c) C(xA, ·) is strictly increasing for every xA ∈ R+, and the marginal cost C1(xA, ·) is
strictly decreasing for every xA ∈ R+.
In the part (a) of the Assumption 2, we assume that the lower bound of the uncertainty
is −1 to ensure non-negative actual cost; part (b) implies that the cost function is decreasing
convex in actual working days xA. To be specific, both the original construction cost, denoted
as Co(e, θ), and the actual working days XA(e) may be a function of expediting effort e,
given a particular type θ. We assume that Co(e, θ) and xA(e) are increasingly convex and
decreasingly convex in e, respectively. Therefore, C(xA, θ) is considered as a transformed cost
time points.
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function with property of decreasingly convex in xA.3 Part (c) is standard in the procurement
contract literature (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Assumption 3. The scoring rule function S is given by:
s(pB, xB) = pB + cu · xB, (3.3)
where cu ∈ R+ is the weight (user cost), calculating the time value in dollars.
The linear in price scoring rule in Assumption 3 is empirically relevant because it is
widely used in many public procurement auctions of U.S. states’ Department of Transporta-
tion (DoT), such as California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia, etc.4
When the project is completed and the payment from the procurer is received, the con-
tractor’s ex-post payoff pi is given by:
pi = pB − TC = pB − (1 + ε)C(xA, θ)−K(xA, xB; i, d). (3.4)
The contractor needs to make two decisions: (i) bidding cost and working days in the
procurement auction and (ii) actual working days in the construction stage given winning
the contract. Thus we solve the contractor’s optimal bidding decisions on costs and working
days by backward induction. First, if the contractor would win the contract, the winner
chooses actual working days to maximize the payoff function in Equation (3.4), after knowing
a realization of uncertainty ε at the beginning of the construction stage. We present an
argument in Lemma 1 for the contractor’s decision on actual working days.
3Lewis and Bajari (2011) assumed a U-shaped cost curve that seems to be a textbook long-run average
cost curve, with the most efficient scale of construction at the engineer’s estimate xE .
4We admit that there are a variety of forms of scoring rules used in real-world public procurement. For
example, many states in the U.S., such as Alaska, Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina, use the price-
over-quality ratio (PQR) rule to score the bidders; In addition, in some European countries, the scoring rule
is the sum of the price and quality measurements, but the score is nonlinear in price. Here we restrict our
attention to the quasi-linear score rule because of the data in hands.
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Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2 - 3, for any given bid (pB, xB), incentive coefficients (i, d),
and the realization of private-type θ and uncertainty ε, the optimal completion time xA∗(·),
defined as xA∗ = argmin
xA
{
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
}
, can be characterized as follows:
xA
∗
(θ, ε) =

xd(θ, ε) if xB ∈ [0, xd) ⇔ ε ≥ εd(xB, θ; d)
xB if xB ∈ [xd, xi] ⇔ εi(xB, θ; i) ≤ ε ≤ εd(xB, θ; d)
xi(θ, ε) if xB ∈ (xi, xE] ⇔ ε ≤ εi(xB, θ; i)
where xd(θ, ε;C) and xi(θ, ε;C) satisfy −C1(xd, θ, ε) = d and −C1(xi, θ, ε) = i, respectively;
εi and εd satisfy −C1(xB, θ, εi) = i and −C1(xB, θ, εd) = d, respectively.
In this lemma, εi and εd denote the cutoff values for the cost shock ε. Specifically, if
the realized value of ε is greater than εd (negative shock), then the optimal decision of the
contractor is to delay the construction process and complete at xd, which is greater than xB.
On the other hand, if ε < εi (positive shock), the optimal decision is to complete early at xi.
Finally, if the cost shock is moderate, i.e., between εi and εd. The decision of the contractor
is to stick to the original plan and complete exactly as the bidding time.
An important implication of Lemma 1 suggests that the optimal actual working days xA∗
may deviate from the bidding days xB due to its dependence on the realization uncertainty
ε. This is important because it may affect the contractor’s bidder behavior. Figure B.2
illustrates the scenario of delay completion under negative construction shocks, meaning
that the realized  will increase the actual cost of completing the construction project.
Remark. The construction uncertainty is important in our model since it provides the un-
derlying source driving actual working days in the construction stage deviates (no matter
what level of) bidding days in the bidding stage. However, without uncertainty, actually,
working days solely depend on bidding days. That is, for some range of bidding days, actu-
ally working days will deviate bidding days, whereas for other range they are the same. We
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provide detail proof and illustration in Appendix.
Next, we turn back to the contractors’ bidding strategy in the competing stage. The
contractor quotes a bid combination of costs pB and working days xA to do the following
maximization:
max
pB ,xB
{
pB − Emin
xA
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]}
Pr
(
win
∣∣∣ S = s),
where s is the bidding score as in Equation (3.3) and Pr(win|S = s) is the probability for
the bidder to win the auction given her bidding score. The expectation is taken with respect
to the summary of construction uncertainties ε. Define the contractor’s effective cost, or
pseudo-type, which reflects the contractor’s productive potential as
v(θ) ≡ min
xB
{
cux
B + E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]}
. (3.5)
Then following Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008), the contractor’s optimization
problem is equivalent to:
max
s
(
s− v(θ))Pr(win | S = s). (3.6)
Let FV (·) denote the CDF of the pseudo-type V and let v denote the lower bound for
the support of V . Then the following proposition characterizes the unique symmetric pure
strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (psBNE) of the A+B bidding models.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, the model of A+B bidding has a unique symmetric
psBNE
(
pB
∗
(θ; cu, i, d), x
B∗(θ; cu, i, d)
)
:
pB
∗
= E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]
−
∫ v
v
[
1− FV (v˜)
1− FV (v)
]N−1
dv˜, (3.7)
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xB
∗
= argmin
xB
{
cux
B + E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]}
; (3.8)
Furthermore, if θ is scalar, then
pB
∗
= E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]
−
∫ θ
θ
EC2(xA
∗
, θ, ε)
[
1− FΘ(θ˜)
1− FΘ(θ)
]N−1
dθ˜. (3.9)
∂xB
∗
∂θ
(θ; cu, i, d) > 0. (3.10)
3.2.3 Discussion on social efficiency
To exam how the A+B mechanism affects the social welfare, we focus on two dimensions
of social efficiency: (i) ex-ante efficiency and (ii) ex-post efficiency. Ex-ante efficiency means
that the contract design always picks the right contractor in the sense that the winning
contractor would generate the highest social welfare in equilibrium than that of others if they
would perform the construction. Ex-post efficiency implies that no matter which contractor
would win the contract, the winner always maximizes the social welfare. Let SW ≡ Vc −
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ)− cuxA denote the ex-post realized social welfare, where Vc is the total value
of the construction project, and (1 + ε)C(xA, θ) + cuxA is the total social costs (TSC) in
which cuxA is the cost due to the externalities of the construction.5 Formally, the ex-ante
efficiency and the ex-post efficiency are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Ex-ante efficiency). A contract design is ex-ante efficient if si < min
j 6=i
sj
implies that SWi ≥ max
j 6=i
SWj.
5This specification is similar to the one in Lewis and Bajari (2011) where they claim that the linear
structure in the working days, with a constant user cost as the coefficient, seems to be the right approximation
although it is easy to be extended to the more complicated one.
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Definition 2 (Ex-post efficiency). A contract design is ex-post efficient if xA maximizes
SW for all type θ ∈ [θ, θ], i.e., xA satisfies −(1 + ε)C1(xA, θ) = cu.
Figure B.4 illustrates that the A+B mechanism may be neither ex-ante efficient nor ex-
post efficient when there is a cost shock to the cost function, e.g., an unexpected weather
condition that happens during the construction stage. Consider two bidders, 1 and 2, with
different private-types, θ1 and θ2 respectively, and θ1 < θ2. The theoretical model implies
that the pseudo-type is a strictly increasing transformation of the private-type, and standard
results from the auction literature imply that the contract will be awarded to the bidder with
lowest pseudo-type. Thus bidder one will win the contract. As illustrated in Figure B.2,
under a negative shock to the cost function, the bidder 1’s best response to it may be to
delay the completion at xd1, thereby the total social cost will be cuxd1 + C(xd1, θ1) as shown
in panel (1) of Figure B.4. However, if the bidder two would be awarded the contract and
under the negative shock, the total social cost would be cuxb2 + C(xd2, θ2), which is smaller
than that of the bidder 1. This may be because that the bidder two can have much smaller
private costs than that of bidder one, even though the working days conducted by bidder
two would be longer than that of bidder 1. Thus, the A+B mechanism may not pick the
most socially-efficient contractor from the ex-ante perspective.
Panel (2) of Figure B.4 shows that under the same negative shock to the contractor one,
the A+B mechanism may not generate the highest social welfare. According to the definition
of social welfare, the social optimal completion days should be xcu1 , at which the contractor
internalizes the social costs and aligns the private interests with social interests. Therefore,
as long as the actual working days deviate from xcu1 , due to the convexity of cost function in
working days, the total social cost will be not be minimized, and thus the social welfare is
not optimal.
3.3 Identification
In this section we show how the model primitives, denoted asM ≡ [C(·, ·), FΘ(·), i, d],
can be identified when the data report the realized bidding costs pB, the bidding work-
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ing days xB, the engineering’s estimation of working days xE, the actual working days xA,
and a vector of exogenous variables z ⊂ RD that summarizes bidders and contracts char-
acteristics. The vector z, for example in our empirical application of California highway
procurement practice, can include firm capacity, location, distance and a binary variable
indicating whether the contract is federally funded or not, etc. All the model primitives
may depend on z or its sub-vectors. We suppress z whenever there is no ambiguity since
our identification argument will be conditional on z. We assume that the data observed is
rationalized from the model primitivesM and that the equilibrium conditions presented in
the preceding section are satisfied.
Our identification strategy takes several steps. First, following a standard argument
from Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), we identify the pseudo-type v(θ) from the number
of bidders in the procurement auctions and the distribution of bidding scores. Second,
we recover the structural link between the (observed) bidding days and the distribution of
the pseudo-type through an instrument variable, which is critical to the identification of the
distribution of the contractor’s private-type. Combining the identified distribution of pseudo-
type and the identified structural link, we can recover the distribution of the private-type.
Third, by exploiting the equilibrium conditions, the identification of incentive/disincentive
parameters can be achieved. Finally, with the identification of model primitives above, we
identify the marginal cost function through an exclusion restriction, which exploiting the
variations in the quantiles of the cost and taking into account the fact that quantiles of the
private-type distribution remain the same. We thus can identify the cost function up to a
constant.
3.3.1 Identification of the pseudo-type’s distribution
The first step of identification is to identify the pseudo-type v for each bidder. Following
the results in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), we recover the value of pseudo-type, which
is denoted as v, by exploring the equilibrium bidding strategy and the distribution of bid-
ding scores. Specifically, the symmetric monotone pure strategy equilibrium in optimization
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problem (3.6) is obtained by solving the first-order differential equation in s(·):
s′(v) = (N − 1)(s(v)− v) fV (v)
1− FV (v) (3.11)
with boundary condition s(v) = 0. By introducing the distribution of bidding score FS(s) and
its density fS(s), and substituting FS(s) = Pr(s(V ) ≤ s) = Pr(V ≤ s−1(s)) = FV (s−1(s)) =
FV (v) and fS(s) = fV (v)/S ′(v) into (3.11), we get
v = s− 1
N − 1
1− FS(s)
fS(s)
. (3.12)
Hence the pseudo-type in the symmetric monotone psBNE is identified.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 2 - 3, contractors’ pseudo-type v(θ) defined in Equation (3.5)
is nonparametrically identified.
3.3.2 Identification of the private-type’s distribution
We now turn to the nonparametric identification of the distribution of private-type FΘ.
Recall the definition of pseudo-type v, and denote
g(xB
∗
, θ) ≡ cuxB∗ + E[(1 + ε)C(xA∗ , θ) +K(xA∗ , xB∗ ; i, d)],
where xB∗ is the equilibrium bidding days, xA∗ is the best response to the uncertainty, and
recall that the expectation is taken with respect to the uncertainty ε. Then we have
v = g∗(xB
∗
, θ). (3.13)
For notational simplicity, in the following discussion we suppress the optimal bidding
strategy index B∗ in (3.13) and denote g(·, ·) by the true function form when there is no
ambiguity. Notice that the specification in (3.13) is nonseparable (not additively separable)
in the latent private-type, θ, which captures unobserved heterogeneity in the effect of x on v.
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In addition, x is endogenous explanatory variable because x is obtained as the equilibrium
outcome, which is chosen by the contractor corresponding to θ (see, e.g., optimal bidding
strategy). To identify g∗(·, ·), the following assumptions need to be formalized:
Assumption 4. Let G denote the collection of admissible outcome functions on the support
X ×Θ. If g, g˜ ∈ G are distinct, then there does not exist a strictly increasing function f such
that g(x, θ) = g˜(x, f(θ)) for all (x, θ) ∈ X ×Θ.
Assumption 4 is a normalization condition for point identification of function g∗. Matzkin
(2003) showed that some normalization of unobserved heterogeneity is necessary for nonpara-
metric identification. Specifically, she considers an nonseparable model Y = m(X, ε), where
X is exogenous, and m is strictly increasing in ε. Lemma 1 in Matzkin (2003) established
that if there exists a strictly increasing transformation of ε, say ε˜, then the model cannot
be identified. Thus, some normalization conditions are proposed to achieve identification
purpose. See Matzkin (2003) for some specifications.
Assumption 5. There exists an unobserved variable η and observed instrument variable
W ∈ W for X such that X = h(W, η) and satisfies (a) W ⊥ (θ, η). (b) h(w, ·) is strictly
increasing for every w. (c) V |X = x,W = w and X|W = w are (absolutely) continuously
distributed for all x and w.
As is mentioned in Torgovitsky (2015), Assumption 5 (a)-(b) are essentially the scalar
heterogeneity assumption for the first stage estimation of X on W and is the key restriction
in the nonseparable model 3.13. Both the assumption that W is independent of (θ, η) and
the property that h(w, ·) is strictly increasing are standard in the literature of identification
of nonseparable models with endogenous regressors (see, e.g., Imbens and Newey, 2009;
Torgovitsky, 2015; d’Haultfoeuille and Février, 2015).
The requirement of Assumption 5 can be interpreted using the following example: suppose
the instrumental variable W is whether the contract is federally funded or not (W = 1 or 0,
respectively). Then Assumption 5 implies that whether the contract is federally funded or
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not is independent with bidder’s private-type θ, which is plausible since private-type contains
unobserved information about bidder’s characteristics. Furthermore, in practice it is likely
that bidder’s bidding decision can be affected by the funding source for the contract.
The intuition of the identification method can also be illustrated using this example. By
identification assumptions, bidders with bidding days X = x1 in the auctions with federally
funded contract (W = 1) are unobservably identical (in terms of private-type θ) to bidders
with bidding days X = x0 in the auctions with state funded contract (W = 0) for two
distinct bidding days x1 and x0, as long as these two groups of bidders have the same rank
in terms of their respective X distributions, i.e., FX|W (x1|1) = FX|W (x0|0). Since W has no
effect on V , and the pesudo-type V = v has been identified by Lemma 2, the differences in
pseudo-types between these two groups of bidders must be caused solely by the changes in X
from x0 to x1. Therefore the function g∗ can be point-identified by exploring the variations
generated by these two groups of bidders.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 2-5 hold. Then the function g∗ ∈ G is identified on
(X , ϑ).
Because the function g∗(x, ·) is shown to be strictly increasing for every x, the map-
ping between the function g∗ and the distribution of the observable variables FV,X and the
conditionally cumulative distribution FΘ|X is, for every x and θ,
FΘ|X(θ) = FV |X(g∗(x, θ)).
This is because FΘ|X(θ) = Pr(Θ ≤ θ | X) = Pr(g∗(X,Θ) ≤ g∗(x, θ) | X) = Pr(V ≤
g∗(x, θ) | X) = FV |X(g∗(x, θ)). Since g has been identified in the Proposition 2, FΘ|X(·) is
identified accordingly. Therefore, the distribution of private-type can be recovered
FΘ(θ) =
∫
X
F (x, θ)dx =
∫
X
FΘ|X(θ)FX(x)dx =
∫
X
FV |X(g∗(x, θ))FX(x)dx. (3.14)
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3.3.3 Identification of the cost function and other primitives
We now present the identification of cost function C(·, ·), the daily incentive rate i, and
the disincentive rate d.
First, we show that the cutoff values of uncertainty for deciding whether or not to com-
plete the project on-time or early or delay are the same across private-types. To see this,
recall that the economic model in Section 3.2 implies that the cutoff values should set at the
level that makes marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, that is,
−(1 + ερ)C1(xB, θ) = ρ, ρ ∈ {i, d}.
Taking derivative with respect to θ on the both sides, we have
−dερ
dθ
C1(x
B, θ)− (1 + ερ)(C11(xB, θ)dx
B
dθ
+ C12(x
B, θ)) = 0.
Then we have dερ/dθ = 0. This is because C11(xB, θ)dxB/dθ + C12(xB, θ) = 0, which is
shown in Proposition 2 in the Appendix. The probability of early completion is
Pr(XA < XB) = Pr(ε < εi) = Fε(εi),
and it is same across different private-types because of the fact that εi is independent of θ.
Therefore, εi can be identified as
εi = F−1ε (Pr(X
A < XB)), (3.15)
where the distribution of uncertainty ε is assumed to be known and the probability of early
completion can be identified via the frequency of early completion contracts among total
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observations. Similarly, εd can be identified as
εd = F−1ε (1− Pr(XA > XB)). (3.16)
Having identified the thresholds εi and εd, we now present the identification of the expe-
diting cost function C(·, ·). The F.O.C of solving for xB∗ is given by
cu +
∫ εi
−1
(−a)dF (ε) + C1(xB, θ)
∫ εd
εi
(1 + ε)dF (ε) +
∫ ∞
εd
(−b)dF (ε) = 0,
plug in the equations for determining the cutoff values i = −(1 + εi)C1(xB, θ) and d =
−(1 + εd)C1(xB, θ) and solve for C1(xB, θ) as
C1(x
B, θ) = κ, (3.17)
where
κ = − cu
(1 + εi)Fε(εi) + (1 + εd)(1− Fε(εd)) +
∫ εd
εi
(1 + ε)fε(ε)dε
.
We can see that the right hand side of the equation above is known since cu is observed
data, and by Assumption 2, Fε and fε are known. Also εi and εd are already identified in
the previous steps. Hence κ is identified, and it is a constant. Therefore, i and d can be
recovered as i = −κ(1 + F−1ε (Pr(XA < XB))) and d = −κ(1 + F−1ε (1 − Pr(XA > XB)))
respectively.
Finally, we show how to identify cost function C(·, ·). Recall the assumption in part (c) of
Assumption 2, C1(·, θ) is strictly convex, then (3.17) admits a unique function xB = xB(θ;κ)
by the Implicit Function Theorem. Using the argument in the proof of the Proposition 1
that xB(·) is strictly increasing, together with the identified distribution of private-type FΘ
and the known distribution of bidding days FXB , we can recover the functional form of xB(·).
Specifically, since FΘ(θ) = Pr(Θ ≤ θ) = Pr(XB ≤ xB(θ;κ)) = FXB(xB(θ;κ)), then xB(·;κ))
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can be identified
xB(θ;κ) = F−1
XB
(FΘ(θ)) (3.18)
where F−1
XB
(·) is the inverse of the curriculum distribution function of bidding days. (3.17)
implies that the marginal expediting cost function C1 can be identified. Therefore, the
expediting cost function can be identified up to a normalization.
We summarize the results of identification in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 2-5 hold. Then the model primitivesM≡ [C(·, ·), FΘ(·), i, d]
are identified.
3.3.4 Discussion on the constructive estimation
This section discusses estimation method based on the identification results in Section 3.3.
The model primitives we need to estimate include the cost function C(·, ·) and incentive and
disincentive scheme i and d. The estimation method is an application of the semiparametric
minimum distance method proposed in Torgovitsky (2017). Specifically, we will parametrize
C(xB, θ) and (i, d) so that g(x, θ) can be rewritten as gγ0(x, θ), where the subscript γ0 denotes
the true value of the parameters in C(·, ·) and (i, d). Since contractor’s pesudo type v is
unobserved in the data, we can use equation (3.12) and the nonparametric method proposed
in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) the obtain the estimated value vˆ. Specifically,
vˆ = s− 1
N − 1
1− FˆS(s)
fˆS(s)
, (3.19)
where FˆS(s) and fˆS(s) denote the nonparametric (kernel or series) estimator for the CDF
and PDF of the bidding score s. By the identification results in Torgovitsky (2015), we have
γ = γ0 ⇐⇒ (FX|W (·), θ) ⊥ W (3.20)
for all γ in the parameter space Γ, where FX|W (·) is the conditional CDF of X on the
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instrumental variable W . Equation (3.20) implies that
Dγ(t) ≡Pr
[
FX|W (x|w) ≤ tx, g−1γ (x, vˆ) ≤ tθ, w ≤ tw
]
− Pr [FX|W (x|w) ≤ tx, g−1γ (x, vˆ) ≤ tθ]Pr(w ≤ tw)
=Pr
[
x ≤ QX|W (tx|w), vˆ ≤ gγ(x, tθ), w ≤ tw
]
− Pr [x ≤ QX|W (tx|w), vˆ ≤ gγ(x, tθ)]Pr(w ≤ tw)
=0
for every t = (tx, tθ, tw) ∈ T ≡ (0, 1) × Θ ×W if and only γ = γ0. Note that QX|W is the
conditional quantile function of X given W . Let ‖ · ‖µ denote the L2-norm with respect to
a probability measure µ with support containing T . Then ‖Dγ‖µ = 0 if and only if γ = γ0.
Therefore given some consistent estimator Dˆγ of Dγ, we can estimate γ0 by minimizing
‖Dˆγ‖µ.
Let QˆX|W denote a consistent estimator for the conditional quantile function QX|W 6.
Then following Torgovitsky (2017), a feasible estimator of Dγ(t) can be constructed as
Dˆγ(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
1
[
xj ≤ QˆX|W (tx|wj), vˆj ≤ gγ(xj, tθ), wj ≤ tw
]
−
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
1
[
xj ≤ QˆX|W (tx|wj), vˆj ≤ gγ(xj, tθ)
])( 1
n
n∑
j=1
1 [wj ≤ tw]
)
,
and γˆ can be defined as any γ ∈ Γ such that
γˆ = argmin
γ∈Γ
‖Dˆγ‖µ. (3.21)
Consistency and asymptotic normality follows directly from the results in Torgovitsky
(2017).
6In practice, QˆX|W can be obtained by using empirical conditional quantile function when W is a finite
set, or by using kernel smoothing quantile regression if W is continuously distributed.
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3.4 CalTrans Auctions: Background and Data
In this section, we apply our model to analyze the auctions of highway construction
contracts awarded by the California Department of Transportation (“CalTrans”, hereafter).
CalTrans is a government department in the state of California that is responsible for the
planning, construction, and maintenance of public transportation facilities such as highway,
bridge, and railways. The innovative A+B contract design was first introduced by the
CalTrans in the 1990s as an experiment for emergency type projects and has been extended
to non-emergency type projects since 2000. At the beginning of the design of each contract,
the engineer will estimate the project’s cost and a target number of working days for project
completion. A maximum number of lanes that can be closed at each phase of the project
and their closure time will also be specified by design engineers, based on advice from traffic
operation unit. Finally, CalTrans will make a decision as to whether a standard first-price
procurement auction or A+B auction should be adopted during the bidding stage of the
construct.
In the standard design, the bidders draw private costs for completing the project once in-
formed of engineer estimates and quotes their prices in the standard design, and the contract
will be awarded to the bidder who quotes the lowest price and should be completed within
the engineer’s days estimate. In the A+B design, the contract will be awarded according to a
scoring rule, and the contractor must complete the contract within the number of days they
bid; otherwise, penalties, which equal to the user cost in A+B contracts, will be charged for
late completion.
We use the same source of data as Lewis and Bajari (2011). The data includes 3202 bids
submitted by contractors in 708 procurement contracts awarded by the CalTrans between
2003 and 2008. Among these contracts, 424 bids conducted in the 80 contracts that are
implemented by the A+B mechanism. These contracts include barrier construction, bridge
repair or resurfacing, new lane and ramp construction, road rehabilitation, slope work and
widening/realignment. We index the contracts by j = 1, 2, · · · , N and the contractors by
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k = 1, 2, · · · , Nj in the jth contract. For each contract, the data reports initial specification,
which includes estimated project cost and working days, and actual specification adopted
(actual cost and working days). The data also reports the bids submitted by all participating
contractors in each auction as well as several characteristics of the contractors. These include
user cost, which is the weight on the days in the A+B scoring rule, the distance between
each contractor’s location and the working site for the project, number of bidders in each
auction, each contractor’s capacity, which is measured as the total values of all contracts
held by a particular contractor during our sample period, two binary variables that indicates
whether the contractor is located in California and whether the contract is federally funded
or not, average annual daily traffic near the contract location and the fraction of the total
number of lanes on the highway that may be closed during construction hours.
Table B.1 presents the summary statistics for our data. The estimated cost and com-
pleting time for a standard A+B contract is about $ 21.9 million and 314 days. During
the bidding stage of each contract, the average working days each bidder submits is 190.1
days while the average actual working days for each contract is 183.9 days. Among the
80 A+B contracts, only about 42.5 percent (34) will be completed exactly as the bidding
days. Therefore more than 50 percent of A+B contracts will be completed either earlier
or later than contractor’s bidding days. Figure B.6 shows the histogram of the difference
between bidding days and actual working days. This provides some empirical evidence that
contractors may strategically deviate from the bidding days in the execution phases.
As we note in the introduction, our paper is motivated by a different set of empirical
questions than that in Lewis and Bajari (2011). Lewis and Bajari (2011) used this data to
estimate construction costs of the procurement contract, which is assumed to be deterministic
after the realization of contractor’s private-type. However, in reality, it is common for the
contractor to face cost uncertainty during the construction stage. For example, unexpected
bad weather condition may increase the project cost and delay completion time. Therefore,
in contrast, the three primary goals of our empirical application are (a) to estimate the
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expediting cost function and test the restrictions on it imposed by theoretical model in
section 3.2; (b) to evaluate the efficiency of A+B mechanism from both ex-ante and ex-
post perspective: specifically, we would like to answer the questions that whether the social
welfare produced by other contractors would be greater than that of winning contractor in
the A+B bidding and that whether winning contract would maximize the social welfare no
matter which contractor wins the contract; and (c) to access the welfare gains that would
be achieved from counterfactual alternatives including change of incentive rule in the A+B
bidding and change of selecting mechanism to traditional one that only A is considered to
award the contracts.
From a modeling perspective, there is a significant qualitative difference between our
approach and that of Lewis and Bajari (2011). Specifically, Lewis and Bajari (2011) main-
tained that no cost uncertainty would happen during the construction stage of the project
and hence contractor has perfect foresight about the construction cost during the bidding
stage. Thus the model in Lewis and Bajari (2011) cannot explain why bidding days may
deviate from actual working days in the data. In comparison we consider the possible dis-
crepancy between the quoted completion days and intended actual completion days due
to incentive mechanism, and incorporate the effect of construction uncertainty on realized
actual completion days and answer empirical and policy questions (a)-(c) above.
3.5 Econometric Implementation
Our estimation strategy takes three steps. First, following a similar procedure as in Lewis
and Bajari (2014) we estimate the private-type θ by regressing normalized bidding days on
bidder’s characteristics and obtaining the residuals as θˆ; Second, we estimate the equilibrium
pseudo-type v by employing a semiparametric technique as in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis
(2014). Finally, the cost function of the contractor will be estimated by treating θ and v
obtained from the previous steps as data in the dependent variable and applying the method
of minimum distance. The idea is to construct a minimum distance objective function based
on the equilibrium pseudo-type equation (3.5).
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Recall that the identification argument in Section 3.3 is presented for the simple case with
homogeneous contracts, conditional on given contractors’ characteristics, and no structural
observational errors. In comparison, we consider in the current section a general environ-
ment that allows rich heterogeneity among the contract and contractors. Acknowledging the
limited sample size and to make estimation feasible, we now adopt a parametric specification
of model primitives.
3.5.1 Estimation of the bidder’s private-type
Following the theory in Section 3.2, contractors have latent private-type θ. In order to
estimate contractor’s cost function C(·), we need to first obtain estimated value for θ. We
assume that θ is independently and identically distributed across contracts and contractors
with N (0, σ2θ),7 and use a linear regression procedure to estimate θ and σθ.
Recall Proposition 2 indicates that bidding days is strictly increasing in private-type,
therefore in the first stage, we estimate the private-type θ by regressing bidding days (nor-
malized by engineers’ estimates) on bidders’ specific characteristics and treat residuals as
the estimated private-types for bidders.
xBjk
xEjk
= zjk · ω + θjk, (3.22)
where zjk is a vector contains bidder’s characteristics that are known to CalTrans as well as
econometricians. Such a specification is also motivated by the fact the bidding days of each
contractor in the auction stage depends on the cost shock ε only through its expected value.
Note that the linear specification assumption is not necessary but easy to implement and
interpret due to the limitation of sample size in data. With sufficient data, a nonparametric
approach can be used instead. Hence under the linear specification, the private-types can
be obtained as the residuals in estimating (3.22). Furthermore, σθ can be estimated as the
7Lewis and Bajari (2011) also assume that the private-type relating to acceleration is normally dis-
tributed, i.i.d across contracts and contractors, and argue that this assumption would validate because this
is not a dynamic model, even though it may seem to be strong due to the persistence of some contractor
characteristics.
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standard deviation of the residuals.
3.5.2 Estimation of the equilibrium pseudo-type
In the second stage, we estimate the equilibrium pseudo-type v and then treat them as
data of the dependant variable. Given the sample size, a nonparametric approach (see, e.g.,
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) is not feasible since it requires us to nonparametrically
estimate the conditional CDF FS|Z and conditional PDF fS|Z , and it is well known that
nonparametric (kernel or series) estimation will suffer from the curse of dimensionality when
the dimension of Z is large. Consequently, instead of the fully nonparametric approach, we
adopt the semiparametric procedure in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014). Specifically,
we estimate the conditional distribution of contractors’ bidding scores via the following linear
regression
s˜jk = zjk ·ψ + ζjk, (3.23)
where the dependant variable s˜jk is the normalized bidding score
sjk
sEj
, where
sEj ≡ pEj + cujxEj
is the bidding score computed by using engineer’s estimated bidding price and time. As
before, the vector zjk includes the contractors’ characteristics, and the idiosyncratic error
ζjk is independent of zjk. As is mentioned in Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2014), such
specification allows for heterogeneity in the structural error via the contract size sEj .
For each contract indexed by j, we estimate the coefficient ψˆ and then use it to calculate
the residual ζˆjk for all contracts. By construction,
FS|Z(sjk) = Pr
(
zjk ·ψ + ζjk ≤ sjk
sEj
| Z
)
= Pr
(
ζjk ≤ sjk
sEj
− zjk ·ψ | Z
)
= Fζ
(
sjk
sEj
− zjk ·ψ
)
,
where Fζ(·) is the curriculum density function of ζjk (we suppress the dependence of FS|Z
and Fζ(·) on Nj to simplify notation). The corresponding conditional density of bidding
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scores is
fS|Z(sjk) =
∂
∂sjk
Fζ
(
sjk
sEj
− zjk ·ψ
)
=
1
sEj
fζ
(
sjk
sEj
− zjk ·ψ
)
.
By plugging in the estimate ψˆ, and the empirical distribution and kernel density of ζˆij to
the right hand side above, we can get the estimate FˆS|Z and fˆS|Z respectively. Then using
equation (3.12), the equilibrium pseudo-type for contractor i in the project j is estimated as
vˆjk = sjk − 1
Nj − 1
1− FˆS(sjk)
fˆS(sjk)
. (3.24)
3.5.3 Estimation of the cost function and other parameters
Model primitives specification
We specify the following quadratic functional form of the deterministic expediting cost
by taking into account the contracts and contractors’ heterogeneity
C(x, θ;xE, z;α1, α2,β, φ) = α1(x− xE)2 + (α2θ + β · z¯)(x− xE) + φ, (3.25)
where x is the actual working days, xEjk is the engineering’s estimates of days to work, z¯ ⊆ z
is a vector of contracts and contractors’ characteristics, parameters are α1, α2, β and φ, with
α1 > 0, α2 < 0, φ > 0, respectively. The vector z¯ essentially contains some contract-level
variables that are known to the contractors at the time of their decisions. This specification is
adopted to capture asymmetry among contractors, and satisfies the restriction in Assumption
2 since actual working days x should never exceed the estimated working days by engineer.
Such a specification is also followed by most of the empirical studies on procurement contracts
(see, e.g., Lewis and Bajari, 2014).
In reality, in addition to the engineer’s estimate of project costs and project length,
incentive and disincentive provision may vary across contracts because of the value of the
contract and the degree of project urgency. To capture this feature, the daily incentive and
disincentive rates are specified as i = acu and d = bcu respectively since cu in general will
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vary across different contracts.
Recall that in the identification argument presented in Section 2 we assume that the dis-
tribution of implement uncertainty is known to econometrician so that the model primitives
can be recovered from data. Along with this, we assume that the uncertainty is indepen-
dently and identically distributed across contracts, truncated from a normal distribution
N (0, σ2ε) with a two-sided truncation −1 < ε < 1.8 Let γ denote the vector of parameters
in this model, then γ = {α1, α2,β, φ, a, b, σε}.
Estimation approach
The main idea to estimate γ is to employ the equilibrium pseudo-type equation as a
regression function. There are two reasons to do so. First, it is complicated to get a closed-
form solution for the bidding days due to the parametrized specification above, so is for
the bidding costs. In order to use both information about bidding, which is a relatively
large sample in our application, the equilibrium pseudo-type is a proper choice because it
contains the information about the bidding days and bidding cost; next, taking into account
the computation speed of estimation, the equilibrium pseudo-type would reduce much time
of estimation because it involves less numerical integration than that of the bidding equation
for the project costs.
The main estimation equation is based on the equilibrium pseudo-type equation (3.5).
The challenge to estimate using (3.5) is that the equilibrium pseudo-type v in the dependent
variable and the private-type θ in the explanatory variables are not available. Therefore we
replace them with the estimated values in the first and second steps and estimate γ by a
minimum distance method. Specifically,
vˆ − cuxB = E[(1 + ε)C(xA∗ , θˆ)− ρ · (xB∗ − xA∗)], ρ ∈ {i, d}. (3.26)
8Normal distribution of construction risk is widely used in quantitative risk analysis in highway con-
struction management practice. See Guide to Risk Assessment and Allocation for Highway Construction
Management issued by U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration.
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Let Mˆjk ≡ cujxBjk + E
[
(1 + εj)C(x
A
jk, θˆjk) − ρj · (xBjk − xAjk)
]
be the estimated value for
the right hand side of equation (3.26), and let γˆ ∈ Γ denote the estimated value of γ, then
model γˆ can be estimated via
γˆ = arg min
γ∈Γ
N∑
j=1
Nj∑
k=1
(vˆjk − Mˆjk)2 (3.27)
By treating θˆ and vˆ as data in the sample, we adopt a standard bootstrap procedure to
calculate the standard error of parameters in the deterministic expediting cost functions and
the daily incentive/disincentive coefficients.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Parameters
Table B.2 reports the regression estimates for the normalized bidding days in (3.22) under
three nested specifications. Note that the variable capdummy is a dummy variable and equals
to one if the capacity of the contractor is greater than $50 million. In all specifications, the
capdummy has a significant (at 10 percent) and positive marginal effect (-0.0564 on average
across all three specifications) on the normalized bidding days. This can be interpreted
as the evidence of economies of scale in the construction costs for contractors working on
multiple contracts simultaneously. Furthermore, the number of bidders has a significant
(at 1 percent) and negative marginal effect (-0.0133 on average) on the normalized bidding
days. This may indicate that increased competition in the auction stage will force bidders to
shorten the bidding time for completing the project. Besides the user cost in the specification
(2) and (3) has statistically significant (at 5 percent) and negative impact on the bidding
days. Finally, the relatively small R2 in all three specifications (0.055 on average) means
that the private-type θ plays a deterministic role in contractor’s bidding time decision.
The second stage regression estimates for (3.23) under three similar specifications as in
the first stage are shown in Table B.3. Similar to the first stage, capdummy and the number of
bidders have significant (at 1 percent) and negative impacts on the normalized bidding score
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in all three specifications. The regression results also indicate that contractors located in
California will tend to have smaller bidding scores. This may be because contractors within
California are more familiar with the working conditions of the highway construction projects
and hence are more efficient in conducting the works. Note that in the first specification the
normalized distance between contractor’s location and the working site also has a significant
(at 5 percent) and negative impact (2696.6) on its bidding score. In the second stage, we first
use a nonparametric method to estimate the distribution of the residuals ζˆ, and then derive
the distribution and density function for bidding score s using the estimated distribution.
The kernel density estimate for ζˆ in specifications (1)-(3) are demonstrated in Figures B.7,
note that we use Gaussian kernel as the smoothing function and the bandwidth is selected
according to the rule of thumb. For comparison, we also include the density plot based on
the normal density function.
Table B.4 shows the estimates of parameters for the structural model under specifications
(1)-(3) of the first and second stage estimation results. From the results in all three speci-
fications, we can see that estimated value of α1, α2 are significantly (at 1 percent) positive
and negative respectively. These results are in accordance with the structural model and
indicate that the cost function is convex in working days and decreasing in private-type.
Furthermore, the values of the estimated coefficients of incentive/disincentive (0.214/7.738
on average) also conform to our model set-up. The estimation results provide strong evi-
dence that the data can be rationalized by our model. Note that in all three specifications
the distance between contractor’s location and the working site, and whether the contract
is federally funded or not will have significant negative effects on contractor’s cost. These
results are consistent with practical construction works. The estimated standard deviation
of the uncertainty ε is also significant with a p-value less than 0.01.
To quantify the welfare analysis of the A+B mechanism, we plug in the structural esti-
mates in Table B.4 to compute the ex-ante and ex-post welfare loss under A+B design of the
procurement contract. From the discussion in Section 3.2.3, an A+B contract is ex-ante inef-
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ficient if the winner of the contract under the A+B mechanism is not the one that generates
the highest social welfare, and the ex-ante welfare loss is defined as the difference between
the social welfare induced by the winner and the highest social welfare induced by other
bidders. Analogously the contract is ex-post inefficient if the winner of the contract does
not maximize the social welfare (complete the contract in the way that would minimize the
total cost), and the ex-post welfare loss is defined as the difference between the social welfare
generated by the operator of the contract and the maximum social welfare that would have
been generated if the contractor had minimized the total cost.
The results of welfare comparison are shown in Table B.5. In all three specifications,
more than 60 percent of the 75 A+B contracts in our sample are ex-ante inefficient, with
an average welfare loss of 1.426 million dollars. Besides, the results also demonstrate that
more than 50 percent of the A+B contracts will be ex-post inefficient and result in a welfare
loss equal to 3.46 million dollars on average. Figure B.8 provides a graphical illustration
of the welfare analysis. Specifically, panel (1) of Figure B.8 shows the rank (based on the
total cost) of the auction winner among all bidders in each of the 75 A+B contracts, and
panel 2 shows the difference between the actual and optimal (first best) total cost for each
contractor. Our results provide strong empirical evidence to support the prediction of the
theoretical model, i.e., when facing implementation uncertainty, it is highly possible that
the A+B mechanism can neither accurately select the contractor who will generate smallest
social cost in the bidding stage nor provide incentive for the contractor to minimize social
cost in the execution stage.
3.6.2 Model fit
In this section, we show that the model fits the actual bidding and working behavior quite
well under our parameterization of the cost function. We examine fit in a number of ways.
In Figure B.9, we show empirical CDFs of each contractor’s bidding days in actual data
(blue, solid) and those simulated from the structural model (red, dashed). This is intended
as an informal check on the shape of the distribution. In Figure B.10, we also plot the actual
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completion time for each A+B contract in actual data (blue, solid) and those simulated from
the structural model (red, dashed). From these two figures, we can see that the model does
an excellent job in predicting each contractor’s bidding behavior and actual working days of
each A+B contract in all three specifications. To further analyze the goodness of fit for the
structural model, we conduct the regression analysis, and the results are presented in Table
B.6 and B.6b. Specifically, we regress bidding days and actual working days in data on their
simulated values obtained from the structural model. The results indicate that the model
fits the data quite well in the sense that the coefficients of simulated data are significant (at
1 percent) and close to unity, and the R2 is relatively high (0.784 on average) under all three
specifications.
3.7 Counterfactuals
In this section, we consider two counterfactual policy changes and provide welfare analysis
for each of them based on the estimated cost function for contractors. In the first counterfac-
tual, we consider what would happen if the incentive/disincentive scheme is changed into a
linear incentive (lane rental) contract, where the contractor pays a penalty (set equal to user
cost) each day from the beginning of the contract. The second is a time incentive contracting
in A design with the incentive cost K = −i · (xE − xA). For comparison, we also simulate
outcomes and calculate welfare for current policy, i.e., A+B mechanism. We first provide
some detailed explanations for the two counterfactual policies below.
Linear incentive contracting in A+B design
Under this policy design, the contractor have to pay a fixed amount of daily penalty
(rent) from the beginning of the construction stage. regardless of the completion time of the
project. The daily penalty will be set to equal to the user cost. Therefore the during the
bidding stage the bidder’s optimization problem becomes:
max
pB ,xB
{
pB − Emin
xA
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) + cu · xA
]}
Pr(win | S = s). (3.28)
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Optimal actual working days xA∗ responding to realized uncertainty should equal marginal
cost to the daily disincentive rate, that is:
(1 + ε)C1(x
A∗ , θ) = −cu. (3.29)
Thus, the ex-post efficiency can be achieved as long as the procurer set this daily incentive
rate as user cost, even though in this case B part would be ineffective, that is, optimal bidding
strategy for working days xB∗ equals to 0, and the optimal bidding cost would be
pB
∗
= E
[
C(xA
∗
, θ, ε) + cu · xA∗
]− ∫ θ
θ
EC2(xA
∗
, θ, ε)
[1− FΘ(θ˜)
1− FΘ(θ)
]N−1
dθ˜. (3.30)
In addition, under current setting the pseudo-type of bidder becomes
v(θ) = E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA
∗
, θ) + cu · xA∗
]
. (3.31)
Since the A+B mechanism selects the most efficient (with the smallest pseudo-type)
bidder, by the envelope theorem the winner of the contract would perform at the lowest
social cost, which implies the A+B contracting under linear incentive is ex-ante efficient as
well.
Time incentives contracting in A design
Under this policy, contractor will be rewarded for early completion of the project, with
rewards equal to i · (xE − xA)9. Then the bidder’s optimization problem becomes:
max
pB
{
pB − Emin
xA
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ)− i · (xE − xA)]}Pr(win | S = s). (3.32)
Following Lewis and Bajari (2011), we assume that the engineerâĂŹs estimate of work-
ing days xE is presumably close to the minimum cost which is the most efficient scale of
9If xE < xA, i · (xE − xA) becomes negative and is equivalent to penalties for late completion
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construction. Recall the assumption that cost function is strictly decreasing and convex in
xA that are smaller than the most efficient working days. Consequently, in this case, any
actual working days that is beyond the engineer’s estimate is not rational for any contractor
given a realized uncertainty, because not only do they face an increasing cost but also a
daily penalty. Thus, the rational working days should be no more than engineer’s estimate.
Due to the existing of a positive daily incentive rate for early completion, the contractor will
rationally choose actual working days such that the bonus of one day earlier completion is
the same as the extra cost, which means that the optimal actual working days xA∗ satisfies
(1 + ε)C1(x
A∗ , θ) = −i. (3.33)
Therefore contrary to the lane rental policy, the ex-post efficiency can not be achieved
because the daily incentive i for early completion is smaller than the user cost cu. Besides
contractor’s optimal bidding strategy can be characterized by the equation below:
pB
∗
= E
[
C(xA
∗
, θ, ε)− i · (xE − xA∗)]− ∫ θ
θ
EC2(xA
∗
, θ, ε)
[1− FΘ(θ˜)
1− FΘ(θ)
]N−1
dθ˜. (3.34)
However ex-ante efficiency can be guaranteed because under this policy design the bid-
der’s pesudotype becomes
v(θ) = E
[
(1 + ε)C(xA
∗
, θ)− i · (xE − xA∗)]. (3.35)
By Assumption 2, the marginal cost C1(xA
∗
, θ) is strictly decreasing in xA∗ and θ, conse-
quently based on (3.33), it is easy to verify that (3.35) is strictly decreasing in θ. Therefore
the most efficient bidder will win the contract and the total social costs generated by that
bidder should also be the smallest among all bidders10.
10This is because the total social costs under xA
∗
is also strictly decreasing in private-type θ.
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Counterfactual analysis
To conduct counterfactual analysis, we simulate outcomes under the A+B policy and two
counterfactual policies by sampling from the estimated distribution of θ and . Specifically in
each iteration, we first randomly draw bidder’s private-type from the estimated distribution
of θ, and then follow the auction rules of each policy design to determine the contract
winner by computing the bidding price (and days) for each bidder. Actual working days of
the contractor will be calculated based on the realized uncertainty, which is sampled from
the estimated distribution of . Finally, we conduct the ex-ante and ex-post welfare analyses
by using a similar method as in Section 3.6.1 for all three policy designs
The results of welfare analysis are presented in Table B.7. We can see that changing the
incentive scheme has a fairly big impact on inefficiency percentage and average welfare loss.
The current A+B policy can lead to a large percent of ex-ante (81.5 percent on average)
and ex-post inefficiency (100 percent) and average welfare loss of 3.556 (ex-ante) and 4.135
(ex-post) million dollars per contract. Under the alternative lane rental policy, the ex-ante
inefficiency will be reduced by 61.4 percent on average with an average welfare gain of 0.569
million dollars. For ex-post inefficiency, the lane rental policy performs much better, with
100 percent inefficiency reduction and welfare gain of 4.135 million dollars. The A design
with time incentive contracting also performs better than the A+B policy by decreasing the
ex-ante inefficiency to 8.7 percent and increasing welfare by 2.558 million dollars. Regarding
ex-post efficiency, although all contracts will be inefficient under A design, the average welfare
loss is much smaller (0.289 million dollars) than the A+B policy.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies A+B procurement contracts in the context of highway projects con-
struction. We set up a structural model that features by time incentives/disincentives,
externalities, and construction risks. We explain why contractors often do not complete the
projects on time. This discrepancy may make the A+B mechanism neither ex-ante efficient
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nor ex-post efficient. We show that the model components (the marginal expediting cost
function, the distribution of private-type for contractors, and the incentive/disincentive daily
rate) are all identified from the contract level and bid level data. We apply the model to
analyze the data on the Caltrans auctions of highway procurement contracts. Our estimates
provide substantial evidence that considering the existence of implement uncertainty in the
structural analysis of bidding data leads to significant inefficiency.
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4. SUMMARY
This dissertation applies alternative empirical methods in economics to study a “macro-
phenomenon” — the “Chinese saving puzzle” and a “micro-mechanism” — the allocation of
procurement contracts.
In the first paper, we investigate the role of income inequality interacting with liquidity
constraints in explaining the high household saving rate in China. In a simple two-period
model, households are heterogeneous in income and subjective discount factor, and whether
the liquidity constraint is binding, consumption and saving rate are endogenously deter-
mined. The model generates several predictions consistent data facts: (1) the rich save
more; (2) the proportion of constrained households for the poor is higher than that for the
rich; (3) liquidity constraints would increase household saving rate. (4) when income in-
equality increases, the rich save even more, in the meanwhile, the poor would also save more
due to the binding liquidity constraints, and thus the aggregate household saving rate would
rise.
Using three sources of large, nationally representative household survey data sets, the
China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), and the
Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), we provide direct empirical evidence implied
by the theoretical model. We find that in China, (1) the top 20 percent permanent income
households’ saving rate is 19–23 percent significant higher than the bottom 20 percent house-
holds’. (2) the bottom 20 percent permanent income households are more likely to face a
borrowing constraint, with a 12–20 percent significant higher probability; (3) the existence
of liquidity constraints would lead to a significant increase of more than 20 percent in the
household saving rate; (4) income inequality would have a significant positive impact on the
aggregate household saving rate at the county level, with a 1 point on a scale of 100 measure
increase in the Gini coefficient leading to an increase of 0.2 percent in the aggregate saving
rate; (5) the estimated MPC for the top 20 percent households range from 200 to 400 RMB
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per 1000 RMB, while for the bottom 20 percent households, the range from 600 to 900 RMB
per 1000 RMB.
These findings would have significant policy implications. The Chinese government’s
policies on reducing the saving rate have not yet produced substantial results. If income
inequality and liquidity constraints were the key reasons for the high aggregate household
saving rate, the resulting policy would be drastically different. For example, it is appropriate
for the Chinese government to design some income redistribution programs (such as EITC) to
reduce income inequality or devote more resources to support the credit market development.
An economic policy of tackling income inequality would lower the aggregate saving rate, thus
becoming a policy of economic transition and growth.
In the second essay, we study the A+B procurement contracts in the context of high-
way projects construction. We set up a structural model that features by time incen-
tives/disincentives, externalities, and construction risks. We explain why contractors often
do not complete the projects on time. This discrepancy may make the A+B mechanism
neither ex-ante efficient nor ex-post efficient. We show that the model components (the
marginal expediting cost function, the distribution of private type for contractors, and the
incentive/disincentive daily rate) are all identified from the contract level and bid level data.
We apply the model to analyze the data on the Caltrans auctions of highway procurement
contracts. Our estimates provide substantial evidence that considering the existence of im-
plement uncertainty in the structural analysis of bidding data leads to significant inefficiency.
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APPENDIX A
INCOME INEQUALITY, LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS, AND CHINA’S HOUSEHOLD
SAVING RATE
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: International comparison
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Figure A.2: China’s household saving rate by income class
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Figure A.2: China’s household saving rate by income class continued
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Figure A.3: China’s household saving rate and Gini coefficient
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
ho
us
eh
old
 sa
vin
g 
ra
te
s
.3
5
.4
.4
5
.5
Gi
ni
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
year
China's Gini coefficients China's household saving rates
92
Figure A.4: County-level aggregate saving rate and Gini coefficient
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Figure A.4: County-level aggregate saving rate and Gini coefficient continued
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
China County Gini Coefficient (CHIP 2013)
county aggregate saving rates fitted values
(3) CHIP 2013
94
Figure A.5: The ratio of previous wealth to current income by income percentile
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: The uneven distribution of China’s household saving rate
CHFS 2015 CFPS 2014 CHIP 2013 NBS
saving rate shares saving rate shares saving rate shares saving rate
top 1% 0.866 69.1 0.581 44.0 0.536 12.2
top 5% 0.741 99.7 0.515 76.7 0.426 29.3
top 10% 0.672 116.0 0.471 96.6 0.403 44.4
top 25% 0.569 138.2 0.412 133.6 0.373 73.5
bottom 50% -1.327 -45.8 -0.634 -52.8 0.017 1.35
% savers 55.9 45.3 74.6
saving rate (2015) 0.291 0.285
saving rate (2014) 0.189 0.281
saving rate (2013) 0.273 0.278
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Table A.2: Liquidity constraints and saving rate by income group
(a) CHFS 2015 Urban
measure I measure II
FA < 2 mon. PI FA ≥ 2 mon. PI no CC at least one CC
% constrained s.r s.r. % constrained s.r s.r
top 20% 16.93 0.769 0.389 59.51 0.545 0.435
middle income 31.52 0.125 0.003 81.65 0.096 -0.179
bottom 20% 37.78 -0.794 -1.587 92.27 -1.142 -2.677
(b) CFPS 2014 Urban
measure I
FA < 2 mon. PI FA ≥ 2 mon. PI
% constrained s.r s.r.
top 20% 43.01 0.338 0.242
middle income 43.04 -0.015 -0.071
bottom 20% 58.53 -0.781 -0.977
(c) CHIP 2013 Urban
measure I
FA < 2 mon. PI FA ≥ 2 mon. PI
% constrained s.r s.r.
top 20% 15.81 0.422 0.403
middle income 14.40 0.388 0.306
bottom 20% 21.31 0.310 0.2595
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Table A.3: Definition of variables and summary statistics
(a) Definition of variables
Variable Description
household consumption sum of family members’ expenditure on food, clothing, housing,
appliance and commodities, communication and transportation, culture
recreation and entertainment, medical care and others
household income sum of family members’ wage income, business income, agricultural
income, investment income and transfer income
hh_income_i dummy variable, equals one if the household income is in the ith quintile
and zero otherwise
hh_size total number of members in the family
YDratio number of age 0-14 in the household divided by hh_size
ODratio number of age above 65 in the household divided by hh_size
employed dummy variable, takes one if currently employed
employed_typ_j dummy variable, equals one if household head works in type j
organization, j = 1 (SOE, collective, or government), 2 (private or
foreign company), or 3 (others)
hukou dummy variable, takes one for urban and 0 for rural
hh_health dummy variable, equals one if the household has a poor health member
and zero otherwise
health_insurance dummy variable, takes one if the household has health insurance and
zero otherwise
pension dummy variable, equals one if the household has pension and zero
otherwise.
house_owner dummy variable, takes one if the household own house and zero
otherwise.
boy_number number of boys in the household
girl_number number of girls in the household
childage_04/59/1014/1519 dummy variables, takes one for child’s age between 0 and 4 / between 5
and 9/ between 10 and 14/between 15 and 19)
age age of household head
age2 age square
gender dummy variable, takes one for male and zero for female
married dummy variable, equals one for married household head and zero for
unmarried household head
ccp_member dummy variable, takes one for ccp member and zero otherwise
yos years of schooling
hh_credit dummy variable, equals one for constrained household and zero for
unconstrained household
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Table A.3: Definition of variables and summary statistics continued
(b) Summary of statistics: CHFS 2015
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
hh size 25,635 3.177 1.449 1 20
YDratio 25,634 0.117 0.162 0 1
ODratio 25,634 0.170 0.318 0 1
employed 25,563 0.591 0.492 0 1
employ type 10,248 1.775 0.737 1 3
industry 9,342 11.28 6.968 1 24
hukou 24,377 0.607 0.488 0 1
health 25,584 0.186 0.389 0 1
hh health 25,628 0.314 0.464 0 1
health insurance 25,635 0.914 0.280 0 1
pension 25,169 0.792 0.406 0 1
house owner 22,802 0.990 0.0997 0 1
boy number 25,635 0.340 0.546 0 4
girl number 25,635 0.260 0.517 0 5
childage_04 25,635 0.134 0.377 0 7
childage_59 25,635 0.155 0.397 0 5
childage_1014 25,635 0.132 0.364 0 6
childage_1519 25,635 0.143 0.382 0 5
age 25,628 52.13 14.96 3 101
age2 25,628 2941 1607 9 10201
gender 25,635 0.699 0.459 0 1
married 23,304 0.834 0.372 0 1
ccp member 24,079 0.113 0.316 0 1
yos 25,598 10.28 4.098 0 22
hh credit 25,635 0.721 0.448 0 1
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Table A.3: Definition of variables and summary statistics continued
(c) Summary of statistics: CFPS 2014
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
hh size 6,603 3.005 1.578 1 14
YDratio 6,603 0.136 0.183 0 1
ODratio 6,603 0.150 0.306 0 1
employed 6,255 0.600 0.490 0 1
employ type 2,641 1.777 0.647 1 3
industry 3,117 8.100 5.188 1 19
hukou 6,387 0.514 0.500 0 1
health 6,597 0.170 0.376 0 1
hh health 6,598 0.273 0.446 0 1
health insurance 6,603 0.876 0.330 0 1
pension 6,603 0.406 0.491 0 1
house owner 6,599 0.821 0.383 0 1
boy number 6,603 0.359 0.573 0 4
girl number 6,603 0.303 0.566 0 5
childage_04 6,603 0.167 0.431 0 4
childage_59 6,603 0.166 0.430 0 4
childage_1014 6,603 0.143 0.379 0 3
childage_1519 6,603 0.154 0.396 0 3
age 6,603 54.37 16.30 0 102
age2 6,603 3221 1792 0 10404
gender 6,603 0.669 0.471 0 1
ethnicity 597 0.0704 0.256 0 1
married 6,600 0.767 0.423 0 1
ccp member 6,603 0.125 0.331 0 1
yos 6,600 7.987 4.870 0 19
schooling 6,600 1.441 0.708 1 3
hh credit 5,986 0.545 0.498 0 1
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Table A.3: Definition of variables and summary statistics continued
(d) Summary of statistics: CHIP 2013
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
hh size 6,674 2.980 1.107 1 8
YDratio 6,674 0.121 0.162 0 0.667
ODratio 6,674 0.121 0.283 0 1
employed 6,674 0.677 0.468 0 1
employ type 4,515 1.604 0.652 1 3
industry 4,513 9.779 5.993 1 20
hukou 6,672 0.844 0.363 0 1
health 6,667 0.0601 0.238 0 1
hh health 6,670 0.115 0.319 0 1
health insurance 6,640 1.733 6.005 0 156
pension 6,597 1.232 3.533 0 163
house owner 6,322 0.966 0.180 0 1
boy number 6,674 0.309 0.496 0 3
girl number 6,674 0.250 0.471 0 3
childage_04 6,674 0.109 0.324 0 2
childage_59 6,674 0.131 0.350 0 2
childage_1014 6,674 0.138 0.356 0 2
childage_1519 6,674 0.150 0.379 0 3
age 6,674 50.22 13.18 17 97
age2 6,674 2696 1400 289 9409
gender 6,674 0.728 0.445 0 1
ethnicity 6,673 0.0451 0.208 0 1
married 6,672 1.112 0.315 1 2
ccp member 6,634 0.276 0.447 0 1
yos 6,672 11.34 3.555 0 21
hh credit 6,331 0.840 0.366 0 1
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Table A.4: The rich do save more
(a) Saving rate and current income
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hh_income_2 0.303*** 0.305*** 0.257*** 0.247*** 0.0731*** 0.0868***
(0.0157) (0.0221) (0.0203) (0.0394) (0.0139) (0.0160)
hh_income_3 0.462*** 0.453*** 0.349*** 0.292*** 0.135*** 0.166***
(0.0149) (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0396) (0.0143) (0.0147)
hh_income_4 0.582*** 0.553*** 0.464*** 0.385*** 0.178*** 0.186***
(0.0154) (0.0202) (0.0224) (0.0392) (0.0142) (0.0146)
hh_income_5 0.783*** 0.750*** 0.628*** 0.544*** 0.241*** 0.262***
(0.0159) (0.0204) (0.0238) (0.0419) (0.0131) (0.0156)
hh_size -0.0219*** -0.0214*** -0.0267*** -0.0498*** -0.000924 -0.00535
(0.00459) (0.00705) (0.00844) (0.0148) (0.00604) (0.00819)
YDratio -0.0730 0.0245 -0.155* -0.240* -0.105** -0.0499
(0.0486) (0.0609) (0.0829) (0.132) (0.0462) (0.0580)
ODratio 0.0656* 0.0989* 0.0653** -0.115 0.0674*** 0.0105
(0.0395) (0.0571) (0.0264) (0.115) (0.0202) (0.0484)
employed 0.0837*** 0.0837*** 0.00187 0.0397 0.0463*** 0.0923
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0154) (0.0422) (0.0138) (0.107)
employ_typ_2 0.00141 0.0682** -0.00404
(0.0121) (0.0321) (0.0131)
employ_typ_3 0.00914 0.0126 0.00648
(0.0136) (0.0496) (0.0236)
hukou -0.0234** -0.00854 -0.113*** -0.103*** 0.000936 -0.000357
(0.00923) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0308) (0.00986) (0.0123)
hh_health -0.0152* -0.0214 -0.0220 -0.103*** -0.0404*** -0.0349**
(0.00862) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.0341) (0.0150) (0.0173)
health_insurance -0.0201 -0.0393* 0.0357 -0.0290 -0.00103 -0.00130**
(0.0144) (0.0239) (0.0263) (0.0441) (0.000721) (0.000663)
pension -0.00293 0.0162 0.00969 0.0114 0.000624 -0.000582
(0.0120) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0296) (0.00165) (0.00211)
house_owner -0.0458* -0.0582 0.0672*** 0.0647** 0.00454 -0.0303
(0.0265) (0.0494) (0.0170) (0.0275) (0.0239) (0.0291)
boy_number -0.0756** -0.0222 -0.0440 -0.000347 -0.0401 -0.0225
(0.0319) (0.0295) (0.0441) (0.0475) (0.0253) (0.0255)
girl_number -0.0822** -0.0288 -0.0582 0.0145 -0.0489* -0.0337
(0.0323) (0.0335) (0.0477) (0.0540) (0.0266) (0.0271)
childage_04 0.0917** 0.0327 0.0720 0.122* 0.0332 0.0162
(0.0358) (0.0318) (0.0510) (0.0702) (0.0281) (0.0325)
childage_59 0.0621* -0.00946 0.0645 0.0712 0.0491 0.0275
(0.0345) (0.0323) (0.0498) (0.0576) (0.0305) (0.0320)
childage_1014 0.0465 -0.0113 0.0827 0.105 0.0463* 0.0198
(0.0338) (0.0304) (0.0515) (0.0678) (0.0278) (0.0301)
childage_1519 0.0185 -0.0275 -0.00349 -0.00794 0.0238 0.0216
(0.0325) (0.0294) (0.0513) (0.0623) (0.0273) (0.0268)
age 0.00579* -0.00313 0.00431 -0.0133* 0.000673 -0.00655
(0.00316) (0.00442) (0.00303) (0.00755) (0.00236) (0.00431)
age2 -2.50e-05 6.81e-05 -4.22e-05 0.000195** -5.86e-06 8.62e-05*
(3.36e-05) (4.98e-05) (2.83e-05) (8.49e-05) (2.47e-05) (4.78e-05)
gender 0.0327*** 0.0322*** 0.0225 0.0118 0.0336*** 0.0226*
(0.00883) (0.0122) (0.0147) (0.0284) (0.00953) (0.0119)
married -0.0335** -0.00862 -0.0729*** -0.0355 -0.000690 0.0266
(0.0139) (0.0216) (0.0183) (0.0342) (0.0144) (0.0240)
ccp_member -0.0192* -0.0233 -0.0410** -0.0497 -0.0130 -0.0119
(0.0106) (0.0148) (0.0174) (0.0349) (0.0110) (0.0135)
yos -0.00794*** -0.0102*** -0.00898*** -0.00130 -0.00589*** -0.00753***
(0.00161) (0.00213) (0.00158) (0.00352) (0.00134) (0.00195)
hh_credit -0.104*** -0.0903*** -0.0181 0.0117 0.0976*** 0.0789***
(0.00872) (0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0273) (0.0145) (0.0176)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.0512 0.281*** -0.0442 0.419** 0.167** 0.348**
(0.0742) (0.104) (0.0853) (0.202) (0.0799) (0.172)
Observations 11,236 5,683 4,229 1,766 5,894 4,019
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.4: The rich do save more continued
(b) Saving rate and permanent income
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(sub-sample reg. ) (3 years avg. inc.) (sub-sample reg. ) (3 years avg. inc.) (sub-sample reg. ) (3 years avg. inc.)
hh_income_2 0.347*** 0.0509** 0.255*** 0.0313 0.0959*** 0.0832***
(0.0307) (0.0207) (0.0491) (0.0577) (0.0182) (0.0117)
hh_income_3 0.512*** 0.120*** 0.308*** 0.136** 0.169*** 0.136***
(0.0317) (0.0255) (0.0520) (0.0547) (0.0196) (0.0130)
hh_income_4 0.617*** 0.156*** 0.472*** 0.143* 0.175*** 0.166***
(0.0300) (0.0223) (0.0521) (0.0784) (0.0174) (0.0127)
hh_income_5 0.819*** 0.190*** 0.616*** 0.173*** 0.257*** 0.234***
(0.0319) (0.0265) (0.0620) (0.0606) (0.0194) (0.0153)
hh_size -0.00777 0.0283*** 0.0152 -0.00168 -0.00144 0.00240
(0.00949) (0.00933) (0.0321) (0.0194) (0.0123) (0.00499)
YDratio 0.0391 -0.0479 -0.0291 -0.217 -0.0594 -0.0826*
(0.0681) (0.100) (0.172) (0.181) (0.0693) (0.0476)
ODratio 0.121 0.0466 -0.0533 -0.0343 0.0392**
(0.0923) (0.0633) (0.0947) (0.0770) (0.0176)
employed 0.0648* 0.113*** 0.0347 0.0126 0.0208 0.0419***
(0.0363) (0.0235) (0.0751) (0.0467) (0.0353) (0.0117)
hukou -0.00258 0.00891 -0.0655* -0.0630* 0.000555 -0.00260
(0.0172) (0.0220) (0.0391) (0.0361) (0.0173) (0.0111)
hh_health -0.0379** -0.0556*** -0.0484 -0.0415 -0.0459** -0.0424***
(0.0182) (0.0210) (0.0651) (0.0381) (0.0219) (0.00878)
health_insurance 0.0102 0.000288 0.00430 0.0293 -0.00100 -0.000165
(0.0255) (0.0350) (0.0464) (0.0678) (0.00131) (0.000617)
pension 0.0234 0.0360 0.0917*** 0.0633 0.000445 -0.000399
(0.0186) (0.0253) (0.0353) (0.0443) (0.00249) (0.000723)
house_owner -0.0938 -0.150** 0.0433 0.0812 -0.0296 -0.00581
(0.0839) (0.0662) (0.0331) (0.0536) (0.0376) (0.0252)
boy_number -0.00880 -0.100* -0.0447 -0.0631 0.00134 -0.0451**
(0.0425) (0.0514) (0.0742) (0.0793) (0.0328) (0.0178)
girl_number -0.0143 -0.126** -0.0624 -0.0945 -0.0113 -0.0485**
(0.0448) (0.0541) (0.0834) (0.0864) (0.0362) (0.0200)
childage_04 0.00847 0.0697 0.0211 -0.000895 0.00919 0.0165
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0962) (0.0834) (0.0353) (0.0238)
childage_59 -0.0197 0.0720 0.0607 0.153* 0.00537 0.0494**
(0.0453) (0.0507) (0.0847) (0.0891) (0.0356) (0.0235)
childage_1014 -0.0269 0.0788 0.0540 0.109 0.00506 0.0525**
(0.0434) (0.0521) (0.101) (0.0948) (0.0361) (0.0238)
childage_1519 -0.0236 0.0249 0.0105 0.0698 -0.000359 0.0293
(0.0426) (0.0502) (0.0838) (0.0907) (0.0307) (0.0212)
age -0.00787 0.0141 -0.00323
(0.00606) (0.00875) (0.00222)
age2 9.53e-05 -8.97e-05 3.56e-05
(6.53e-05) (8.00e-05) (2.23e-05)
gender 0.0228 -0.00320 0.0344 0.0498 0.0406** 0.0233**
(0.0140) (0.0180) (0.0429) (0.0425) (0.0160) (0.0103)
married -0.0568* 0.0385 -0.129** -0.0340 0.0125 -0.00566
(0.0303) (0.0238) (0.0560) (0.0524) (0.0382) (0.0135)
ccp_member -0.0360 -0.0207 -0.0282 -0.0528 -0.0199 -0.0130
(0.0223) (0.0332) (0.0428) (0.0498) (0.0156) (0.00855)
yos -0.00718*** 0.00289 -0.00751 -0.00507 -0.00587** -0.00576***
(0.00242) (0.00270) (0.00498) (0.00420) (0.00257) (0.00134)
hh_credit -0.0975*** -0.0853*** -0.0148 0.0115 0.0970*** 0.0644***
(0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0337) (0.0356) (0.0189) (0.0125)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0554 0.279* -0.133 -0.326 0.207** 0.259***
(0.105) (0.159) (0.118) (0.286) (0.0820) (0.0727)
Observations 3,901 6,849 965 1,030 2,149 5,879
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times
for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.4: The rich do save more continued
(c) Robust check: nonentrepreneurs and older households
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(excld. entrep. ) (age ≥ 60) (excld. entrep.) (age ≥ 60) (excld. entrep.) (age ≥ 60)
hh_income_2 0.436*** 0.695*** 0.226*** 0.841*** 0.0909*** 0.0769***
(0.0636) (0.0436) (0.0235) (0.112) (0.0125) (0.0253)
hh_income_3 0.448*** 0.990*** 0.291*** 1.164*** 0.148*** 0.122***
(0.0810) (0.0430) (0.0245) (0.114) (0.0119) (0.0304)
hh_income_4 0.864*** 1.194*** 0.426*** 1.271*** 0.184*** 0.184***
(0.0779) (0.0505) (0.0239) (0.128) (0.0133) (0.0287)
hh_income_5 0.910*** 1.445*** 0.599*** 1.412*** 0.244*** 0.274***
(0.0902) (0.0527) (0.0240) (0.140) (0.0154) (0.0351)
hh_size -0.0649** -0.0345** -0.0336*** -0.0531 0.00122 -0.00758
(0.0280) (0.0147) (0.0105) (0.0377) (0.00516) (0.0160)
YDratio -0.224 -0.611*** -0.180** 0.504 -0.0793 -0.336
(0.372) (0.231) (0.0846) (0.389) (0.0499) (0.227)
ODratio -0.486 0.107*** 0.0292 0.323** 0.0448*** 0.0122
(0.329) (0.0286) (0.0462) (0.144) (0.0170) (0.0394)
employed 0.117 0.181*** 0.00277 0.193** 0.0355*** 0.0892***
(0.0746) (0.0378) (0.0214) (0.0840) (0.0120) (0.0292)
hukou 0.0476 -0.0303 -0.112*** -0.141 -0.00145 0.0110
(0.0544) (0.0307) (0.0193) (0.107) (0.0119) (0.0278)
hh_health 0.0558 -0.104*** -0.0109 -0.0174 -0.0373*** -0.0546***
(0.0671) (0.0212) (0.0179) (0.0485) (0.00864) (0.0207)
health_insurance -0.0409 0.00727 0.0465 -0.148 -0.000311 0.00239
(0.0876) (0.0721) (0.0293) (0.0895) (0.000678) (0.00193)
pension 0.127* 0.00395 -0.00722 -0.0806 -0.000471 0.00630
(0.0724) (0.0443) (0.0180) (0.165) (0.000769) (0.00440)
house_owner -0.786*** 0.0836 0.0411* 0.0578 0.00176 0.104**
(0.177) (0.115) (0.0215) (0.0937) (0.0244) (0.0443)
boy_number -0.00417 -0.0741 0.0142 -0.0546 -0.0457** -0.0784
(0.0957) (0.0878) (0.0402) (0.155) (0.0181) (0.0657)
girl_number -0.0214 -0.0198 0.0116 -0.0772 -0.0476** -0.0488
(0.113) (0.0941) (0.0435) (0.152) (0.0202) (0.0733)
childage_04 0.0703 0.0946 0.0249 -0.122 0.0122 0.0717
(0.160) (0.0994) (0.0483) (0.152) (0.0251) (0.0916)
childage_59 0.0681 0.123 0.0135 -0.0137 0.0476* 0.124
(0.145) (0.111) (0.0484) (0.147) (0.0245) (0.0903)
childage_1014 0.130 0.107 0.0312 0.0665 0.0546** 0.143
(0.147) (0.106) (0.0503) (0.139) (0.0256) (0.0891)
childage_1519 -0.0256 -0.0515 -0.0362 -0.000626 0.0291 -0.0161
(0.103) (0.0952) (0.0475) (0.158) (0.0221) (0.0778)
age 0.0282 0.00475 -0.0190 -0.00341 0.0480
(0.0268) (0.00380) (0.0816) (0.00215) (0.0294)
age2 -0.000295 -3.58e-05 9.37e-05 3.47e-05 -0.000313
(0.000277) (3.60e-05) (0.000540) (2.15e-05) (0.000202)
gender -0.00232 0.0712*** 0.0294 0.162** 0.0235** 0.0165
(0.0555) (0.0240) (0.0186) (0.0738) (0.0106) (0.0258)
married -0.103 -0.100*** -0.0685*** -0.108 -0.00565 -0.0155
(0.0900) (0.0348) (0.0231) (0.0816) (0.0133) (0.0285)
ccp_member -0.0305 0.0276 -0.0602*** -0.0385 -0.0125 0.00554
(0.106) (0.0349) (0.0225) (0.0597) (0.00873) (0.0207)
yos -0.0264** -0.00904** -0.00764*** -0.0156** -0.00662*** -0.00705**
(0.0104) (0.00353) (0.00202) (0.00721) (0.00140) (0.00312)
hh_credit 0.0184 -0.0864*** -0.00521 -0.0550 0.0709*** 0.0907**
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(0.0483) (0.0226) (0.0166) (0.0668) (0.0121) (0.0358)
constant 0.394 -0.747*** -0.189* 0.231 0.263*** -1.563
(0.667) (0.141) (0.105) (2.989) (0.0723) (1.047)
Observations 5,243 5,380 4,228 1,633 5,555 1,182
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors in
parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.4: The rich do save more continued
(d) Robust check: per capital income and alternative definition of saving rate
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(redef. s.r. ) (re-grouped) (redef. s.r. ) (re-grouped) (redef. s.r. ) (re-grouped)
hh_income_2 0.326*** 0.347*** 0.257*** 0.208*** 0.128*** 0.0842***
(0.0213) (0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0610) (0.0186) (0.0193)
hh_income_3 0.529*** 0.519*** 0.349*** 0.309*** 0.222*** 0.151***
(0.0231) (0.0273) (0.0332) (0.0657) (0.0192) (0.0201)
hh_income_4 0.739*** 0.635*** 0.533*** 0.451*** 0.289*** 0.190***
(0.0233) (0.0273) (0.0310) (0.0591) (0.0206) (0.0203)
hh_income_5 1.208*** 0.829*** 0.858*** 0.625*** 0.431*** 0.251***
(0.0328) (0.0290) (0.0387) (0.0600) (0.0286) (0.0188)
hh_size -0.0266** 0.0661*** -0.0476*** 0.0715** 0.00703 0.0441***
(0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0154) (0.0344) (0.00837) (0.0148)
YDratio -0.0258 0.0511 -0.315*** -0.121 -0.0940 -0.0811
(0.0938) (0.0795) (0.107) (0.183) (0.0779) (0.0781)
ODratio 0.0213 0.162** 0.0327 -0.0950 0.0853*** -0.0993
(0.0766) (0.0750) (0.0613) (0.0678) (0.0308) (0.0947)
employed 0.0799*** 0.116*** 0.0116 0.116*** 0.0597*** 0.0153
(0.0194) (0.0296) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0182) (0.0422)
hukou -0.0442** -0.000267 -0.185*** -0.0320 -0.0134 -0.00190
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0288) (0.0414) (0.0223) (0.0144)
hh_health -0.0281 -0.0481** -0.0171 -0.0623 -0.0674*** -0.0299
(0.0175) (0.0216) (0.0271) (0.0619) (0.0140) (0.0191)
health_insurance 0.000201 -0.00388 0.0699* -0.0478 0.000656 -0.00103
(0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0378) (0.0540) (0.00151) (0.00140)
pension -0.00141 0.000259 -0.0111 0.120*** -0.00162 0.000593
(0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0233) (0.0374) (0.00134) (0.00228)
house_owner -0.122** -0.0510 0.0546* 0.102** -0.0118 -0.0215
(0.0612) (0.0849) (0.0310) (0.0414) (0.0436) (0.0393)
boy_number -0.115** -0.0191 -0.0165 0.0188 -0.0738** -0.0145
(0.0478) (0.0407) (0.0515) (0.0846) (0.0294) (0.0373)
girl_number -0.142*** -0.0156 -0.0233 0.0206 -0.0841** -0.0230
(0.0514) (0.0428) (0.0586) (0.0866) (0.0335) (0.0387)
childage_04 0.119** 0.0293 0.0716 -0.0368 0.0130 0.00650
(0.0520) (0.0464) (0.0641) (0.106) (0.0392) (0.0451)
childage_59 0.0713 0.0125 0.0501 0.0155 0.0612 0.0104
(0.0575) (0.0454) (0.0629) (0.103) (0.0389) (0.0419)
childage_1014 0.0762 -0.0146 0.0799 0.00798 0.0703* 0.0160
(0.0528) (0.0425) (0.0667) (0.108) (0.0392) (0.0426)
childage_1519 0.0241 -0.0203 -0.000193 -0.00355 0.0366 0.00482
(0.0520) (0.0432) (0.0613) (0.0913) (0.0340) (0.0334)
age 0.00519 -0.0235 0.00925* 0.00111 -0.00435 0.0216
(0.00782) (0.0278) (0.00533) (0.000894) (0.00379) (0.0280)
age2 -1.35e-05 0.000396 -7.66e-05 0.0173 4.27e-05 -0.000300
(8.23e-05) (0.000367) (5.21e-05) (0.0409) (3.75e-05) (0.000370)
gender 0.0341* 0.0154 0.0471* -0.0109 0.0354** 0.0410***
(0.0189) (0.0137) (0.0249) (0.0631) (0.0159) (0.0152)
married -0.0422* -0.000399 -0.109*** -0.0363 0.00144 -0.0187
(0.0237) (0.0389) (0.0320) (0.0499) (0.0201) (0.0335)
ccp_member 0.00961 -0.0272 -0.0828*** -0.0157 -0.0186 -0.0177
(0.0293) (0.0193) (0.0280) (0.0670) (0.0145) (0.0151)
yos -0.0136*** -0.00508** -0.0119*** -0.0133*** -0.0112*** -0.00564**
(0.00275) (0.00249) (0.00291) (0.00511) (0.00234) (0.00230)
hh_credit -0.202*** -0.101*** -0.0475** -0.0131 0.0731*** 0.120***
(0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0233) (0.0348) (0.0205) (0.0230)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0845 -0.0323 -0.148 1.683 0.399*** -0.293
(0.179) (0.532) (0.138) (1.247) (0.123) (0.523)
Observations 11,236 3,901 4,228 965 5,894 2,149
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors
in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.4: The rich do save more continued
(e) Check validity of the theoretical model
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hh_savingrate hh_(prev. w/curr. inc.) hh_savingrate hh_savingrate hh_(prev. w/curr. inc.) hh_savingrate
hh_(prev. w/curr. inc.) -0.00226*** -0.00288***
(0.000436) (0.000769)
hh_income_2 0.286*** -6.333*** 0.290*** 0.226*** -4.402*** 0.224***
(0.0173) (1.200) (0.0220) (0.0235) (1.123) (0.0276)
hh_income_3 0.442*** -10.23*** 0.434*** 0.291*** -5.906*** 0.277***
(0.0176) (1.029) (0.0240) (0.0245) (1.171) (0.0275)
hh_income_4 0.556*** -12.15*** 0.534*** 0.426*** -6.838*** 0.418***
(0.0181) (1.126) (0.0218) (0.0239) (1.099) (0.0291)
hh_income_5 0.756*** -15.00*** 0.719*** 0.599*** -8.061*** 0.580***
(0.0199) (1.355) (0.0272) (0.0240) (1.174) (0.0285)
hh_size -0.0235*** -0.205 -0.0201** -0.0336*** -0.488* -0.0338***
(0.00734) (0.327) (0.00833) (0.0105) (0.282) (0.0112)
YDratio 0.0205 -2.921 -0.0429 -0.180** 1.766 -0.145
(0.0748) (2.679) (0.0807) (0.0846) (2.168) (0.101)
ODratio 0.0528 0.854 0.0409 0.0292 2.372 0.0455
(0.0594) (1.974) (0.0625) (0.0462) (1.464) (0.0507)
employed 0.0595*** 1.290 0.0563*** 0.00277 1.771** 0.00814
(0.0147) (1.111) (0.0165) (0.0214) (0.736) (0.0242)
hukou -0.0181 1.192 -0.0198 -0.112*** -0.0575 -0.106***
(0.0127) (0.838) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.697) (0.0232)
hh_health -0.0168 -1.298* -0.00522 -0.0109 -0.775 -0.0109
(0.0144) (0.705) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.764) (0.0204)
health_insurance 0.00298 -1.973** 0.0112 0.0465 -1.112 0.0674*
(0.0227) (0.883) (0.0284) (0.0293) (1.100) (0.0366)
pension -0.00220 1.332* 0.00602 -0.00722 -0.597 -0.0192
(0.0144) (0.728) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.585) (0.0206)
house_owner -0.0882** 6.180*** -0.179*** 0.0411* 3.493*** 0.0749***
(0.0412) (1.618) (0.0487) (0.0215) (0.949) (0.0273)
boy_number -0.0718** -0.00158 -0.0975** 0.0142 0.0599 -0.00257
(0.0341) (0.959) (0.0452) (0.0402) (0.874) (0.0476)
girl_number -0.0923** -0.385 -0.110** 0.0116 -0.507 -0.00326
(0.0374) (1.144) (0.0466) (0.0435) (0.999) (0.0512)
childage_04 0.0855** 1.940 0.122*** 0.0249 1.043 0.0205
(0.0379) (1.255) (0.0430) (0.0483) (1.008) (0.0563)
childage_59 0.0487 1.567 0.101** 0.0135 1.882 0.0256
(0.0427) (1.258) (0.0490) (0.0484) (1.234) (0.0531)
childage_1014 0.0605 1.106 0.0904* 0.0312 0.527 0.0385
(0.0389) (1.321) (0.0460) (0.0503) (1.142) (0.0579)
childage_1519 0.0176 0.604 0.0538 -0.0362 0.770 -0.0363
(0.0381) (1.228) (0.0446) (0.0475) (1.085) (0.0559)
age 0.00428 -0.00525 0.00471 0.00475 0.403*** 0.0121***
(0.00483) (0.218) (0.00566) (0.00380) (0.115) (0.00424)
age2 -1.06e-05 0.00188 -2.57e-05 -3.58e-05 -0.00260** -0.000101***
(5.21e-05) (0.00244) (5.97e-05) (3.60e-05) (0.00106) (3.83e-05)
gender 0.0197 0.0995 0.0145 0.0294 -1.200* 0.0385*
(0.0139) (0.874) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.656) (0.0220)
married -0.0200 -1.114 -0.0323 -0.0685*** 0.886 -0.0737***
(0.0175) (1.606) (0.0245) (0.0231) (0.828) (0.0270)
ccp_member 0.00140 -2.071** -0.0103 -0.0602*** 0.229 -0.0614***
(0.0221) (0.992) (0.0326) (0.0225) (0.765) (0.0227)
yos -0.00793*** 0.274*** -0.00717*** -0.00764*** 0.283** -0.00737***
(0.00196) (0.0974) (0.00230) (0.00202) (0.115) (0.00236)
hh_credit -0.108*** 2.797*** -0.0980*** -0.00521 1.653** 0.00170
(0.0130) (0.848) (0.0146) (0.0166) (0.749) (0.0182)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.110 17.19*** 0.0745 -0.189* 4.290 -0.386***
(0.116) (5.056) (0.140) (0.105) (4.401) (0.131)
Observations 6,849 6,849 6,849 3,235 3,235 3,235
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for
bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.5: The poor are more likely to face liquidity constraints
(a) CHFS 2015 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (f.a. measure) (2) (f.a. measure) (3) (cc measure ) (4) (cc measure )
(3 years avg. inc.) (3 years avg. inc.)
hh_income_1 0.100*** 0.120*** 0.270*** 0.174***
(0.0200) (0.0239) (0.00906) (0.0143)
hh_income_2 0.0900*** 0.0685*** 0.229*** 0.160***
(0.0185) (0.0202) (0.00886) (0.0137)
hh_income_3 0.0545*** 0.0448** 0.188*** 0.119***
(0.0171) (0.0215) (0.00922) (0.0148)
hh_income_4 0.0204 0.00889 0.130*** 0.0723***
(0.0164) (0.0199) (0.00969) (0.0149)
hh_size 0.0116** 0.0102 3.34e-05 -0.0273***
(0.00505) (0.00652) (0.00599) (0.00682)
YDratio -0.0653 -0.133* -0.229*** -0.246***
(0.0583) (0.0746) (0.0570) (0.0677)
ODratio -0.0210 -0.0202 0.120*** 0.134**
(0.0390) (0.0501) (0.0463) (0.0550)
employed -0.0178 -0.0172 0.0100 -0.0246
(0.0121) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0168)
hukou -0.0830*** -0.0769*** -0.0883*** -0.0949***
(0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0123) (0.0142)
hh_health 0.0661*** 0.0775*** 0.00966 0.0341***
(0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0111) (0.0122)
health_insurance -0.0331* -0.0579** -0.0275 -0.0117
(0.0182) (0.0240) (0.0168) (0.0232)
pension -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.0702*** -0.0844***
(0.0131) (0.0168) (0.0134) (0.0154)
house_owner -0.0219 0.0493 -0.0428 -0.0591
(0.0489) (0.0606) (0.0385) (0.0649)
age 0.00323 0.0122** -0.0167*** 0.000654
(0.00355) (0.00509) (0.00386) (0.00556)
age2 -1.60e-05 -0.000102* 0.000264*** 8.48e-05
(3.84e-05) (5.47e-05) (4.39e-05) (6.19e-05)
gender -0.0257** -0.0136 0.0128 0.00724
(0.0106) (0.0137) (0.00933) (0.0127)
married -0.0461*** -0.0512** 0.00962 0.00916
(0.0159) (0.0213) (0.0159) (0.0214)
ccp_member -0.0104 0.0461 -0.0346** -0.00545
(0.0139) (0.0285) (0.0162) (0.0263)
yos -0.0191*** -0.0165*** -0.0273*** -0.0271***
(0.00158) (0.00196) (0.00174) (0.00214)
Province FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,236 6,849 11,236 6,849
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.5: The poor are more likely to face liquidity constraints continued
(b) CFPS 2014 Urban and CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (f.a. measure) (2) (f.a. measure) (3) (f.a. measure) (4) (f.a. measure)
(3 years avg. inc.) (3 years avg. inc.)
hh_income_1 0.232*** 0.195*** 0.135*** 0.145***
(0.0300) (0.0349) (0.0303) (0.0272)
hh_income_2 0.204*** 0.136** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.0270) (0.0532) (0.0248) (0.0246)
hh_income_3 0.0927*** 0.128*** 0.0412* 0.0441**
(0.0274) (0.0327) (0.0232) (0.0204)
hh_income_4 0.0553** 0.0547* 0.0658*** 0.0569**
(0.0268) (0.0303) (0.0219) (0.0234)
hh_size 0.00322 0.00866 0.0178*** 0.0196***
(0.00701) (0.00814) (0.00639) (0.00631)
YDratio -2.40e-05 -0.0263 -0.00654 -0.00428
(0.0489) (0.0642) (0.0409) (0.0403)
ODratio -0.0455 -0.0547 -0.0574** -0.0594**
(0.0370) (0.0426) (0.0277) (0.0273)
employed -0.0212 -0.0124 -0.0208 -0.0200
(0.0215) (0.0248) (0.0149) (0.0149)
hukou -0.0822*** -0.0935*** 0.0251 0.0231
(0.0236) (0.0247) (0.0182) (0.0184)
hh_health 0.0720*** 0.0741*** 0.0374** 0.0358**
(0.0196) (0.0230) (0.0162) (0.0163)
health_insurance -0.0314 -0.0451 0.000329 0.000341
(0.0282) (0.0373) (0.000554) (0.000547)
pension -0.00806 -0.0127 -0.00342 -0.00328
(0.0193) (0.0242) (0.00235) (0.00232)
house_owner -0.0280 -0.0180 -0.0388 -0.0314
(0.0203) (0.0244) (0.0368) (0.0357)
age 0.00651* 0.00988** -0.00440 -0.00436
(0.00341) (0.00492) (0.00285) (0.00280)
age2 -5.63e-05* -7.73e-05* 3.43e-05 3.53e-05
(3.42e-05) (4.52e-05) (2.71e-05) (2.66e-05)
gender 0.00215 0.0384* -0.00287 -0.00460
(0.0181) (0.0220) (0.0132) (0.0132)
married -0.0412* -0.0683** 0.0211 0.0187
(0.0251) (0.0308) (0.0178) (0.0176)
ccp_member -0.0247 -0.0431* 0.0128 0.0132
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0139) (0.0139)
yos -0.00483** -0.00748*** -0.00162 -0.00107
(0.00231) (0.00269) (0.00195) (0.00197)
Province FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,387 3,016 4,907 4,898
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.6: The effect of liquidity constraints on the household saving rate
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(cc measure ) (cc measure) (f.a. measure) (f.a. measure) (f.a. measure ) (f.a. measure)
credit × 2015 -0.278*** -0.114*** -0.263*** -0.212*** -0.264** -0.240**
(0.0775) (0.0357) (0.0673) (0.0440) (0.118) (0.230)
credit -0.0942* -0.194*** 0.0192 -0.0486* 0.0114 -0.0688***
(0.0548) (0.0421) (0.0335) (0.0252) (0.0398) (0.0251)
2015 -0.279*** -0.130*** 0.0783 -0.0190 -0.244*** -0.159***
(0.0368) (0.0257) (0.0494) (0.0357) (0.0437) (0.0252)
income 2.13e-06*** 1.93e-06*** 9.27e-06***
(3.44e-07) (2.84e-07) (1.04e-06)
loginc 0.756*** 0.778*** 0.798***
(0.0159) (0.0181) (0.00912)
hh_size 0.160*** -0.0408*** 0.161*** -0.0421*** 0.0794*** -0.131***
(0.0175) (0.0121) (0.0188) (0.0153) (0.0201) (0.0102)
YDratio -0.0321 -0.147 -0.0937 -0.197 -0.242 -0.475***
(0.220) (0.166) (0.240) (0.188) (0.169) (0.105)
ODratio -0.304*** -0.00651 -0.736*** -0.224* -0.0933 0.158***
(0.0679) (0.0527) (0.159) (0.116) (0.0775) (0.0459)
employed 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.236*** 0.204*** 0.103*** 0.0794***
(0.0411) (0.0307) (0.0441) (0.0341) (0.0350) (0.0209)
hukou 0.0755** -0.243*** 0.0714* -0.132*** -0.0817** -0.321***
(0.0367) (0.0297) (0.0405) (0.0326) (0.0369) (0.0232)
hh_health -0.180*** -0.0564** -0.181*** -0.0539* -0.0880*** -0.0112
(0.0348) (0.0277) (0.0377) (0.0292) (0.0310) (0.0184)
health_insurance 0.0278 -0.0900** 0.0601 -0.0523 -0.0136 -0.0429
(0.0602) (0.0422) (0.0601) (0.0422) (0.0526) (0.0300)
pension 0.248*** -0.0102 0.266*** -0.00377 -0.0313 -0.0161
(0.0381) (0.0287) (0.0399) (0.0311) (0.0395) (0.0242)
house_owner 0.0249 0.0960*** -0.0313 0.0146 0.156*** 0.0554*
(0.0487) (0.0363) (0.0527) (0.0369) (0.0501) (0.0295)
boy_number -0.164** -0.155** -0.199** -0.151** -0.0608* -0.00537
(0.0747) (0.0604) (0.0778) (0.0639) (0.0358) (0.0228)
girl_number -0.152* -0.150** -0.172** -0.151** -0.0185 -0.0118
(0.0829) (0.0668) (0.0871) (0.0712) (0.0400) (0.0241)
childage_04 -0.0540 0.148** -0.0440 0.144* -0.133** 0.135***
(0.0895) (0.0708) (0.0970) (0.0779) (0.0545) (0.0340)
childage_59 -0.0474 0.141** -0.0122 0.150* -0.116** 0.120***
(0.0908) (0.0702) (0.0986) (0.0767) (0.0522) (0.0328)
childage_1014 -0.0915 0.110 -0.0632 0.132 -0.0390 0.145***
(0.0948) (0.0749) (0.102) (0.0819) (0.0589) (0.0383)
childage_1519 -0.0888 0.0194 -0.0768 0.0236 -0.101** -0.00102
(0.0889) (0.0699) (0.0938) (0.0742) (0.0393) (0.0262)
age -0.00552 0.0179*** 0.0198 0.0160 0.0183** 0.0325***
(0.00830) (0.00683) (0.0134) (0.0104) (0.00858) (0.00490)
age2 0.000127 -4.37e-05 -0.000165 -2.41e-05 -0.000144* -0.000224***
(7.78e-05) (6.45e-05) (0.000143) (0.000111) (7.92e-05) (4.49e-05)
gender 0.00717 -0.0195 0.0641 0.0198 0.0496** 0.0690***
(0.0380) (0.0290) (0.0406) (0.0325) (0.0208) (0.0150)
married -0.150*** -0.278*** -0.121** -0.248*** -0.0555 -0.0759***
(0.0513) (0.0384) (0.0574) (0.0448) (0.0435) (0.0248)
ccp_member -0.122 -0.0565 -0.141 -0.105 -0.0446 -0.127***
(0.0911) (0.0604) (0.0970) (0.0642) (0.0508) (0.0314)
yos 0.0170*** -0.0146*** 0.0106* -0.0253*** -0.00382 -0.0161***
(0.00466) (0.00362) (0.00541) (0.00436) (0.00370) (0.00227)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.787*** -8.220*** -1.294*** -8.309*** -4.58e-06** -8.785***
(0.260) (0.254) (0.329) (0.300) (1.91e-06) (0.211)
Observations 9,588 9,588 7,024 7,024 7,209 7,209
R-squared 0.231 0.558 0.243 0.576 0.237 0.579
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors in paren-
theses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.7: The effect of income inequality on the aggregate household saving rate
CHFS 2015 Urban CFPS 2014 Urban CHIP 2013 Urban
VARIABLES county_savingrate county_savingrate county_savingrate county_savingrate county_savingrate county_savingrate
county gini 0.198* 0.176** 0.135 0.139 0.0188 0.00636
(0.115) (0.0710) (0.413) (0.412) (0.126) (0.125)
logcounty_pc_inc 0.322*** 0.329*** 0.00946* 0.00967* 0.0962*** 0.107***
(0.0178) (0.0201) (0.00535) (0.00599) (0.0223) (0.0229)
county_YDratio 0.353 -0.0237 0.277
(0.330) (0.0967) (0.177)
county_ODratio 0.583** 0.0354 -0.104
(0.283) (0.0744) (0.151)
Constant -3.093*** -3.290*** 0.0301 0.0284 -0.637*** -0.761***
(0.178) (0.225) (0.173) (0.189) (0.241) (0.251)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 353 353 334 334 212 212
R-squared 0.521 0.527 0.227 0.227 0.152 0.169
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for
bootstrapped median regression.
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Table A.8: The estimates of marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income
(a) CHFS Urban
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
VARIABLES hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump
hh_per_income 0.788*** 0.610*** 0.374* 0.541*** 0.223**
(0.112) (0.135) (0.191) (0.125) (0.0889)
hh_tran_income 0.788*** 0.611*** 0.364* 0.507*** 0.178*
(0.112) (0.135) (0.191) (0.127) (0.0952)
hh_netasset 0.00258 0.00267 0.00552*** 0.00378* 0.00755***
(0.00178) (0.00189) (0.00184) (0.00203) (0.00108)
hh_size 1,845*** 2,256*** 1,928** -455.1 7,738**
(520.1) (746.1) (964.9) (1,603) (2,975)
YDratio 3,356 3,752 7,838 728.0 -53,291***
(5,460) (5,902) (9,017) (9,438) (19,647)
ODratio 255.8 1,937 -6,332** -8,972 -6,840
(1,664) (3,839) (2,968) (6,439) (13,406)
employed -835.8 -3,095 -5,642 -3,028 3,586
(1,155) (2,406) (3,619) (4,439) (6,465)
hukou 1,115 1,618 3,557 -5,127 4,924
(1,020) (1,945) (2,923) (4,383) (6,983)
hh_health 468.2 600.7 5,046* 5,281 13,002
(1,252) (1,763) (2,840) (4,557) (8,132)
health_insurance 818.5 -5,301* 5,876 10,938** -37,742
(2,548) (2,983) (5,334) (4,575) (26,362)
pension 107.5 -1,709 -354.5 8,811*** 15,302
(1,528) (2,093) (5,229) (3,223) (13,844)
house_owner 963.7 6,240 10,855** -11,075
(2,840) (10,370) (4,182) (25,768)
age -309.7 -405.6 -2,064** -1,498 550.6
(311.6) (758.6) (949.9) (922.6) (2,172)
age2 2.048 1.537 15.82* 12.43 -9.408
(2.641) (6.461) (8.723) (7.890) (19.29)
gender -2,579* -2,514 -1,020 1,485 18,535
(1,311) (2,731) (3,287) (4,034) (12,512)
married 3,402** 3,223 6,112** 6,899 4,335
(1,501) (2,730) (2,465) (7,658) (8,798)
ccp_member 2,003 7,668 -9,152 -10,602* 1,014
(3,108) (4,754) (10,935) (6,198) (12,878)
yos 201.1 393.1 -329.7 1,042** 19.43
(233.7) (388.4) (400.1) (443.0) (1,212)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 3,139 16,225 51,066* 48,290 6,421
(10,747) (23,458) (27,895) (39,625) (83,059)
Observations 294 436 479 476 488
R-squared 0.650 0.220 0.222 0.228 0.238
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
111
Table A.8: The estimates of marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income con-
tinued
(b) CFPS Urban
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
VARIABLES hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump
hh_per_income 0.874*** 0.347** 0.831*** 0.486** 0.393***
(0.102) (0.169) (0.198) (0.208) (0.126)
hh_tran_income 0.927*** 0.361* 0.739*** 0.477** 0.336***
(0.0985) (0.187) (0.203) (0.206) (0.125)
hh_netasset 0.00410** 0.00453 0.00425 0.00102 0.00764**
(0.00159) (0.00360) (0.00343) (0.00196) (0.00369)
hh_size 879.4* 1,423** 1,621 2,557** -840.1
(489.1) (672.4) (1,050) (989.1) (2,085)
YDratio -1,503 -4,587 1,425 8,354 23,179
(3,648) (5,285) (6,333) (9,386) (17,154)
ODratio 776.4 -4,393 1,852 -6,132 -6,818
(1,785) (3,251) (5,194) (6,606) (19,803)
employed -692.5 -1,254 3,645 5,278 8,038
(978.3) (2,234) (3,030) (3,654) (6,518)
hukou 831.1 4,431** 3,471 7,554** 14,384**
(1,014) (1,708) (2,131) (3,533) (6,118)
hh_health -716.9 -363.0 2,192 -429.5 -2,001
(749.6) (1,979) (2,406) (3,483) (5,962)
health_insurance -94.29 624.9 38.74 -9,354 -8,738
(1,407) (2,759) (2,618) (6,569) (8,984)
pension 1,007 -1,382 -1,900 251.4 9,983*
(1,016) (2,184) (2,435) (2,971) (5,519)
house_owner -2,441** -3,162 -4,790 860.8 -3,897
(1,155) (2,573) (3,417) (3,256) (7,581)
age -310.8 -565.2 -1.083 -979.6 -918.4
(325.9) (416.9) (551.5) (831.7) (1,486)
age2 1.740 4.446 -0.978 11.08 11.59
(2.735) (3.716) (4.861) (7.028) (12.55)
gender 905.9 -2,282 -849.3 -5,015 -1,582
(784.4) (1,980) (2,426) (3,648) (6,571)
married -1,966* 5,344** -40.79 9,584** 14,149**
(1,070) (2,071) (2,749) (4,458) (5,956)
ccp_member 1,470 3,282 2,242 2,882 -461.7
(1,513) (2,064) (3,024) (3,230) (6,547)
yos 146.4 121.6 768.0*** 347.7 133.1
(129.8) (190.0) (265.2) (337.8) (770.2)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 22,369** 19,787 11,894 16,818 29,539
(10,159) (14,757) (21,953) (28,023) (47,455)
Observations 359 489 546 572 494
R-squared 0.557 0.216 0.226 0.162 0.204
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
112
Table A.8: The estimates of marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income con-
tinued
(c) CHIP Urban
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
VARIABLES hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump hh_consump
hh_per_income 0.613*** 0.623*** 0.510*** 0.346*** 0.233***
(0.0287) (0.0707) (0.0827) (0.0871) (0.0806)
hh_tran_income 0.563*** 0.502*** 0.453*** 0.308*** 0.0167
(0.0732) (0.111) (0.107) (0.101) (0.111)
hh_netasset 0.00258 -0.00342 0.00283 0.000505 0.00129
(0.00338) (0.00523) (0.00306) (0.00378) (0.00356)
hh_size 400.5 556.1 679.0 1,246* 1,052
(264.7) (414.3) (559.5) (683.8) (1,234)
YDratio 940.3 1,880 8,397** -2,443 11,196
(1,524) (2,736) (3,752) (5,187) (8,620)
ODratio -475.2 -3,291** -1,227 -5,937* -16,334**
(991.9) (1,594) (2,141) (3,374) (6,964)
employed -1,458** -1,731* -2,714* -2,834 -4,635
(638.1) (1,042) (1,384) (1,827) (4,941)
hukou -1,325** 80.83 1,145 -366.2 6,422
(626.6) (998.8) (1,439) (1,870) (4,076)
hh_health 777.7* 2,542** 1,204 5,521*** 1,689
(458.1) (997.9) (1,389) (1,882) (4,341)
health_insurance 148.1 6.603 61.08 102.8 72.48
(115.5) (56.30) (92.83) (63.91) (178.4)
pension -32.62 -8.11 14.03 43.11 879.7
(78.36) (156.2) (41.50) (169.0) (549.1)
house_owner -649.5 119.0 -143.1 2,579 323.7
(992.3) (2,177) (2,818) (4,149) (8,969)
age -70.71 -173.2 146.3 134.9 1,110**
(133.4) (224.0) (257.9) (411.2) (449.7)
age2 -0.0399 1.116 -1.415 -1.741 -7.981*
(1.322) (2.171) (2.526) (3.944) (4.668)
gender -348.6 -165.2 -1,901 -2,882* -5,462**
(636.8) (861.6) (1,275) (1,575) (2,609)
married 502.3 724.7 102.3 -2,231 -4,509
(632.4) (1,475) (1,539) (2,792) (4,368)
ccp_member -265.5 297.8 1,392 160.3 1,592
(634.0) (848.8) (1,003) (1,608) (2,260)
yos 108.2 339.4*** 480.4*** 850.1*** 1,617***
(86.61) (123.5) (172.5) (224.7) (489.5)
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 8,524** 4,150 -634.0 12,734 1,985
(3,964) (8,733) (8,572) (15,165) (22,473)
Observations 1,214 1,205 1,236 1,236 1,240
R-squared 0.363 0.122 0.098 0.074 0.237
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (cluster at county level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 2.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 500 times for bootstrapped median regression.
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APPENDIX B
INCENTIVES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN A+B PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of lemma 1
At the beginning of the construction stage, when there is a realized shock ε, the contractor
chooses optimal actual working days xA to minimize the realized total cost (1 +ε)C(xA, θ) +
K(xA, xB; i, d), where K(xA, xB, i, d) = I(xA < xB) · i · (xA−xB) + I(xA > xB) ·d · (xA−xB).
Intuitively, because of the daily incentive for the early completion and the daily disincentive
for the delay completion, there are two critical points for the shock ε in the support, such
that
−(1 + εi)C1(xB, θ) = i (B.1)
−(1 + εd)C1(xB, θ) = d (B.2)
for any given xB, where εi < εd since i < d and C1(·, θ) < 0. Notice that if the contractor
completes the construction based on the bidding days, that is xA = xB, then the realized total
costs, denoted as TC0, equals (1 + ε)C(xB, θ). Depending on the realization of uncertainty
ε, there are three scenarios:
Scenarios (I): The shock is “positive”, namely ε ∈ (−1, εi).
(i) If the contractor chooses to delay to complete the project, xA > xB, then the realized
total costs, denoted as TC+, equals (1+ε)C(xA, θ)+d ·(xA−xB). Taking difference between
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TC0 and TC+, we have:
TC0 − TC+ = (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)−
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) + d · (xA − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)
[
C(xB, θ)− C(xA, θ)
]
− (1 + εd)C1(xB, θ) · (xB − xA)
= (1 + ε)C1(x˜, θ) · (xB − xA)− (1 + εd)C1(xB, θ) · (xB − xA)
=
[
(1 + ε)C1(x˜, θ)− (1 + ε)C1(xB, θ) + (1 + ε)C1(xB, θ)− (1 + εd)C1(xB, θ)
]
· (xB − xA)
=
{
(1 + ε)
[
C1(x˜, θ)− C1(xB, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ (ε− εd)C1(xB, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
}
· (xB − xA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
namely, TC0 < TC+, which implies that any choice of delay completion is worse than on-
time completion. The second equality is due to plug in the Equation B.2; the third equality is
obtained by the Mean-Value theorem where xB < x˜ < xA; the first part in the sixth equality
is positive by the assumption of the convexity of the cost function and the lower bound of
the shock is −1; the second part is positive because ε < εi < εd and the assumption that
the cost function is decreasing in working days; the last part is negative under the condition
that xA < xB.
(ii) If the contractor completes the project earlier than the bidding days, that is, xA < xB,
then total realized costs, denoted as TC−, equals (1 + ε)C(xA, θ) + i · (xA − xB). Consider
xA = xi such that − (1 + ε)C1(xi, θ) = i, (B.3)
combing above equation with Equation B.1, we have xi < xB because the assumption of the
convexity of the cost function and ε < εi. Let TCi denote the total costs evaluates at xi.
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Taking difference between TCi and TC0, we have
TCi − TC0 =
[
(1 + ε)C(xi, θ) + i · (xi − xB)
]
− (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)
= (1 + ε)C(xi, θ)− (1 + ε)C1(xi, θ) · (xi − xB)− (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)
= (1 + ε)
[
C(xi, θ)− C(xB, θ)− C1(xi, θ) · (xi − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)
[
C1(x
′, θ) · (xi − xB)− C1(xi, θ) · (xi − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
C1(x
′, θ)− C1(xi, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
· (xi − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
namely, TCi < TC0, which implies that early completion at xi is better than on-time
completion. The second equality is obtained by plugging in the Equation B.3; the fourth
equality is because the Mean-Value theorem where xi < x′ < xB; the first part in the fifth
equality is positive due to ε > 1, and the second part is positive because of the assumption
of the convexity for the cost function. Next, notice that Equation B.3 is also the first-order-
condition (F.O.C) for the optimal working days conditional on early completion, therefore
xA = xi < xB is the optimal working days given the construction shock is “positive” (i.e.,
ε < εi).
Scenarios (II): The shock is “negative”, namely ε > εd. Applying similar arguments as
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above, we have
TC0 − TC− = (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)−
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) + i · (xA − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)
[
C(xB, θ)− C(xA, θ)
]
− (1 + εi)C1(xB, θ) · (xB − xA)
= (1 + ε)C1(x˜, θ) · (xB − xA)− (1 + εi)C1(xB, θ) · (xB − xA)
=
[
(1 + ε)C1(x˜, θ)− (1 + εi)C1(xB, θ)
]
· (xB − xA)
=
[
(1 + ε)C1(x˜, θ)− (1 + ε)C1(xB, θ) + (1 + ε)C1(xB, θ)− (1 + εi)C1(xB, θ)
]
· (xB − xA)
=
{
(1 + ε)
[
C1(x˜, θ)− C1(xB, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ (ε− εi)C1(xB, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
}
· (xB − xA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
for early completion, namely xA < xB, and
TCd − TC0 =
[
(1 + ε)C(xd, θ) + i · (xd − xB)
]
− (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)
= (1 + ε)C(xd, θ)− (1 + ε)C1(xd, θ) · (xd − xB)− (1 + ε)C(xB, θ)
= (1 + ε)
[
C(xd, θ)− C(xB, θ)− C1(xd, θ) · (xi − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)
[
C1(x
′′, θ) · (xd − xB)− C1(xd, θ) · (xd − xB)
]
= (1 + ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
C1(x
′′, θ)− C1(xd, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
· (xd − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
for delay completion at xA = xd < xB, where xd satisfies the F.O.C −(1 + ε)C1(xd, θ) = d.
Thus, under a negative shock to construction cost function, the contractor will delay to
complete the project at xd.
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Scenarios (III): The shock is “normal”, namely εi ≤ ε ≤ εd. We have
TC0 − TC− =
{
(1 + ε)
[
C1(x˜, θ)− C1(xB, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ (ε− εi)C1(xB, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
}
· (xB − xA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
and
TC0 − TC+ =
{
(1 + ε)
[
C1(x˜, θ)− C1(xB, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ (ε− εd)C1(xB, θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
}
· (xB − xA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
which implies that in this case the contractor will choose actual working days not to deviate
bidding days. 
Proof under the case without uncertainties
Without construction uncertainty in the execution stage, the contractor chooses optimal
actual working days xA to minimize the realized total cost C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d), where
K(xA, xB, i, d) = 1(xA < xB) · i · (xA − xB) + 1(xA > xB) · d · (xA − xB). Notice that
whether or not the contractor chooses to deviate bidding days xB solely depend on the level
of xB, whereas in the case with uncertainty, for any level of bidding days xB, the contractor
may deviate depending on the realization of shocks to cost function. Similar to the case with
uncertainty, because of the daily incentive for the early completion and the daily disincentive
for the delay completion, there are two critical level of bidding days such that:
−C1(x˜i, θ) = i (B.4)
−C1(x˜d, θ) = d (B.5)
where x˜d < x˜i due to the convexity of the cost function and the assumption of d > i. The
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two values partition bidding days into three interval: (i) xB < x˜d, (ii) x˜d ≤ xB ≤ x˜i, and
(iii) xB > x˜i.
Case (i): If xB < x˜d, consider xA = x˜d, we have
T˜C
d − TC0 =
[
C(x˜d, θ) + d · (x˜d − xB)
]
− C(xB, θ)
= C(x˜d, θ)− C(xB, θ)− C1(x˜d, θ) · (x˜d − xB)
= C1(x˜
′, θ) · (x˜d − xB)− C1(x˜d, θ) · (x˜d − xB)
=
[
C1(x˜
′, θ)− C1(x˜d, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
· (x˜d − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
where xB < x˜′ < x˜d. This implies, along with the Equation B.5, that optimal actual working
days will be longer than bidding days and will be set equal to x˜d. The second equality is
obtained by plugging in the Equation B.5, and the third equality is achieved by Mean-Value
Theorem. The first part in the fourth equality is negative due to the convexity of the cost
function.
Case (ii): If x˜d ≤ xB ≤ x˜i, consider xA = xB, then following similar arguments, for any
x˜A < xB, we have
TC0 − T˜C− = C(xB, θ)−
[
C(x˜A, θ) + i · (x˜A − xB)
]
= C(xB, θ)− C(x˜A, θ)− C1(x˜i, θ) · (xB − x˜A)
= C1(x˜
′′, θ) · (xB − x˜A)− C1(x˜i, θ) · (xB − x˜A)
=
[
C1(x˜
′′, θ)− C1(x˜i, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
· (xB − x˜A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
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where x˜A < x˜′′ < xB; and for any x˜A > xB, we have
TC0 − T˜C+ = C(xB, θ)−
[
C(x˜A, θ) + d · (x˜A − xB)
]
= C(xB, θ)− C(x˜A, θ)− C1(x˜d, θ) · (xB − x˜A)
= C1(x˜
′′′, θ) · (xB − x˜A)− C1(x˜d, θ) · (xB − x˜A)
=
[
C1(x˜
′′′, θ)− C1(x˜d, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
· (xB − x˜A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
where xB < x˜′′′ < x˜A. Thus, when bidding days xB ∈ [x˜d, x˜i], the contractor has no incentive
to deviate to complete the project.
Case (iii): If xB > x˜i, consider xA = x˜i, we have
T˜C
i − TC0 =
[
C(x˜i, θ) + i · (x˜i − xB)
]
− C(xB, θ)
= C(x˜i, θ)− C(xB, θ)− C1(x˜i, θ) · (x˜i − xB)
= C1(x˜
′′′′, θ) · (x˜i − xB)− C1(x˜i, θ) · (x˜i − xB)
=
[
C1(x˜
′′′′, θ)− C1(x˜i, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
· (x˜i − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
where x˜i < x˜′′′′ < xB. This implies, along with the Equation B.4, that optimal actual
working days will be shorter than bidding days and will be set equal to x˜i.
In summary, actual working days will depend on which interval bidding days lie in. Next,
what bidding days the contractor will quote in the competition stage? Without uncertainty,
optimal bidding days will be solved by the following minimization problem (by the argument
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in Proposition 2):
xB
∗
= argmin
xB
{
cux
B +
[
C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]}
. (B.6)
Let P˜ V denote cux˜B +
[
C(xA, θ) +K(xA, x˜B; i, d)
]
, where x˜B satisfies −C1(x˜B, θ) = cu.
Notice that x˜d < x˜B < x˜i due to the convexity of the cost function and the assumption that
i < cu < d, and thus xA = x˜B and P˜ V = cux˜B + C(x˜B, θ) by the argument above. Now we
can compare the value of objective function in the Equation B.6 at different bidding days.
Denote PV1 and PV2 the value of objective function for any xB < x˜d and for any xB > x˜i,
respectively, we have
P˜ V − PV1 = cux˜B + C(x˜B, θ)−
[
cux
B + C(x˜d, θ) + d · (x˜d − xB)
]
= cu · (x˜B − x˜d + x˜d − xB) + C(x˜B, θ)− C(x˜d, θ)− d · (x˜d − xB)
= cu · (x˜B − x˜d) + cu · (x˜d − xB) + C1(x¯, θ) · (x˜B − x˜d)− d · (x˜d − xB)
=
[
cu + C1(x¯, θ)
]
· (x˜B − x˜d) + (cu − d) · (x˜d − xB)
=
[
C1(x¯, θ)− C1(x˜B, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
· (x˜B − x˜d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ (cu − d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
· (x˜d − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
where x˜d < x¯ < x˜B, and
P˜ V − PV2 = cux˜B + C(x˜B, θ)−
[
cux
B + C(x˜i, θ) + i · (x˜i − xB)
]
=
[
C1(x¯
′, θ)− C1(x˜B, θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
· (x˜B − x˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ (cu − i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
· (x˜i − xB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0.
where x˜B < x¯′ < x˜i. Furthermore, P˜ V < cuxB+C(xB, θ), for any xB ∈ [x˜d, x˜i] and xB 6= x˜B.
Therefore, without construction uncertainties, the contractor will bid working days at x˜B in
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the competition stage and then choose to complete the project on time. 
B.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
Recall the contractor’s optimization problem in the bidding stage after plugging in the
working decision function xA∗(θ, ε) to response the realization of uncertainty ε for any bidding
days xB
max
pB ,xB
{
pB − Emin
xA
[
(1 + ε)C(xA, θ) +K(xA, xB; i, d)
]}
Pr
(
win
∣∣∣ S = s),
subject to s = pB+cuxB. First, we show that the equilibrium bidding days can be determined
separately from the choice of score, and each contractor sets the bidding days according to
the Equation (3.8). Suppose the contractor with type θ bids (p˜B, x˜B) where x˜B 6= xB∗ . By
choosing the bidding days equal to xB∗ , we can show that the contractor can always be
better-off if the bidding price is set to be p˜B + cu(x˜B − xB∗). Notice that the scores are
exactly same in both cases since p˜B + cu(x˜B − xB∗) + cuxB∗ = p˜B + cux˜B. The difference
between their expected payoff
{
pi(p˜B + cu(x˜
B − xB∗), xB∗)− pi(pB∗ , xB∗)
}
Pr(win | S = s)
=
{
p˜B + cu(x˜
B − xB∗)− E[C(xA∗ , θ, ε)− ρ · (xB∗ − xA∗)]
− p˜B + E[C(x˜A, θ, ε)− ρ · (x˜B − x˜A)]}Pr(win | S = s)
=
{(
cux˜
B + E
[
C(x˜A, θ, ε)− ρ · (x˜B − x˜A)])
−
(
cux
B∗ + E
[
C(xA
∗
, θ, ε)− ρ · (xB∗ − xA∗)])}Pr(win | S = s)
>0.
The last inequality holds following by the Equation (3.6) and the argument shown in Che
(1993) that the winning probability must be positive.
Next, the optimization problem (3.6) can be solved using the established equilibrium re-
122
sult in standard first-price auctions literature that has established the existence and unique-
ness of a symmetric monotone Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (psBNE) (see, Maskin, 1985).
With the symmetric property that contractors j 6= i using the identical bidding strategy
sj = s(vj), which is a strictly increasing, continuous, and differentiable function of the
pseudo cost, the contractor i’s winning probability Pr(win | S = s) = [1− FV (s−1(si))]N−1.
Then the first order condition of optimization problem (3.6) yields
− (N − 1)(s∗i − vi)[1− FV (s−1(s∗i ))]N−2fV (s−1(s∗i ))
1
s′(s−1(s∗i ))
+ [1− FV (s−1(s∗i ))]N−1 = 0.
(B.7)
At a symmetric equilibrium, s∗i = s∗(vi), Equation (B.7) reduces to a differential equation
(here, drop the i subscript)
d
{
[1− FV (v)]N−1s∗(v)
}
=− (N − 1)s∗(v)[1− FV (v)]N−2fV (v) + [1− FV (v)]N−1s∗′(v)
=− (N − 1)v[1− FV (v)]N−2fV (v)]′
=vd
{
[1− FV (v)]N−1
}
.
Integrating by part with boundary condition s(v) = 0 yields
s∗(v) = v −
∫ v
v
[
1− FV (v˜)
1− FV (v)
]N−1
dv˜. (B.8)
If θ is scalar, by the envelope theorem, dv = EC2(xA
∗
, θ, ε)dθ, and it is strictly increasing
in θ. We have FV (v) = Pr(V (θ) ≤ v) = Pr(θ ≤ V −1(v)) = FΘ(V −1(v)) = FΘ(θ). Changing
integration interval to [θ, θ] for θ
s∗(v) = v −
∫ θ
θ
EC2(xA
∗
, θ, ε)
[
1− FΘ(θ˜)
1− FΘ(θ)
]N−1
dθ˜. (B.9)
Then Equation (3.7) and (3.8) can be obtained by substituting the formula of score rule
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and plugging the definition of pseudo cost into Equation (B.8) and (B.9) respectively. 
B.1.3 Proof of proposition 3
By Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2015), Assumption 4 and 5 imply that the identified set
for g(·, ·), denoted as G∗ can be characterized as
G∗ ≡ {g ∈ G : (g−1(X, V ), U) ⊥ W}, (B.10)
where g−1(x, ·) denotes the inverse of g with respect to θ, and U ≡ FX|W (·) is the conditional
rank of X. In the following proof, we focus on the case where the instrumental variable W
is binary, i.e., W = {0, 1}. The proof for the case of continuous W is technically easier and
can be found in Torgovitsky (2015).
By Assumption 5, θ ⊥ W |U . Also since V |X = x,W = w and X|W = w are assumed
to be continuously distributed for all x and w, the events [X = x,W = w] and [U =
FX|W (x|w),W = w] are equivalent with each other for x ∈ X ow ≡ int supp(X|W = w).
These two conditions together imply that if
FX|W (x1|w1) = FX|W (x2|w2) = u for x1 ∈ X ow1 and x2 ∈ X ow2 ,
then
FΘ|X,W (θ|X = x1,W = w1) = FΘ|X,W (θ|X = x2,W = w2) = FΘ|U(θ|U = u).
Thus, the differences between V |X = x1,W = w1 and V |X = x2,W = w2 are solely
due to the direct effect of g∗ on V when X is shifted from x1 to x2. Since the pseudo-type
v is strictly increasing in θ, this direct effect can be isolated. Specifically, if v ∈ Vox1,w1 ≡
int supp(V |X = x1,W = w1), then there exists a unique e such that v = g∗(x1, e). If the
change from x1 to x2 does not change the conditional distribution of X given W = w, then
from the discussion above we know the value of g∗(x2, e) can be recovered as
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g∗(x2, e) = F−1Y |X,W (FY |X,W (v|x1, w1)). (B.11)
Following the discussion in Torgovitsky (2015), next we need to show that two things:
First, g∗(x1, e) can be exogenously compared to g∗(x, e) for all x ∈ X . Second, g∗(x2, e) can
be point-identified for a particular e of interest.
Define Ig(x, e) = g−1(x, g∗(x, e)) as a measure of difference between g∗ and any g ∈ G. It
can be easily verified that Ig(x, e) = e if and only if g(x, e) = g∗(x, e). Also by the strictly
monotonicity of v in θ, Ig(x, ·) is strictly increasing. By Assumption 4, if Ig(x, e) is constant
across all x, i.e., Ig(x, e) = Jg(e), then g(x, e) = g∗(x, e) for all (x, θ) ∈ X × Θ and g∗ is
point-identified.
In order to show that Ig(x, e) = Jg(e), suppose g ∈ G∗ and define θg = g−1(X, V ). By
strict monotonicity of v, we haveQΘg |X,W (t|x,w) = g−1(x,QV |X,W (t|x,w)) andQV |X,W (t|x,w) =
g∗(x,QΘ|X,W (t|x,w)). These two conditions together imply that
Ig(x,QΘ|X,W (t|x,w)) = QΘg |X,W (t|x,w). (B.12)
By the conditional independence of θ and θg with W , and the fact that the events
[X = x,W = w] and [U = FX|W (x|w),W = w] are equivalent with each other, the Equation
B.12 can be rewritten as
Ig(x,QΘ|X,W (t|x,w)) = Dg(FX|W (x|w), e) for x ∈ X ow, e ∈ Θox,w (B.13)
and Dg(FX|W (x|w), e) ≡ QΘg |U(FΘ|U(e|u)|u). From the Equation (B.13), if for all e ∈ Θox1,w1 ,
there exist two distinct points (x1, w1) and (x2, w2) in X ×W such that
FX|W (x1|w1) = FX|W (x2|w2),
then Ig(x1, e) = Ig(x2, e). Consequently, Ig(x, e) is not a function of x and the desired
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point-identification result follows directly. To ensure the existence of such two points, we
use a sequencing argument similar to Torgovitsky (2015). Specifically, since the bidding
days can not be negative, with loss of generality we assume that X = Xw = [ξ,∞) with
ξ ≥ 0. Also for ease of exposition we assume that FX|W (x|1) > FX|W (x|0) for all x > ξ and
FX|W (x|1) = FX|W (x|0) for x = ξ, and Θx,w = Θ. Define a mapping pi : X 7→ X such that
pi(x) = QX|W (FX|W (x|0), 1),
which satisfies FX|W (pi(x)|1) = FX|W (x|0). Pick an arbitrary point x0 > ξ and define a
sequence {xn}∞n=0 such that xn+1 = pi(xn). Since
pi(x) = QX|W (FX|W (x|0), 1) < QX|W (FX|W (x|1), 1) = x
for all x ∈ X , the sequence {xn}∞n=0 is decreasing. Therefore by Monotone Convergence
Theorem and the fact that FX|W (x|1) > FX|W (x|0) for all x except x = ξ, limn→∞ xn = ξ.
Figure B.5 in Appendix B.2 provides a graphic illustration of the convergence of sequence
{xn}∞n=0. Then A straightforward application of the Continuous Mapping Theorem implies
that
FX|W
(
lim
n→∞
xn|1
)
= FX|W
(
lim
n→∞
xn|0
)
.
Since Ig(x, e) is continuous and FX|W (pi(x)|1) = FX|W (x|0), again by Continuous Map-
ping Theorem,
Ig(x0, e) = I
g(x1, e) = · · · = Ig(ξ, e). (B.14)
Since x0 is arbitrarily chosen, (B.14) implies that there exist two distinct points (x0, w0)
and (ξ, wξ) such that Ig(x0, e) = Ig(ξ, e) = Jg(e) for all x > ξ and e ∈ Θo. From the previous
discussion we know g∗ is point-identified. 
126
B.1.4 Additional details on the empirical application
Expression of Mˆjk
Mˆjk ≡ cujxBjk − E
[
(1 + εj)C(x
A
jk, θˆjk)− ρj · (xBjk − xAjk)
]
= cujx
B
jk +
∫ εij
−1
[
(1 + εj)C(x
i
jk, θjk)− ij · (xBjk − xijk)
]
dF (εj)
+
∫ εdjk
εijk
[
(1 + εj)C(x
B
jk, θjk)
]
dF (εj)
+
∫ 1
εdjk
[
(1 + εj)C(x
d
jk, θjk)− dj · (xBjk − xdjk)
]
dF (εj).
in which
C(·, θjk) = α(· − xEj )2 + (βθjk + γzjk)(· − xEj ) + φ
xijk =−
1
2α
( ij
1 + εj
+ βθjk + γzjk
)
+ xEj
xdjk =−
1
2α
( dj
1 + εj
+ βθjk + γzjk
)
+ xEj
εijk = − 1−
ij
2α(xBjk − xEj ) + βθjk + γzjk
εdjk = − 1−
dj
2α(xBjk − xEj ) + βθjk + γzjk
ij = awj = acuj
dj = bwj = bcuj
and the parameters satisfy α > 0, β < 0, 0 < λ < 1, and 0 < a < 1 < b.
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B.2 Figures
Figure B.1: Timing of events and the contractor’s decisions
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Figure B.2: Actual working days may deviate from bidding days
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Figure B.3: Actual working days in the case of without uncertainties
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Figure B.4: Inefficiency under uncertainties
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Figure B.5: Illustration of the identification of function g∗
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Figure B.6: Descriptive evidence of discrepancy
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Figure B.7: Density of the residuals
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Figure B.8: Ex-ante and ex-post inefficiency
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Figure B.9: Model fit: bidding days
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Figure B.10: Model fit: actual working days
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B.3 Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
engineer’s costs estimate (million $) 21.90 29.20 0.860 198.0
engineer’s days estimate 313.6 202.8 45 1000
usercost ($) 14815 15367 1800 93985
bidding costs (million $) 19.90 28.20 0.698 178.0
bidding days 190.1 153.4 25 813
actual working days 183.9 139.4 22 696
number of bidders 5.463 2.565 1 14
distance (miles) 65.04 127.8 1.908 802.1
firm capacity (million $) 70.20 77.40 0 285.0
instate contractor (binary) 0.975 0.157 0 1
federal contract (binary) 0.813 0.393 0 1
daily traffic (vehicles) 117768 74062 2525 284000
lane closure fraction (%) 44.9 10.9 25.0 87.5
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Table B.2: The first stage estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.740∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.0625) (0.0756) (0.0783)
Capdummy(>$50M) -0.0584∗ -0.0550∗ -0.0559∗
(0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0310)
Distance/Estimated Bidding Days -0.00645 -0.0299 -0.0311
(0.0252) (0.0413) (0.0413)
Usercost/Estimated Bidding Days 0.0000307 0.000396 0.000405
(0.000212) (0.000275) (0.000279)
In-state Contractor 0.0597 0.0151 0.0153
(0.0548) (0.0671) (0.0673)
Number of Bidders -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗
(0.00314) (0.00318) (0.00318)
Distance 0.0000547 0.0000578
(0.000142) (0.000141)
Usercost -0.00000195∗∗ -0.00000202∗∗
(0.000000823) (0.000000851)
Federal Contract 0.00967
(0.0238)
Observations 424 424 424
R2 0.049 0.057 0.058
Notes: (a) Standard errors in parentheses; (b) ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: The second stage estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.020∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0725) (0.0749)
Capdummy(>$50M) -0.0749∗∗∗ -0.0767∗∗∗ -0.0765∗∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0276) (0.0278)
Distance/Estimated Bidding Score 2696.6∗∗ 1148.0 1155.6
(1189.9) (1280.5) (1307.6)
Usercost/Estimated Bidding Score -9.450 3.744 3.505
(21.13) (20.03) (19.64)
In-state Contractor 0.143∗∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.107∗
(0.0436) (0.0598) (0.0598)
Number of Bidders -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0296∗∗∗
(0.00284) (0.00289) (0.00291)
Distance 0.000123 0.000123
(0.000114) (0.000115)
Usercost -0.00000274∗∗∗ -0.00000273∗∗∗
(0.000000692) (0.000000709)
Federal Contract -0.00214
(0.0255)
Observations 424 424 424
R2 0.176 0.199 0.199
Notes: (a) Standard errors in parentheses; (b) ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Structural estimation results
Parameters Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
α1 202.709∗∗ 193.331∗∗∗ 221.303∗∗∗
(89.447) (54.174) (50.301)
α2 -204761.468∗∗∗ -189668.128∗∗∗ -207967.317∗∗∗
(72359.927) (38137.009) (36231.117)
β1 (distance) -5.766∗∗ -3.073∗∗∗ -2.468∗∗∗
(2.358) (0.875) (0.953)
Cost Function β2 (firm capacity) 46.485 42.343 24.871
(1592.820) (1512.216) (1386.748)
β3 (in-state contractor) -5387.479 -5865.766∗ -3163.878
(5593.719) (3476.555) (3808.598)
β4 (federal contract) -33664.011∗∗∗ -28416.266∗∗∗ -31557.521∗∗∗
(11488.394) (6281.580) (6542.208)
φ 528.504 761.566 183.079
(42134.626) (34286.920) (189628.219)
Incentive/Disincentive a 0.230∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.197∗∗
(0.107) (0.092) (0.093)
b 8.161∗∗∗ 7.355∗∗∗ 7.698∗∗∗
(2.933) (1.593) (1.596)
σ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.029) (0.027)
Notes: (a) Columns (1), (2) and (3) reports estimates based on the first and second stage estimates from specifica-
tions (1), (2) and (3) in Table B.2 and B.3, respectively; (b) Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using 500
bootstrap samples; (c) ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.5: Welfare analysis for the A+B mechanism
Inefficiency Percentage Average Welfare Loss (million $)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Ex-ante Inefficiency 65.33% 66.67% 66.67% 1.536 1.345 1.397
(64.0%, 66.7%) (65.33%, 69.33%) (65.33%, 68.0%) (0.674, 1.891) (0.640, 1.744) (0.612, 1.588)
Ex-post Inefficiency 60.0% 56.0% 53.33% 3.220 3.413 3.746
(52.70%, 97.30%) (51.35%, 95.95%) (51.35%, 95.95%) (2.093, 9.738) (2.405, 10.037) (2.966, 11.194)
Notes: (a) Columns (1), (2) and (3) reports inefficiency percentage and average welfare loss calculated from estimates in specifications (1), (2) and (3) in
Table B.4; (b) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are calculated using 500 bootstrap samples.
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Table B.6: Model fit: regression results
(a) Bidding days
Bidding Days in Data
(1) (2) (3)
Simulated Bidding Days 1.004∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0474) (0.0465)
Constant -2.002 -5.432 -5.833
(8.106) (8.250) (8.102)
Observations 424 424 424
R2 0.784 0.783 0.786
Notes: (a) Columns (1), (2) and (3) reports estimates based on structural estimates from specifications (1),
(2) and (3) in Table B.4, respectively; (b) Standard errors in parentheses; (c) ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
(b) Working days
Actual Working Days in Data
(1) (2) (3)
Simulated Actual Working Days 0.834∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗
(0.0756) (0.0747) (0.0900)
Constant -2.137 -2.966 -0.920
(14.71) (14.62) (16.26)
Observations 75 75 75
R2 0.746 0.739 0.697
Notes: (a) Columns (1), (2) and (3) reports estimates based on structural estimates from specifications (1),
(2) and (3) in Table B.4, respectively; (b) Standard errors in parentheses; (c) ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table B.7: Counterfactual analysis
Current policy Lane rental A design
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Ex-ante Inefficiency Percentage 81.3% 81.5% 81.6% 18.2% 20.1% 21.9% 8.2% 7.8% 10.1%
(73.3%, 88.0%) (73.3%, 89.3%) (74.7%, 88.0%) (13.3%, 21.3%) (16.0%, 25.3%) (17.3%, 26.7%) (5.3%, 10.7%) (5.3%, 10.7%) (6.7%, 13.3%)
Ex-ante Average Welfare Loss (million $) 3.702 3.345 3.622 2.821 2.854 3.287 0.980 0.849 1.166
(2.848, 4.675) (2.621, 3.943) (2.849, 4.615) (1.707, 3.833) (1.959, 3.943) (2.269, 4.500) (0.394, 1.757) (0.351, 1.598) (0.547, 2.060)
Ex-post Inefficiency Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
- - - - - - - - -
Ex-post Average Welfare Loss (million $) 4.580 3.891 3.933 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.281 0.306 0.280
(4.258, 4.948) (3.607, 4.172) (3.689, 4.225) - - - (0.252, 0.324) (0.276, 0.354) (0.250, 0.323)
Notes : (a) Counterfactual welfare analysis under different policies. Current policy is the original A+B contracting design. Lane rental is A+B design with linear incentive contracting. A design
represents time incentive contracting in A design, i.e., bidders only bid price during the auction stage. (b) 95% confidence intervals in parentheses are simulated 500 times.
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